How to stop the AfD

On a late summer’s day in Bavaria, Alice Weidel confidently strolled onto the stage to a rousing applause. She began a speech that is now legendary—an art piece in Germany’s glittering Hall of Fame for Rhetoric.

They want to destroy our homeland. They want to ban our pork knuckle, our bratwurst ... our schnitzel! And I can tell you, I won't let them take away my schnitzel. Nobody is going to take my schnitzel!

A unique symphony of laughter and nationalistic zeal enchanted the crowd as she pronounced these words now etched in meme folklore. Her detractors, while lacking the same flavor of zeal, were full of glee as it seemed that Ms. Weidel had finally fully succumbed, transforming into the manifest caricature of delusional ultra-right nationalism. Half a year later, it is clear that she is the only one still laughing.

The AfD received just north of 20% of the vote share in Germany’s 2025 national elections¹, simultaneously doubling their previous vote share and overtaking the incumbent SPD, who received their lowest-ever vote share at 16%. While CDU won the spoils of this election campaign, their 7.7% lead over AfD can hardly be called unassailable, especially given that they gained 10% in the last election and that they continue to rise in the polls.

The reason is simple. AfD has a potent narrative, for which tangible ‘evidence’ is apparent. Their narrative so states that the reason why life has gotten increasingly difficult for the average German citizen is that the established parties have sold out the country to globalists (read EU) for scandalous profits. This means that the wealth generated in Germany is now leaving Germany, resulting in a collapsing infrastructure and a reduction in the quality of social services and life in general.

The German worker now has to compete with foreigners willing to do the same job for less, for wages that are unlikely to rise. They have to compete with these same foreigners for housing, with their own government essentially backing the foreigners over their people to support their globalist overlords’ agenda. Add to this the perceived increase in crimes perpetrated by migrants and refugees, their perceived burden on the welfare state, remittances sent home by migrants, the perceived influence of migrants on German culture, and the remarkable sums of money given for international causes, and you get a pretty potent narrative of where the problems in Germany lie.

AfD presents itself as a group of proud but concerned citizens with the prior stated narrative that suggests they understand the pain caused by the current state of the average working German and have simple and ‘practical’ solutions. In contrast to the traditional caricature of an establishment politician who is disconnected, fabulously wealthy, speaks out of both sides of their mouth, and gets nothing done. Coincidentally, this has meant that AfD has been further vindicated by the fact that these ‘textbook politicians’ refuse to associate with them.

At the same time, income inequality has largely trended upwards by most metrics (Gini Coefficient, P90/P50², etc.) for the last 29 years at least. While the real value of wages has stubbornly refused to budge upwards, the cost of living has continued to rise yearly—meaning people have to pay more for the same standard of living with virtually the same salaries. According to the Federal Bureau of Statistics, around 1 in 5 Germans were subject to poverty and/or social exclusion in 2022 ³.

AfD’s account is likely not gospel truth. A basic example would be that, according to the IFO Institute, there is no correlation between an increase in migrants and/or refugees and the crime rate ⁴, and despite recent spikes in 2022 and 2024, crime has generally been trending downwards since 2015, coincidentally, the same year Germany opened its borders to millions of Syrian refugees.

Perhaps twice as doubtful is whether they can accomplish what they promise by the means they state. But at the surface level, it is a logically coherent narrative, and perhaps even more importantly, the average German can see and feel the supposed evidence.

Now, consider the establishment parties. All seem to lack a coherent and compelling narrative.

The centrist and center-right parties have held that more economic growth would result in the improvement of the condition of most people. They have posited that globalization is largely a good thing because it not only grows the economy and encourages a cheaper and better quality of goods but also allows for a ‘multi-kulti’ environment that should encourage greater idea exchange and innovation.

Aside from being intangible to the average German, the narrative that the German economy just needs to grow more and then the far right to ‘return to the abyss from whence they came’ has not been backed by much evidence. 10/12 years before the founding of the AfD, Germany experienced explosive GDP growth, and another 10 since have seen Germany emerge as the 3rd largest economy ⁵. The same period has seen AfD become the 2nd largest party in the Bundestag. So, it is unlikely that a lack of growth is the issue. The average person has not benefited from the wealth generated by globalization; a quick look at wealth distribution would suggest as much.

The narratives of the parties further to the Left have largely done better to touch on some of the key pain points, like rising rent costs, levels of social inequality, and child hunger. That has largely been reflected in the increase of their vote share over the past decade. However, polls from ZDF suggest that the greatest influence for those who voted for Die Linke (the party with the greatest growth) was stopping the advance of the far right ⁶.

It may be a cause for concern that the most persuasive argument that some on the left have is, ‘At least we aren’t Nazis,’ and with some of them adopting some of AfD’s policy positions, it may be worth revisiting that claim in the next few years. The parties on the left have also traditionally been smaller than others and maintained less influence in the Bundestag—a further splintering is unlikely to convince voters that they have a narrative that can hold the parties themselves together.

Additionally, many of the parties on the left have a policy platform that includes a broad array of social, cultural, and environmental policy changes that would likely appear expensive, non-essential, and/or undesirable for people who have traditionally voted for the center. This is clear when one considers Tageshau’s poll, which suggests that more than 56% consider Die Linke’s platform unrealistic and not financially feasible⁷, Die Grüne’s main policy position ranks 5th at the level of importance⁸ for most voters, and BSW’s most persuasive and differentiating factor is that they are not the other parties⁹—likely influenced by their novelty.

A glance at the global south would tell you that policy positions that include an expensive transition to green energy, the perfection of gender and racial equity, etc., while they are indeed great ideals to strive for, tend to become secondary to people sensitive to the creep of a poverty that may stop them from feeding their families.

Ultimately, this comes down to a battle of narratives and what they speak to. There is a level of alienation that has occurred within the collective German psyche—and Europe as a whole. At this point, the challenge is to develop a compelling, coherent narrative directly addressing the pain points of a largely disillusioned population who believe less and less in their policy platforms and their commitment to the improvement of their condition.

While following through with a decisive and inclusive policy will be pivotal, first, they must knit together a simple, compelling, and coherent narrative and show they know what has gone wrong, how it did, and how they plan to fix it.

Otherwise, Ms. Weidel and her party will continue to take away more and more of their schnitzel.