Of the 12 countries that make up South America, at least seven will have right-wing governments by the end of this year (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia). Brazil, which faces elections next October, could retain a progressive government if President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva wins the election, as polls indicate. It would thus remain among the left-wing governments alongside Uruguay, Guyana, and Suriname.

Venezuela has become an unusual case: it remains a dictatorship led by shadowy figures from the left, but the country is controlled by the United States. In contrast, during the first decade of this century, the so-called “pink tide” began to take hold, reaching its peak between 2009 and 2011, when nine out of 12 countries had left-wing governments, some with a strong ideological bent. With the classic determinism of some of the leaders of that time, they believed that the region was embarking on an irreversible process of autonomy or strategic independence and that the United States was losing control of what they called its “backyard.”

The last decade of the 20th century and the first two decades of the 21st century revealed a world undergoing rapid transformation: science was advancing by leaps and bounds, and communications were expanding through cell phones, the internet, and social media. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, changed the United States’ conception of security forever, justifying the use of force wherever its interests were perceived to be threatened, without regard for the norms of international law or the United Nations Charter. This coincided with the spread of globalization, the liberalization of financial flows, and the growth of international trade.

China was opening up as a market for both large and small countries; Canada, Mexico, and the United States were deepening their free trade agreement; new agreements were being signed between economic blocs—such as the European Union with Mercosur—and countries like Mexico, Chile, and Peru; and China was doing the same after joining the World Trade Organization. The Soviet Union and the European socialist bloc had also disappeared. The United States, with its economic, military, technological, and cultural power, was the sole superpower at the dawn of an era of global hegemony.

In South America, in Venezuela, an army commander, Hugo Chávez—who in 1992 had attempted a failed coup against the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez—was imprisoned and released after serving two years in prison, whereupon he launched a political campaign denouncing the corruption of Venezuela’s two-party system. In 1998, he won the presidential election with 59.7% of the vote and also won the subsequent elections in 2006 and 2012 with 62.8% and 54.4%, respectively.

The commander’s popular support led him to proclaim “21st-century socialism,” which would influence several South American leaders—such as Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Cristina Fernández in Argentina—who believed in a new socialist project and were not afraid to confront the United States.

Little remains of that today. The “pink tide” turned blue and deepened in this new era characterized by right-wing extremism in countries such as Argentina and Chile in particular, or El Salvador in Central America, where its leader, Nayib Bukele, has governed since 2019 and serves as a role model for current presidents Javier Milei and José A. Kast. They are part of a deeper political agenda that not only justifies the military dictatorships of the past but also seeks to dismantle parts of the welfare state by handing over—under the guise of freedom—control of the economy and natural resources to the private sector, shielded by the principle of subsidiarity.

If we look closely, this is a policy that comes from the North—from President Donald Trump in particular—who has imposed a geopolitical message reaffirming the concept of “America for Americans,” understood today as a territory of absolute U.S. hegemony in the political, economic, and military spheres, as well as in all areas considered strategic for the United States. He has demonstrated this by claiming sovereignty over Greenland or the Panama Canal. The aim is for the continent—which, since the Cuban Revolution, has inspired several generations with dreams of socialism—to “abandon all hope” for paths that stray from the White House’s hegemonic vision.

President Trump still faces the situation in Cuba, where we have witnessed events that were unimaginable just a few years ago—such as CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Havana last May, which helped ease the economic stranglehold and initiate negotiations on liberation and political regime change. The clock has started ticking for Cuba, and the time will come for Nicaragua as well, once the United States concludes its actions in the war it is waging alongside Israel against Iran.

The situation is not much different when we look at the entire American continent and the Caribbean. Of 35 sovereign states, more than half are governed by the right or the liberal center-right—from Canada, through Central America in countries such as El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama, among others, all the way to the southern tip, with Argentina and Chile. We do not include Cuba or Nicaragua, which have become everlasting dictatorships, or Haiti, practically a failed state.

Some Caribbean countries are center-liberal, with strong democratic and economic stability, as is the case with the Dominican Republic, while others, such as Jamaica—which had a tradition of left-wing governments—have been governed by the center-right since 2016. Trinidad and Tobago, a country rich in natural resources such as natural gas and located just 11 kilometers off the Venezuelan coast, has also had centrist governments that have prioritized relations with the United States. Other Caribbean states are difficult to classify; they have small populations, lack natural resources, are vulnerable to tropical storms, and several of them depend primarily on limited tourism and international aid.

We do not know whether we are witnessing a long-term shift in political trends in South America or whether this will be another brief cycle of the political tides that have ebbed and flowed over the past decades. President Trump’s agenda is to align the continent and ensure that Latin American countries share the United States’ national interest. He has intervened directly or indirectly in recent elections in Honduras, Colombia, Peru, and Chile.

In Brazil, he has pressed for the release of former President Jair Bolsonaro and now supports his son in his bid against President Lula. He has not hesitated to wield the stick—through tariffs—or offer carrots—such as preferential loans and political support—as he has done with Bukele and Milei. Brazil and Mexico—the only two major regional powers—have progressive governments with broad popular support and a foreign policy that is independent in many respects. What remains of progressivism in South America looks to Lula with hope; with pragmatism and the support of a professional diplomatic corps, he has managed to maintain an independent foreign policy.

Why is the Latin American electorate increasingly voting for the right? This is a broad question that is also valid for Europe and the United States. In the case of Latin America, certain issues are clear, starting with insecurity: rising crime, drug trafficking that spans the continent, public and private corruption, the abundance of weapons in illegal markets, and criminal immigration that has established business hubs in the region, often leveraging new technologies.

Underlying all this is the disillusionment stemming from unfulfilled promises made by successive governments, whether left-wing, centrist, or right-wing. Inequality remains the great shadow cast over Latin American societies. It had already been on the agenda since the last century, with progress and setbacks continuing to keep the region the most unequal on the planet. According to the International Monetary Fund, a sharp decline in inequality occurred between 2002 and 2014 as a result of the boom in raw material exports, which led to higher incomes through wages and public transfers.

The Gini index, which measures inequality, showed that during those years it fell by 6.5 points, from 54 to 47.5. This led to a significant reduction in poverty, growth in the middle class, and greater investment in education, health, and social programs. Today, Colombia and Brazil continue to have high inequality indices according to World Bank figures, at 54.4 and 50.3, respectively, while Uruguay has the lowest, with an index of 39.2.

The new “blue wave” sweeping the region has intensified and is now an “electric blue”—intense and charged with extreme ideology. It faces the task of delivering on its promises and addressing demands that have been neglected for several generations; although significant progress was made in the past, these demands—centered on guaranteed rights to education, health care, and housing for a population that has waited far too long—remain unresolved.

At the same time, they must contend with new populist leaders who have risen on promises of easy solutions. The economic vision of this new right brings back the old Adam Smith and his theory of laissez-faire, which holds that the less the state intervenes—that is, the fewer taxes and subsidies—the better, since the economy will be managed by an invisible hand—the market—which will allocate resources, delivering well-being and freedom to the people. The new ruling parties are also extreme in their use of power.

In Chile’s case, they label the liberal center-right as “cowardly right-wingers” for failing to release military personnel convicted of human rights violations who are serving sentences in prisons. They are linked to ultra-conservative religious sectors that support a sort of “authoritarian democracy” designed to restore order, end corruption and crime, and grant more power to the police. Some even propose reinstating the death penalty and, of course, deporting illegal immigrants and closing the borders to immigration.

The left and the center-left have been unable to respond to these policies—which have gained traction in broad sectors of society—and are mired in divisions over past responsibilities, unsure of how to confront this “electric blue wave” or far-right movement, which is rising triumphantly in several Latin American countries.