Disinformation narratives in Romania’s presidential election

Among the many intense and pivotal votes that took place in the past months, including in Germany and in Poland, one that stands out as a case study in disinformation, social media manipulation, extremist politics, the sociology of cults and messianic figures, and hybrid warfare is the Romanian presidential election. Romania has witnessed one of its most tumultuous periods of its existence as a democratic, post-communist state in the previous seven months, following two rounds of presidential elections that were first cancelled and that, respectively, led to the election of the pro-European independent candidate Nicușor Dan in a historical upset for establishment parties.

What seemed in November 2024 as a predictable presidential election in which the candidate of the ruling Social Democratic Party and prime minister Marcel Ciolacu¹ would win without much contest turned out to be the greatest electoral shock in Romanian history. In the first round of the 2024 election, far-right pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu, who was either nonexistent in electoral polls or polling single digits, won first place with almost 23% of the vote, while Ciolacu did not even manage to secure second place, as liberal candidate Elena Lasconi surpassed him by less than 3000 votes.

Besides the shock of having a relatively unknown independent and overtly pro-Moscow candidate in the second round, and besides the suspicious circumstances in which that occurred, it was the first time in Romanian history that none of the traditional mainstream parties managed to secure their candidate’s participation in the second round.

Ultimately, the bizarre auspices in which the presidential elections took place would only augment through the Romanian Constitutional Court’s decision to cancel the election before the end of the second electoral round, citing “Russian hybrid actions” and the manipulation of TikTok algorithms in Georgescu’s favour. In fact, over 34 Russian hybrid attacks² against Romania were documented in 2024 alone, with over 25000 TikTok accounts and 5000 Telegram channels being mobilized in favor of the far-right candidate.

This controversial decision, which was viewed as a necessary but delayed intervention by some and an abuse of power or a breach of democratic principles by others, threw Romania into uncharted territory, both internally and in its relations with its allies. While most European states eventually deemed the court’s decision as legitimate, other strategic partners begged to differ, as illustrated by U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance³ openly singling out Romania as an example of Europe’s antidemocratic tendencies during the Munich Security Conference.

Eventually, the new set of elections was set for May 2025, with a surprise candidate joining the race, the then-mayor of Bucharest, Nicușor Dan. A Sorbonne-educated, politically moderate mathematician, Mr. Dan managed to squeeze through to the second round by less than a percentage point in front of the “establishment” candidate. He would face off in the second round and eventually win by a 53-47 margin against George Simion, a former football hooligan and the leader of the far-right Alliance for the Unification of Romanians Party (AUR). Throughout his campaign, Simion bizarrely portrayed himself as a proxy candidate for Mr. Georgescu, oftentimes claiming that once elected, he would either reinstate Georgescu as the “legitimate” president or would name him prime minister. This peculiar tactic got Simion around 40% of the votes in the first round, but not the presidency.

As for Georgescu, who, following the election cancellation, became a messianic figure for his supporters, a status that was fueled by his social media speeches entrenched in mystical delirium regarding Romania’s holy identity and his divine mission to “save our land,” he would be barred from participating in the 2025 elections⁴. As time passed, more judicial evidence emerged against Georgescu and his associates, the six counts on which he is currently being investigated and for which he was barred from rerunning being “incitement to actions against the constitutional order, communication of false information and repeated false statements, initiation or establishment of a fascist, racist, or xenophobic organization, promotion of the cult of persons guilty of genocide and war crimes, and support for anti-Semitic organizations.”

In a Global Witness investigation, it was revealed that during the electoral period in Romania, TikTok’s algorithms fed on average three times more far-right content to new and politically balanced users than any other content. Thus, while the extent to which social media companies are complacent to the disinformation promoted by far-right, Russia-backed political actors through illegal means is still under scrutiny, it is worthwhile to discuss and categorize the content that was promoted to manipulate the Romanian electorate.

Unlike in other neighboring countries, Russian narratives are not effective in Romania when overtly promoted as Russian due to a centuries-long adversity towards Russian influence and imperialism, as well as an above-average pro-Europeanism (in one form or another) of the population. However, there are certain key spots that Russia was able to strike effectively, which I will shortlist below.

A shortlist of narratives

Pandering to ultra-conservatism

Being part of a highly conservative, Orthodox Christian nation, many Romanians can be susceptible to narratives that a significant stratum of the population deems as controversial, such as sexuality, atheism, or the perceived “global conspiracy” against Christian values and traditions.

Prevalent narratives:

Nicușor Dan wants to instate sex education (a highly sensitive topic in Romanian society) and “LGBT propaganda⁵” to children starting from kindergarten.
Mr. Dan did not baptize his children and is not an Orthodox Christian, as he claims. Instead, as a deepfake video featuring the presidential candidate in a synagogue tried to imply, he is Jewish, thus exploiting antisemitic stereotypes present in Romanian society.
Russia is a protector of the Orthodox faith, as opposed to the decadent and “satanic” West⁶.

The “death of democracy” narrative

This was used to criticize Romanian authorities, implying the existence of a coordinated “deep state” campaign against Călin Georgescu, thus creating a deeply entrenched paranoia.

Prevalent narratives:

Democracy itself was cancelled in Romania, along with the annulment of the elections and with Georgescu’s barring from the May 2025 elections⁷.
The May elections will also be cancelled, solidifying the claim that an autocratic regime is forming.

The Trump-style “rigged elections” narrative

After Mr. Dan’s win, George Simion was the main promoter of this talking point, attempting to reduce the legitimacy of the sitting president.

Prevalent narratives:

The result is not legitimate, and Romanian authorities committed voter fraud⁸ against George Simion.
This was especially the case in the Republic of Moldova, where Mr. Dan obtained 88% of the diaspora vote and where the voters “had their votes checked and were blackmailed with losing their jobs”.

The “foreign intervention” narrative

Ironically, while Russia intervenes in Romanian elections, the far right states that Western powers such as France are the chief perpetrators of foreign interference.

Prevalent narratives:

France meddled in Romania’s elections in Nicușor Dan’s favor, proven by the “fact” that the head of the French Foreign Intelligence Service allegedly visited Romania a few days before the election.
Romania was “transferred” from the United States’ sphere of influence to that of France. This stems from the deeply entrenched narrative that Romania is a Brussels/Washington colony with no autonomy and sovereignty over its territory, institutions, or resources. Moving further, as a result of this “colonization,” the diaspora population was forced to move abroad, is now treated in their host country as second-class citizens, and is being used as the West’s cheap hard labor.
Romania is exploited by foreign companies, which is why Romanians should nationalize their country’s resources and bring them back under “popular control”.

The anti-Ukraine and “war scare” narratives

Romania and Ukraine have a complicated historical relationship, with many Romanians viewing their northern neighbor with a slight suspicion. This was fully exploited by Russian narratives, along with the generalized fear of entering a direct war with Russia.

Prevalent narratives:

Ukrainian refugees (especially children) are receiving thousands of euros in welfare checks, much more than Romanians in need.
Nicușor Dan’s win in the presidential election will spell Romania’s entry into war with Russia; he will send our children to die in Ukraine.
Romania is used by NATO’s leadership to start World War III.
Billions of dollars of foreign aid are being sent to Ukraine as part of an elaborate corruption scheme, while our fellow countrymen are struggling.
Romania should use this opportunity of a weakened Ukraine and ally with Russia to take back the Chernivtsi and the south of Odessa Oblasts (former Romanian territories during the interwar period, annexed by the Soviet Union).
Ethnic Romanians in Ukraine are being persecuted by Ukrainian authorities.

The “strongman” narrative

It stems from the deeply entrenched belief, a residual of communist authoritarianism, that only a strong, iron-fisted despot can lead Romania and help it regain its sovereignty and dignity.

Prevalent narratives:

Romania needs strong, “patriotic” leaders (much like Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orban, or Robert Fico) that can break the rules, challenge Brussels (or generally the perceived global world order), and put national interest above foreign influence. Furthermore, such leaders are portrayed as “pacifists” who refuse to fund a war that is not theirs, namely the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
On the same note, while George Simion is aggressive and assertive, Nicușor Dan is weak and uncharismatic, with the sitting president even repeatedly being called “autistic” by his rival⁹.

Conclusion: patterns and responses

Considering these six types of narratives perpetrated in Romania’s presidential elections by malign forces, one could create the approximate “composite sketches” of individuals who are most likely to be targeted and persuaded by them. As such, they could be an anti-Western Orthodox dogmatist, a communist nostalgic with sprinkles of economic nationalism, a frustrated diaspora laborer, a young MAGA supporter angered by the corruption of establishment politicians, or even an ultranationalist who supports annexing Ukrainian territories. These are very different strata of society and ideologies that go across the political spectrum, but as long as the Kremlin’s spin doctors are able to identify each group and create tailor-made narratives, they can change the course of democratic nations in a matter of months.

We have seen similar trends in other European elections, but not to the same extreme as in Romania’s case, where a cult-like movement was created behind the previously anonymous Călin Georgescu solely by manipulating social media algorithms. This raises questions regarding the appropriate means through which hybrid threats can be countered while also assuring that inalienable rights to freedom of speech will not be violated. While the current reactive modus operandi towards propaganda campaigns by European democracies is a short-term solution, future threats will call for the increase of societal resilience through social media education and pre-bunking techniques.

In Romania, such educational programs on disinformation are totally absent at the moment, which explains the rise of populist parties to such a great extent and the degree to which these many narratives penetrated public discourse. While Romania eventually elected the pro-European candidate, his opponent still received almost 47% of the vote, indicating the tremendous efforts President Dan will have to make to reach out to those voters.

In the end, it is not solely propaganda as a quasi-mystical, immovable force that drew Romanian voters towards abhorrent and sometimes dangerous propaganda. Instead, these narratives were built on the unstable foundation created by decades of corruption and distrust in authorities, laid after numerous examples of bad governance on both sides of the political spectrum. As such, combating disinformation won’t be the panacea to radicalism, as it will have to be combined in the upcoming presidency and executive alike with good governance and regional development that can reach the often-forgotten citizens of Romania. Their desperation is illustrated by the fact that they viewed a virtual “implosion” of the country as the only viable solution, thus making them easy prey for Moscow’s chief propagandists.