The Iran blowback and what it means for Russia

What started in 2023 as a war between Israel and Iran’s numerous proxies in the Middle East, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, has escalated into an intense two-week conflict between Tel Aviv and Tehran in June 2025. As these three groups had been significantly weakened and their military leadership decimated by Israel’s attacks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu eventually decided to strike the proxy coordinator itself.

In the context of Iran’s rapidly developing nuclear weapons program, Israel struck Iran on June 13th by specifically targeting en masse Iran’s nuclear and military sites, as well as its commanders and atomic scientists, with more than 200 fighter jets. This led to retaliatory strikes by Tehran, followed by a trade of missile attacks on both sides. Eventually, as the conflict was escalating to the point of a possible full-scale war, the United States intervened in Israel’s favor and used B-2 stealth bombers transporting “bunker buster” missiles against Iran’s leading nuclear facilities. The damage assessment is not fully clear, but it can be safely assumed to be significant, dragging back Iran’s nuclear ambitions for years.

Regardless of the exact damage assessment, Iran’s military capacity, prestige, and regional influence were tremendously affected: firstly, through the decimation of its proxies, then through the US and Israeli strikes on its territory, which showcased Tehran’s deep vulnerabilities. However, the implications of this two-week conflict go far beyond Tehran and stretch towards its staunch ally as well: Moscow. This article explores the key consequences of the recent Iran-Israel (and U.S.) conflict for Russia, focusing on military implications, the Kremlin’s influence in the Middle East, its evolving relationship with the Ayatollah regime, and the alternative partnerships now emerging.

Russia’s drone-making capacity was not affected

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, Moscow has launched roughly 29,000 Iranian-made Shahed kamikaze drones against Kyiv, making them one of the most lethal and disruptive weapons of this war, particularly in terms of the fear they’ve instilled among civilians.

Initially, as the Israel-Iran conflict came to a halt, it was confirmed that Iran’s drone and missile production was struck, leading to the assumption that this would significantly disrupt Russia’s drone attacks. However, Russia’s subsequent strikes on Ukraine proved the polar opposite, namely that Moscow managed to fully implement Iran’s blueprints and production know-how on its own territory, as proven by its drone hub in the Alabuga region, Tatarstan.

After several brutal strikes, especially on Kyiv, in mid-June, Russia managed to break its record of drones launched per day twice: 537 drones were launched on June 28th, and 539 drones on July 4th, leading to tens of casualties and hundreds of injuries. The majority of drones were based on the Shahed model. This proves that Russia is capable of maintaining a stable production and is no longer dependent on Iran’s own production. In fact, estimates from Ukrainian intelligence suggest that Russia produces around 2700 long-range Geran drones (Shahed-inspired) monthly.

Indeed, the only type of Iranian military equipment likely to face supply disruptions is ballistic missiles, as Israel claims to have destroyed a third of Tehran’s launchers. Combined with the fact that Iran has already used a large part of its remaining stockpile in its retaliatory strikes, this makes it unlikely that it will be able to export substantial quantities to Russia.

All things considered, while Russia’s war effort shows no signs of slowing and its production capacity remains steady, the Kremlin’s ability to project military power beyond Ukraine, particularly in the face of the United States and China, appears to be diminishing.

Washington’s show of strength against Iran: several warning signals for Moscow

Willingly or not, the United States' strike using its most advanced technology on a hopeless Iranian defense system showcased the deadly effectiveness of the U.S. military-industrial complex, serving as a wake-up call for Russia. In a matter of hours and using 22 bunker buster missiles, the United States was capable of destabilizing a disruptive regional power and forcing it into a ceasefire.

Beyond the strategic and technological dominance of its adversaries, the Kremlin is likely alarmed by another critical issue for its imperial ambitions: nearly all of Iran’s air defense systems are Russian-made S-300s, which proved ineffective against strikes from both Israel and the United States. This shows that Russia’s reliability as a strategic defense partner and technological innovator is severely put under scrutiny, which might affect the willingness of other authoritarian states or militias to acquire Russian-made equipment. Moreover, according to some analysts, Russia’s inability to maintain a high production of anything but low-end, uncomplex, or Soviet systems proves that it is not capable of keeping up in the long term with its Western and Chinese counterparts in the field of defense innovation.

As such, this considerable gap between Washington and Moscow’s advancement in the field of military technology will be kept in mind by the latter in its future attempts to threaten NATO states, for example. As long as the United States is still poised to protect its North Atlantic partners, Russia will be treading carefully and relying on hybrid warfare instead.

Moreover, the aforementioned facts also underline another important aspect: Russia’s involvement in the resource-draining Ukraine invasion made it incapable of respecting its military commitments to strategic allies, especially in the Middle East. This was a case and point in Syria, where Putin’s staunch ally, Bashar al-Assad, and his regime were toppled by rebels in a matter of weeks, with no response from the Kremlin, apart from Assad’s evacuation.

While the Ayatollah regime has withstood intense pressure over the past years, and the past months in particular, it is clearly no longer willing to tolerate the kinds of shortcomings exposed by its defense partnership with Russia. As such, it is already being speculated that Iran could pivot towards Chinese military equipment in the very near future. This could include Chengdu J-10C fighter jets, which proved effective even against Western jets in the recent brief conflict between Pakistan and India. In exchange for access to military technology, Beijing could ask for privileged access to Iranian oil and for its cooperation in facilitating the Belt and Road initiative.

As key countries increasingly align with either the United States or China, Russia risks being pushed out of its role as a power broker, especially in the Middle East. Considering all these, Russia has to worry about the following aspects after Iran’s performance in the June 2025 conflict: their lagging behind in the technology race with world powers, the US’s military efficiency against Russian equipment, and the Kremlin’s decreasing sphere of influence in the Middle East.

Fewer and fewer allies for Moscow in the Middle East

By focusing its resources primarily on the Ukraine war, Russia neglected the Middle East as a zone of interest, with the fall of Assad and the loss of the strategic Tartus naval base being its most substantial failures.

Meanwhile, Iran’s humiliating barraging and destruction of nuclear facilities is another hit for Russia, in particular from an ideological point of view: the bulwark of anti-Western influence and one of the main sponsors of terrorist organizations was humiliated by Western powers, and Moscow was not able (and not willing) to do anything substantial in its defense.

In the meantime, other Middle Eastern regions, such as the Arabian Peninsula, are much more poised to strengthen their alliance with Western countries, especially with the United States. This is perfectly illustrated by the historical US-Saudi Arabia investment deal amounting to $600 billion.

Of course, this doesn’t rule out the possibility of growing economic ties between Russia and the Gulf states. This is especially evident in the post-2022 relationship between Russia and the United Arab Emirates, where Russia included the UAE in the BRICS alliance, whilst the UAE welcomed a significant influx of Russian immigrants and capital. However, as things stand, the US remains the main power broker on the Arabian Peninsula, with Russia most likely playing a secondary, even marginal role in some domains.

From a military and strategic standpoint, Gulf and North African countries alike currently prioritize maintaining a business-friendly regional stability, which helps explain their rejection of Iran’s militaristic regime and its disruptive proxies. Therefore, if Russia hopes to secure a foothold in these parts of the Middle East, it will need to reconsider its relationship with Iran, which is easier said than done. That being said, does Russia have alternative alliances in the Middle Eastern region or in its vicinity?

Russia’s alternatives in the region? Central Asia

The post-Soviet Central Asian countries remain within Russia’s sphere of influence, largely due to economic dependencies, such as extensive energy deals and remittances from Central Asian migrant workers in Russia, as well as deep-rooted historical and military ties. However, what the Kremlin once saw as its backyard is increasingly being challenged by China’s growing economic influence.

Just recently, in June 2025, President Xi Jinping signed a treaty further increasing economic ties with the five Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan), a two-way trade that has been registering a 10% year-on-year increase. In fact, nations such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are running trade deficits with China in the tens of billions, further solidifying Beijing’s influence in the region.

On the other hand, there is an increasing interest on the side of Central Asian countries themselves to decrease their dependence on Russia, from both an economic and defense perspective, a relationship that they view as one of subordination. Meanwhile, China’s “no-strings-attached” type of economic collaboration, as opposed to the West’s normative demands or to the Russian imperialistic footprint, is an attractive alternative.

That being said, out of necessity, Central Asian countries will continue to play all three sides in the current geopolitical landscape. However, in the long term, if Russia fails to leverage its influence, whether through economic pressure or expanded energy cooperation, it risks losing its position as the dominant regional power in any part of the Asian continent, which would be a major geopolitical setback for the Kremlin. Still, even regaining control over Central Asia wouldn’t be enough for Russia to extend its influence into the Middle East, which explains why it’s currently willing to form alliances with virtually anyone, including terrorist groups.

The Taliban

Russia has recently announced an alliance that would have been unthinkable just two decades ago, or even during the late Soviet era: a partnership with Taliban-led Afghanistan. Coincidence or not, shortly after Iran’s military setbacks, Russia accepted the credentials of a new ambassador to Afghanistan, becoming the first nation in the world to officially recognize the Taliban government.

Based on its geographical position, Afghanistan could serve as a transit hub for Russian energy and as another piece of the puzzle in its sanction-avoiding efforts. It is also a form of support for a new potential coordinator of terrorist proxies that can counter Western influence in the Middle East. Despite the risk of damaging its reputation among other Middle Eastern states by backing the Taliban government, Russia is willing to play every card to stay relevant in Asia. However, its alliance with the Taliban also highlights a significant level of desperation on Moscow’s part.

Moscow-Tehran future coalition: under the sign of reticence

Rhetorically, it is most likely that the two countries will continue supporting their struggle against Western hegemony, but on a practical level, especially in the military and technology fields, their cooperation will most likely decrease. Tehran needs new reliable allies that can guarantee the regime’s safety, whether that is either through direct military intervention on their side (unlikely) or through the delivery of superior armament. China can offer the latter.

"Behind closed doors, however, Iran's confidence in Russia has been undermined, and this no doubt will weaken the relationship. Tehran has learned to its cost that Russia is no longer a dependable ally,” as Neil Quilliam, Chatham House Middle East expert, claims.

Russia has shown a lack of determination to defend its steadfast Middle Eastern ally, making it only natural for Iran to seek alternatives. For now, both authoritarian states will likely do their best to maintain appearances, but in reality, their bilateral relationship is on shaky ground.

Conclusion: the trembling of the “Axis of Evil”?

Iran’s lack of reaction and lack of support from its allies reveal two important truths about Russia and authoritarian regimes more broadly.

First, Russia has clearly shown that the era of Soviet Union-level power projection is over. It no longer has the capacity to be a catalyst for akin regional powers on a global scale or safeguard its strategic interests worldwide. The war in Ukraine drained its economic and military resources to such an extent that Russia is becoming a marginal player not only in the Middle East but even in its own near abroad. Its desperate alliances with the Taliban government and with North Korea’s Kim regime, among others, highlight this decline, forcing Moscow to increasingly rely on rogue actors to maintain relevance.

Second, Iran’s bombardment by Israel and the United States exposes the limits of the much-discussed solidarity among authoritarian states, the so-called “Axis of Evil.” At the end of the day, these despotic regimes operate on an “every man for himself” mentality, which makes it no surprise that in large-scale conflicts, especially those involving the United States, the cracks of their presumed alliances become even more apparent. This, in turn, underscores the growing importance of solidarity among democratic nations, which, when united, can effectively counter fragmented authoritarian regimes.

While the Ayatollah’s regime has survived, Russia has taken blows on multiple fronts, revealing just how difficult it is for the aging behemoth that is the Russian military and foreign policy to patch its vulnerabilities.

Looking ahead, the weakening of both Iran and Russia creates a vacuum that could reshape regional power dynamics, but it also presents a critical window of opportunity for democratic coalitions. Rather than allowing China to step in as the new guarantor of authoritarian order, Western democracies must double down on diplomatic, economic, and technological engagement in the Middle East and Central Asia. The unraveling of the myth of authoritarian unity offers not just a tactical advantage but a strategic imperative: to fill the cracks with resilient, rules-based partnerships before others do.