On April 11, negotiations described as historic began between the US and Iranian delegations. Their failure led to further talks on April 17. Two days before the ceasefire was set to expire, the heads of both delegations were absent. These false interregnums mask the presence of hundreds of advisors from both sides in Islamabad, working continuously and independently of the maximalist pronouncements made by the warring parties.

The Iranian delegation's rejection of the red lines proclaimed by the US, namely the main one — the delivery of 440 kilograms of enriched uranium—clearly demonstrates the stakes facing both delegations. A rejection of maximalism would entail proposing an empowered IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), with more intrusive inspections and the support of mediators who would guarantee that Iran's nuclear weapons program would not be restarted. This achievement would be followed by the gradual lifting of the sanctions that are strangling the Iranian economy and an end to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf (Bandar Abbas, Khark Island, Bandar Mahshahr, Bushehr, Qeshm Island), as well as the port of Chabahar, which has direct access to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean, near the border with Pakistan.

How to get rid of the war of attrition

Meanwhile, the background noise is the overlapping blockades and mutual accusations of ceasefire violations, with Iranian boats firing on a French ship and a British cargo vessel. Added to this are drone attacks on US military ships in retaliation for the attack on an Iranian ship from China. Then there's the incident involving the cargo ship Touska, boarded by US forces, who claimed it was an inspection of its cargo due to “its prior history of illicit activities.”

Essentially, by abandoning the war of attrition, neither adversary loses face. On the contrary, Trump will have something to show his electorate before the November elections. For the ayatollahs, a supervisory group would allow the IAEA to fulfill its oversight obligations regarding maintaining nuclear infrastructure for civilian purposes. By doing so, the ayatollahs would claim they have not bowed down to the Great Satan.

As part of the agreement, Hezbollah will have to end its operations in Lebanon. Such an agreement will allow Trump to present himself to his electorate as the great peacemaker in the Middle East. It will also allow him to justify to his voters the attack on Iran and the massive mobilization of US military personnel and equipment. An objectively precarious victory, but enough to resume the election campaign for November 2026, aiming to maintain at least a majority in one of the Legislative Chambers.

It's difficult to find plausible outcomes that might arise from the mind of an erratic figure like Trump. But there is certainty that Trump dreams of retiring from power in glory and majesty, which was the primary basis of the MAGA movement: an isolationist retreat in a world where, even under those conditions, the US dictates the terms of peace.

How far removed is that scenario from The Big Short?

Trump knows that successfully achieving the Iranian objective requires completing a Roadmap capable of neutralizing conflicts in the Middle East. To this end, long-standing enemies must reach agreements in which each can claim some benefit. American diplomacy understands that achieving peace in Lebanon requires neutralizing Hezbollah, a movement that is part of the Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance, a strategic ally of Syria and the Huthíes of Yemen, and an Axis that includes several Iraqi Shiite militias fighting in southern Lebanon.

To achieve a peace agreement, whether temporary or permanent, Trump ordered Netanyahu to cease fire and reach an agreement with Lebanon—in other words, to neutralize Hezbollah's actions. This, at least superficially, will mark the beginning of Netanyahu's decline in power. That, at least on the surface, will signify the beginning of Netanyahu's decline in power.

Such ambitious plans necessitate rebuilding allegiances with the Persian Gulf states, some of which have been bombed by Iran in a demonstration of the capabilities of asymmetric defense using drones and fast boats. This is no small task, facing considerable opposition along the way; it's worth remembering that in 2016, Saudi Arabia declared Hezbollah a terrorist organization. But the scope of the war extends even further when considering the complex oil route beyond the Strait of Hormuz, in the Arabian Sea and its bordering states: Oman, Iran, Yemen, Pakistan, and India.

China's intervention

China's primary interest is protecting its trade routes and energy supply – Iran provides China with 90% of its oil production. Several incidents have been reported involving vessels linked to China that have defied or circumvented restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz. The Rich Starry tanker, owned by a Shanghai-based Chinese company, was the first known vessel to cross the strait and leave the Gulf carrying methanol on April 14, ignoring warnings from the US Navy. On the military front, Iran has used Chinese satellites in its attacks on US military bases in the Persian Gulf, striking its allies in the United Arab Emirates. Diplomatically, China has condemned the actions of the US and Israel, calling them a violation of Iranian sovereignty.

Trump is aware that China, the evader of the embargo, is merely an anecdote; he needs China as a guarantor. If the 90% of energy that the Asian giant buys doesn't generate funds to supply Hezbollah and the Huthíes, Trump could declare that China is part of his agreement with Iran and that free transit is ensured by a global coalition, not just by US actions. If that works, China secures its energy and its Belt and Road Initiative. For its part, the US, specifically Trump, will be able to justify, focus, and implement the initial intention of the MAGA (Make America Great Again) to create the foundations for internal economic competition in the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia move from a regional cold war to being partners in a monitored energy development hub. It is, in essence, the replacement of the American Peace—based on military power, with a Commercial Peace, based on mutual benefits and the fear of migratory/economic collapse. It is the end of the zero-sum game, opening the door to preserving the system.

Two elements of a complex board

Persia is not a 20th-century political accident; it is a millennia-old civilization. In a reconstruction plan, the Ayatollahs represent factors of national unity within a moral framework that, in times of war, consolidated its legitimacy of resistance against external pressure. In times of peace and reconstruction, the task is different. The US needs allies through diplomatic channels, namely China and Pakistan.

China as a “civilizational translator.” China arrives in Iran with the respect that one ancient civilization has for another. For Beijing, Iran is the central hub of the Silk Road. If China acts as a guarantor, it is not due to ideological affinities, but to ensure the stability of the heartland of Eurasia, including Russia, of course. In this framework, the image of the Great Satan is integrated into the rationale of a shared prosperity that must be managed and preserved.

As we said at the beginning, these are the big stakes facing the regional actors in the conflict.