'Colonial legacies' refer to the enduring impacts, structures, and influences – cultural, political, economic, and social – left behind by colonial powers in former colonies. These lasting legacies have shaped modern identities, governance, and inequalities, often perpetuating resource extraction, language imposition, and social stratification long after independence.

Economic development involves the sustained process of improving a community’s economic well-being and quality of life through policies, programmes, and activities. Focusing on fostering growth, creating jobs, improving skills, and enhancing infrastructure to raise living standards ensures that development moves beyond mere income growth to structural economic improvements. Combining both aspects of colonial legacies and economic development introduces a crucial argument about determinism and agency, raising the question of whether governance is shaped by circumstances or whether states can act independently to shape their own lives.

While colonialism created enduring institutional and economic constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa, the contrasting experiences of Botswana and Zimbabwe show that post-independence leadership and domestic institutions significantly shaped long-term development outcomes.

To what extent was post-independence governance more decisive than broadly similar inherited colonial institutions in explaining the divergent development trajectories of Botswana and Zimbabwe?

Literature review

Economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa has consistently been characterised by significant variation across countries, with some achieving sustained growth while others have experienced stagnation or decline. This divergence is particularly striking given that many countries in the region share similar historical experiences, most notably the legacy of European colonial rule. Scholars have offered competing explanations for these differences, with some pointing to the role of colonial institutions and their long-term persistence in addition to the eradication or survival of pre-colonial dynamics, while others emphasise the role of local agency and post-independence political choices.

The following literature review examines how colonial legacies have shaped economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa, with particular attention to the role of institutions, variations in colonial strategies, and their political and economic consequences. Specifically, I aim to explore the contrasting experiences of Botswana and Zimbabwe. Despite both sharing broadly similar colonial contexts, they have followed markedly different development trajectories as a result of inherited institutions, local agency, and post-independence governance.

Colonial institutions and governance outcomes

To begin with, numerous scholars have argued that institutions created under colonialism shaped long-term development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Austin (2010) asserts that colonial legacy takes the form of “path determination”, implying that colonial choices determined post-colonial ones, or at least conditioned them, such that departure from the colonial pattern was, and perhaps remains, difficult and costly. This view dictates that African countries’ path is defined by dependence on previous colonial powers, aligning with Raúl Prebisch’s ‘Dependence Theory', which argues that global poverty and underdevelopment are not internal failures of poor nations but are directly caused by their exploitative, peripheral role in a capitalist world economy dominated by wealthy 'core' nations which are usually previous Western colonial powers.

Furthermore, Heldring and Robinson (2012) further support this perspective by stating, "Post-independence economic decline in Africa can be explicitly attributed to colonialism because the types of mechanisms that led to this decline were creations of colonial society and institutions which persisted.” This alludes to the longer-term institutional effects of colonialism, which weakened the prosperity of development within previous colonies through the usage of indirect rule. As a result, indirect rule made local elites – which were usually appointed by colonial powers – less accountable due to a lack of a checking/accountability system. The claim alluding to weak institutions introduced by colonial powers is also supported by Austin (2010), who shares the opinion that the unwillingness of colonial governments to promote property rights and implement marketisation into colonial Sub-Saharan African institutions resulted in damaging effects.

In addition to the implementation of institutions, colonial powers also prevailed through institutional persistence aimed at cementing a longer-term legacy of extractive institutions and economies which would enable them to benefit from the acquisition of resources consistently after colonialism. According to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2009), colonial powers set up authoritarian and absolutist states which facilitated extraction through fragmenting the political systems and institutions within the colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa. This claim can be further supported by Mufandaedza's (2025) study of Zimbabwe in which they found that Zimbabwe inherited many authoritarian systems from colonial rule, including strict laws and limited freedoms.

These laws were often used to suppress opposition, control the media, and limit free expression. Additionally, a lack of accountability within institutions favoured a small elite, which has enabled the persistence of extractive institutions through the institutional continuity of colonial powers. Whereas, in the case of Botswana, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) offer a contrasting perspective in which colonial powers implemented institutions of private property and market-based policies which ensured that a broad cross-section of society had effective property rights and remained with their pre-colonial traditions, fostering greater stability and development in the country.

Colonial economic systems (settler vs peasant economies)

Another perspective scholars focus on concerns the types of colonial economies that were set up during colonial rule and how they prevailed to influence present development trajectories.

Austin (2010) introduces two distinct types of colonial economies: settler and peasant economies. Austin (2010) argues that Sub-Saharan African economies can be divided into these two economic systems to better understand the dynamics of development across the region. In settler economies, European settlers migrated and established permanent communities within the country due to labour scarcity, broad access to land ownership, and early investment in education and infrastructure. As a result, these regions had equal income distribution among settlers, a strong long-term economic growth trajectory, and stronger foundations for industrialisation.

Whereas peasant economies had a large indigenous population working primarily in agriculture under direct colonial control or indirect control through an elite population due to labour abundance, land concentrated in elites’ ownership, and the usage of coercive labour systems. Contrastingly, these regions lived in high inequality, limited access to education and capital, and a persistent cycle of poverty. This difference in economic policy implementation persists into the affected regions to this day. As recounted by Mufandaedza (2025), during Zimbabwe’s transition to decolonisation in 1980, they were expecting to produce a sovereign Zimbabwe inhabited by free citizens who would reclaim the land stolen by the white settlers. Yet, since institutions were also deeply intertwined with the economic systems, these attempts did not result in any benefit besides increased instability in the country.

Also, economic outcomes, inequality, and poverty indicators and theories are worth considering. Austin (2010) asserts that Sub-Saharan Africa has a lower output per head than any major world region has and, on average, has expanded slowly and haltingly since 1960. This assertion supports the perspective that there is an underdevelopment baseline expected within the region. In addition, Austin (2010) introduces the mechanism of a dual economy present within the region: the formal and informal sectors.

The formal sector is the official, regulated part of the economy, typically including registration with the government and following labour laws and regulations. Whereas the informal sector is an unofficial and unregulated part of the economy, typically with little to no job security and legal protection. This economic dualism presents both positives and negatives within the region. While the economy becomes less productive and stable, growth tends to be slower and uneven, and the government struggles to provide services and regulate effectively. It also prevents mass unemployment and keeps the economy functioning at a basic level, both characteristics that countries within the region especially benefit from to alleviate the lack of sufficient employment opportunities.

According to Heldring and Robinson (2012), economic performance in the region can be linked back to colonial economic activities; as the agriculture and mining exports expanded, the rates of economic growth remained modest. In addition, real wages for indigenous workers fell in settler colonies. Both scenarios demonstrate the limited economic growth within the region due to colonial structures and a decline in welfare that Sub-Saharan African countries received. Yet, it’s worth noting that although countries share the same regional location, their paths might differ. Khan, Morrissey, and Mosley (2016) distinguish between two groups of countries that start off with similar levels of poverty (albeit higher in the high performers) but then fall into two divergent paths in reducing poverty over the next two decades.

The divergence started to take shape in the 1990s, with high performers reducing poverty by almost eight percentage points, whereas the low performers saw an average increase in poverty of four percentage points. Over the 2000s, the high performers were able to accelerate the pace of poverty reduction and reduce average poverty levels by a further 17 percentage points, whereas the low performers had a further slight increase in poverty. For example, Botswana had an economic growth rate of 7.7 per cent between 1965 and 1998, although inequality remained remarkably high according to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), whereas Zimbabwe experienced economic decline following the failed land reform in 1980, which discouraged investment in the region and, as a result, a decline in agricultural production.

Agency vs colonial determinism

Furthermore, another important factor to consider is the existence of any African agency over colonial determinism during colonial rule. Austin (2010) acknowledges that having responsibility entrusted mainly to Africans worked for their benefit, including the role African elites played – although for this group much was towards personal benefit over the greater good.

In support, Heldring and Robinson (2012) acknowledge that Botswana’s emergence as a success story is not because of colonialism but despite it – strongly cementing the positive effect of an antideterministic colonial effect. Furthermore, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) claim that tribal institutions encouraged broad-based participation in Botswana before colonialism. The continuance of inclusive tribal traditions supports the stance that strong pre-colonial institutions prevail against colonial power, as do farsighted decisions made by political leaders post-independence in Botswana, alluding to greater agency. However, there are instances in which post-colonial agency can manifest in negative ways, precisely due to the continuation of authoritarian regimes and erasure of pre-colonial institutions to consolidate a specific leader’s supremacy. In the case of Zimbabwe, according to Mufandaedza (2025), Mugabe aimed to consolidate his supremacy in the name of post-colonial agency.

Comparative analysis of Botswana and Zimbabwe

Colonial institutions and path dependence

There is one African country that has performed not only well but also better than any other country in the world in the last 35 years – Botswana.

(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001))

This quote still holds true, mostly in comparison to numerous African states. The variables behind Botswana’s success story are an exquisite example of how historical choices shape modern ones and contribute positively to a nation-state.

In 1895, at the peak of European colonial expansion and settlement, three Tswana chiefs went to Britain to see Queen Victoria and pleaded with her for Britain and not Rhodes to control the Protectorate. Yet, British policy changed from 1934 onwards, and there was a more sustained attempt by the British administration to establish its authority over the chiefs in the tribal territories. However, these measures were challenged in the courts by two chiefs, though they lost the formal case; the united opposition of the chiefs and the Second World War essentially blocked the imposition of the new policies – resulting in Botswana’s ‘distant’ experience of colonialism in comparison to other countries.

Upon independence in 1966, the Botswana Democratic Party passed legislation that progressively stripped tribal chiefs of their residual powers, for example, over the allocation of lands. Particularly important was the Chieftaincy Amendment Act of 1970, which essentially gave the President the ability to remove a chief. These actions are presumed to be influenced by the Tswana governance model, which emphasises the voice of community constituents, placing leaders as representatives rather than decision-makers. Also, during colonial rule, tribal chiefs worked within the role of the political elite, facing orders from colonial leaders. The removal of their significant presence can also be interpreted as Botswana’s attempt to rebuild their political structure as a new nation-state, separate from colonial perspectives.

Despite all this, the BDP resisted all calls to 'indigenise' the bureaucracy until suitably qualified Batswana were available. The decision to keep expatriate workers and freely use international advisers and consultants showcased how preserving national aspects while pursuing advantageous political-economic aspects is possible and necessary.

Contrastingly, in Zimbabwe, the policies formulated and implemented by the settler state were rooted in the belief of racial superiority and an unwavering determination to prioritise the interests of the white population at the expense of the indigenous (nonwhite) population. Colonisation had a profound impact on the minds and bodies of the colonised in Zimbabwe, leading to a sense of inferiority when compared to the traditional lifestyle of colonisers.

Thus, many viewed the end of the 1980 guerrilla war as a golden opportunity to build democratic institutions that put the people at the centre and promote human security. Zimbabweans had higher expectations, including a break from nationalist violence, the expansion of democratic spaces, and the protection of human rights once majority rule was achieved (Mufandeza, 2025).

However, the need to transition towards decolonisation in 1980 to produce a sovereign Zimbabwe inhabited by free citizens who would reclaim settlement land was overlooked by national political violence that prevailed between ZANU and ZAPU, the two major Zimbabwean political parties.

The main difference between them is that ZANU was mainly supported by the Shona and ZAPU by the Ndebele, which highlighted ethnic tensions between the two major ethnic groups, the Shona (Mugabe's ethnic group) and the Ndebele (aligned to rival political leader Joshua Nkomo). These tensions led to a dictatorial and regimental approach by ZANU, rather than democratisation as a means to consolidate power.

To understand the complex political transitions that occurred in Zimbabwe, it is of paramount importance to unpack and unmask decolonisation. Colonisation in Zimbabwe was partly achieved by turning the indigenous communities (Shona and Ndebele) against themselves and their culture and keeping them poor through socioeconomic exclusion. Thus, the roots of corruption can partly be traced back to colonial systems, which lacked accountability and favoured a small elite. These systems made it difficult for post-independence Zimbabwe to build transparent and fair governance.

The ZANU-PF government tried to reduce white dominance in the economy by introducing policies such as affirmative action, indigenisation (giving more control to Black Zimbabweans), and removing racial inequalities across sectors. However, these changes were limited at first. Agreements made at independence, especially under the Lancaster House Constitution, encouraged reconciliation and protected white economic interests. As a result, white farmers continued to dominate commercial agriculture, especially tobacco farming, throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

Evidently, Botswana’s limited settler presence and continuity of indigenous governance reduced the persistence of extractive governance, in contrast to Zimbabwe’s settler-colonial structure and post-independence authoritarianism, which reinforced coercive political institutions – although both inherited British colonial institutions.

Colonial economic structures and development

The case study of Zimbabwe is a prime example of a peasant economy. Corruption has been a major problem since independence in 1980, and it continues to harm the economy, costing the country a significant portion of its annual output and worsening poverty and inequality.

A major turning point in 2000 with the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), which led to the redistribution of land from white farmers to Black Zimbabweans. This policy is motivated by the accusation that white farmers faced of ‘straddling’ between own-account farming and creating multiple sources of income through the agriculture industry, which manifested in wealth accumulation, with some evidence of ‘an emergent group of capitalist producers creating a distinct class differentiation amongst indigenous and settler farmers'. Another claim was that colonial settlers were taking the most fertile land.

During the FTLRP, the majority of white farmers lost their land, which caused a sharp decline in agricultural production, especially in the tobacco sector. Over time, the industry began to recover, mainly due to small-scale farmers and contract farming. (Bernstein, 2012)

While the land reform programme reduced white dominance, it also had negative consequences. The way it was carried out—often violently and without proper planning—damaged the economy and disrupted production. Yet, the outcomes of the programme were not consistently negative, as Bernstein (2012) reports that around 40% of households are producing well and selling regularly twelve years after its implementation. In addition, new agrarian relations emerged, such as a dramatic increase in the scale of farm wage employment.

In all, Zimbabwe’s economic trajectory is a testament to how colonial mechanisms, particularly in regard to race and ethnicity, reflect the barriers and access to opportunities to foster development across the region.

Interestingly, the case study of Botswana also reflects a peasant economic structure, but unlike Zimbabwe, it is categorised by indirect control through Tswana leadership and land ownership amongst indigenous populations.

At independence in 1966, Botswana was a very poor country with few assets and infrastructure. Though in 1954 an abattoir had been opened in Lobatse, enabling beef to be sold beyond the region for the first time, this was about the only industry in the country. Given the poor agricultural conditions in the country, imports of food were also large (about 10% of GDP in 1965), and most analysts viewed Botswana as a dependent and underdeveloped labour reserve for South Africa. In addition, 50% of government expenditures upon independence had to be financed by transfers from Britain. Like Lesotho and Swaziland, Botswana was also part of the South African Customs Union and used the South African Rand as its currency.

To rebuild their position, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) implemented a consistent series of development plans emphasising investment in infrastructure, health and education through the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. Compared to most other African countries after independence, the BDP resisted all calls to 'indigenise' the bureaucracy until suitably qualified Batswana were available. Thus, they kept in place expatriate workers and freely used international advisers and consultants.

In 1969, they renegotiated the Customs Union with South Africa, securing for themselves a greater share of revenues, protection of infant industries, and a free trade agreement. By encouraging mining companies to explore the country, kimberlite diamond pipes containing diamonds of industrial and gem quality were discovered at Orapa and Letlhakane and later at Jwaneng. By the mid-1970s, Botswana’s government was running a budget surplus and earning significant income from diamonds. Moreover, in 1975, once it became clear how productive these mines were, the government invoked a clause in the original mining agreement with DeBeers and renegotiated the diamond mining agreement. As a result, the government received a 50% share of diamond profits.

These contrasting differences within the same economic system category resulted in differing outcomes despite having the same colonial power (Britain) governing over both regions – as Botswana secured a strong long-term economic growth trajectory and stronger foundations for industrialisation.

Agency and the limits of colonial determinism

Zimbabwe’s political culture—which is shaped by both colonial and liberation struggles—has made it difficult to achieve meaningful democratic change. Specifically, the Mugabe government’s consolidation of power was enacted by changing the constitution, centralising state control, and using intimidation and violence against political opponents.

After the beginning of Mugabe’s rule in 1980, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in 1989 began to oppose the move toward a one-party state. However, a violent political culture prevailed, leading to ZUM members being harassed, attacked, and even killed.

In the 1990s, several opposition parties—such as ZANU-Ndonga, the Democratic Party, and others—failed to build strong national support or effectively challenge ZANU-PF. Caused largely due to government repression and an unfair electoral system.

After the military intervention in 2017, President Mnangagwa promised economic recovery, political reform, compensation for white farmers, and re-engagement with the international community. However, many challenges remained, particularly the continuation of the military playing a significant role in politics, leading to the 2018 elections being disputed with accusations of manipulation, the army using force against protesters, and the political opposition remaining weak and divided. Despite there being initial hope for change, many aspects of Mugabe’s leadership style (“Mugabeism”) continued under Mnangagwa. Some of these aspects include strong executive power, usage of state control and coercion, and limited political freedom.

Despite the prevalence of authoritarian dynamics in Zimbabwe’s governance, myths and assertions concerning Zimbabwe’s land reform – that it has been a total failure; that its beneficiaries are mainly ‘political cronies’ of ZANU-PF (Mugabe’s political party); that there is no investment in the new settlements; that agriculture is in complete ruins, creating chronic food insecurity; and that the rural economy has collapsed – are inaccurate and yet to be proven through substantial facts.

The case study of Botswana highlights a contrasting outcome, as their governance has maintained traditional customs during and post-colonialism, eliminating the influence of colonial determinism.

These include Botswana's tribal institutions that encouraged broad-based participation and constraints on political leaders during the pre-colonial period. As a result of the way in which Botswana entered the British Empire, and because of the putative amalgamation with South Africa, colonialism was very light.

The Tswana tribes did traditionally attempt to integrate other groups into their institutional structure (though there were often tributary elements in this), and even after independence, this promotion of homogeneity continued in Botswana. There is a lack of a separate historiography and experience of "stateness", but instead foreigners were rather integrated into Tswana society.

The particular political strength of the BDP coalition was that they could integrate within the party the traditional rural structures of loyalty between commoners and chiefs. This structure of traditional loyalty was cemented by the continuation of clientelistic practices such as the lending of cattle and the mafisa system, in which wealthy owners lend livestock to less fortunate individuals, allowing borrowers to use the animals for milk and draught power while breeding them. It acts as a socio-economic safety net and wealth-redistribution mechanism, fostering mutual benefit.

Thus, it's no surprise that the BDP easily maintained power from 1965 to 2024 without evidence of electoral fraud.

In all, analysing Zimbabwe’s case study showcases the continuation of colonial determinism through being embedded in post-colonial agencies, highlighting how the eradication of tribal customs in the public sphere creates space for other introduced mechanisms to prevail, even if negative. However, the comparison ultimately suggests that colonial legacies constrained political choices but did not fully determine them. Governance decisions after independence were more decisive in shaping divergent development trajectories.

Conclusion

To conclude, the divergent development trajectories of Botswana and Zimbabwe cannot be explained solely through inherited colonial institutions, despite both states experiencing British colonial rule and broadly similar structural constraints. Colonialism undoubtedly established enduring political and economic inequalities across Sub-Saharan Africa through extractive institutions, racial hierarchies, and weak systems of accountability. In both Botswana and Zimbabwe, colonial legacies shaped the foundations upon which post-independence states were constructed, influencing governance structures, economic organisation, and political culture through mechanisms of path dependence.

However, the contrasting experiences of the two countries demonstrate that post-independence governance was ultimately more decisive in shaping long-term development outcomes.

Botswana’s leadership successfully adapted inherited institutions by preserving inclusive pre-colonial traditions, maintaining bureaucratic stability, and implementing pragmatic economic policies, particularly in relation to diamond revenue management and state planning. Rather than reproducing extractive systems, Botswana’s political elites used state institutions to encourage relative stability, investment, and long-term growth.

In contrast, Zimbabwe illustrates how post-colonial governance can reinforce and deepen colonial patterns of authoritarianism and economic exclusion. Although independence initially created opportunities for democratic reform and redistribution, Mugabe’s consolidation of power, the persistence of coercive political structures, and the politicisation of ethnicity contributed to institutional instability and economic decline. While some policies, such as land reform, addressed genuine colonial inequalities, their implementation often intensified corruption, weakened investor confidence, and disrupted production.

Ultimately, the comparison between Botswana and Zimbabwe challenges purely deterministic interpretations of colonialism. Colonial institutions created important structural conditions, but they did not predetermine outcomes. Instead, the evidence suggests that leadership choices, institutional management, and the ability of post-independence governments to either reform or reproduce inherited systems were more significant in explaining divergence. Therefore, while colonial legacies remained highly influential, post-independence governance proved the more decisive factor in shaping economic development trajectories in Botswana and Zimbabwe.

Bibliography

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Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, A. Simon. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation (2009).”
Austin, Gareth. “African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies (2010). Bernstein, Henry. “Zimbabwe’s Land Reform. Myths and Realities Book Review (2011).”
Heldring, Leander and Robinson, A. James. “Colonialism and Development in Africa (2012).
Khan, Rumman; Morrissey, Oliver; Mosley, Paul. “Colonial legacy and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa" (2016).
Mufandaedza, Dhibhora. “An Overview of Zimbabwe’s Political and Economic Track 1980-2020 (2025).