What US-Russia energy opportunities is Trump eyeing?

With the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, what Moscow deemed as its secured energy market in Europe started to fade away, with sanctions being imposed on oil imports and with Russian gas being purchased at a much lower rate, witnessing a drop from 45% to 18% of EU gas imports from 2021 to 2024. In response to these geopolitical shifts on the European continent, various resource-rich countries, such as Norway, Azerbaijan, Algeria, and Qatar, saw it as an opportunity to increase their European market share under the pretext of the EU’s diversification strategy. Among those, the United States saw it as an opportunity to become a leading supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Europe, while Europe envisioned American LNG as the long-term solution to reducing energy dependency on Russia, commissioning and launching new LNG terminals in Germany, Greece, Finland, the Netherlands, France, and others.

However, under the current Trump administration, the United States' energy strategy, previously focused on becoming a key energy alternative in Europe, has been replaced by a more lenient approach towards Moscow, with the return of Russian gas in Europe not being excluded. Recently, according to Politico, as part of the efforts of Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff to improve relations with Moscow, it seems that the White House is considering dropping energy sanctions¹ imposed on Russia as a result of its Ukraine invasion. Among the projects that might have been discussed in relation to this topic are the Nord Stream gas pipelines and the Arctic 2 LNG project.

The question that arises is, simply put, why? Allowing Russia to resume its gas exports through Europe, whether we refer to pipeline gas or LNG, is detrimental to American LNG exporting companies, who have just started to gain a foothold in European markets. The answer can be partially found in the recently leaked Trump’s “one-page peace deal,” allegedly presented to both belligerent parties in late April 2025. Among the main points, it is mentioned that all sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 will be lifted and that “the U.S. and Russia would strengthen their economic ties, especially in the energy and industrial sectors.”

Thus, it is possible that Washington is willing to accept a return of Russian gas to Europe in exchange for other common projects in the field of natural resources. The Trump administration is, as such, willing to risk the reinstating of a European dependence on Russian energy, a situation that was, during Trump’s first term, ardently criticized. In fact, this could be part of Trump’s evident attempts to divide EU member states and reduce Brussels’ influence in the business sector particularly.

As things stand, it is possible that the US will accept Russia’s unfettered control of the European energy market and the lifting of sanctions as a bargaining chip for new joint business opportunities between the two and for relieving what is viewed as the financial burden of supporting Ukraine. Listed below are some of the business, energy, and resource opportunities that the Trump administration might be eyeing as part of the ongoing negotiations with Russia and Ukraine, based on recent declarations, deals, and claims made by all three parties as of early May 2025.

The US-Russia Arctic ambitions

While American LNG companies operating in Europe might be put at a significant disadvantage in the aforementioned framework, it is highly likely that the US is looking towards further collaboration with Russian companies, especially in the Arctic region. As it was highlighted in one of the first official 2025 meetings between American and Russian diplomats in Riyadh, Kirill Dmitriev², CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, stated that “we need to pursue joint projects, including, for example, in the Arctic.” The fact that in the incipient stages of the US-Russia negotiations regarding the Ukraine war, the potential of the Arctic region was one of the central themes speaks volumes of the economic and political priorities of both Washington and Moscow.

Prior to the full-scale invasion, the United States held one of its most significant investment projects in Russia through Exxon Mobil, which used to produce oil on Russian territory and had a 30% stake in the Sakhalin-1 oil and gas project in the Far East of the country while also being involved in Arctic exploration projects. However, it is highly unlikely, according to energy experts, for a reinstatement of Exxon’s business in Russia in the near future for two reasons: the company already took a $4.6 billion write-down for exiting Sakhalin-1 in 2022, and the high costs of arctic projects require a high oil price, which is currently not the case. Despite this, one should not underestimate Trump’s attempt at a “reverse Nixon,” namely dragging Russia away from China as much as possible, and the Arctic region is essential in that sense.

Beijing’s reduced influence³ over a region of strategic and energetic importance through a collaboration with Russia would represent, considering Trump’s aforementioned vision, a net win. Albeit, one must take into account that such an action would be done by simultaneously sacrificing Europe’s trust in the United States and, zooming in, by shaking NATO’s unity in the Arctic, as has been shown by the Trump administration’s ambitions in Greenland. As things stand, this is a sacrifice Trump is willing to make if it means significantly isolating China from access to military and energy projects in the Arctic.

Moreover, since the Siberian oil and gas resources are not fully exploited and since Russia’s pipeline connections with China are still minuscule in comparison to the European infrastructure, one shouldn’t be surprised that the United States wants to be at the forefront of the exploitation and export of Russia’s Far East resources through its companies. In practical terms, this could be represented by a higher stake in Sakhalin-1 and subsequently a higher American presence in the Asian LNG market, a joint venture between a Russian and an American Arctic exploration and exploitation company, or a pledge to stop the expansion of Russia-China pipelines. And if any of these endeavors imply a return of Russian gas in Europe, it sounds like an offer Trump is willing to make.

Nord Stream 2 or other European pipelines

As stated previously, the Trump administration is considering lifting sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and on other Russian assets in Europe, despite the impairment that would cause to American LNG companies. However, this process could happen only with a significant American stake in Russian energy infrastructure, one that would secure a profit regardless of the European position towards Moscow. As such, according to energy officials working at Russian companies Gazprom and Rosneft⁴, “the idea of allowing US companies to get access to Russian energy or transport assets has been discussed internally in Moscow.” Restarting Russian energy projects in Europe without American sanctions could become a short-term benefit to the US, since it could lead to a reduction in energy prices as a whole. Moreover, if Washington has a stake in some of the projects that would be reloaded, it could be a highly profitable endeavor, but this would be achieved at the cost of compromising the US-Europe relationship.

Russian gas pipelines connected to Europe. Source: Bruegel.

Looking at the map above and considering that Nord Stream 1 was sabotaged in September 2022, that TurkStream is already at full capacity, and that the Yamal pipeline will most likely remain limited in volume because of Poland’s foreign policy towards Russia, the only options that are left on the table for Washington to negotiate with the Russian and Ukrainian counterparts are the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and the Brotherhood and Soyuz pipelines that pass through Ukraine.

In the case of Nord Stream 2, it never became fully operational, but it was also partially damaged during the sabotage at Nord Stream 1 and has been under US sanctions even before the start of the full-scale invasion. However, it is estimated to still hold a 50% capacity, and it is possible that the United States would be interested in gaining a percentage of the profits created by this pipeline. The only obstacle for the Trump administration in this endeavor would be the chancellorship of Friedrich Merz, who has showcased time and again his rhetorical and military support for Ukraine and his plea for Europe to achieve “independence” from the United States⁵, especially from a military point of view. Thus, he now views not only Russian dependency but also a US one as a threat to European security.

When it comes to Nord Stream specifically, Merz has not clarified his position as of yet, since there is significant pressure coming from German society and heavy industry officials, who urge a return to Russian gas to reduce energy and production prices in the context of a stagnating German economy. In the case Merz refuses to succumb to this pressure, it is possible that the Trump administration, which has been reiterating its suspicion towards European unity and, through Elon Musk especially, has voiced support for far-right populist parties in Europe, will attempt to use the prospect of operationalizing Nord Stream 2 as a “bait” towards voting for Alternative for Germany (AfD).

Ultimately, a partnership with a party that is open to Russian energy and to engaging with both Trump and Putin could be seen as highly favorable for the current White House. As such, what seems like the political blockage of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline could change quickly, either through Merz compromising or through AfD gaining political power, capitalizing on the societal distress towards energy prices.

Regarding the pipelines passing through Ukraine, the US has reiterated its wish to control them through the US government's International Development Finance Corporation. However, in the more recent US-Ukraine minerals deal from April 30th, it was also mentioned that there will be no change in ownership⁶ changes when it comes to Ukrainian state companies, such as Ukrnafta or Energoatom. As such, it is up to Ukraine to decide whether it will resume the passing of Russian gas through its territory towards Europe, but given the fact that Russian bombardments persist, despite calls for peace, it will take immense pressure from Washington and Moscow for Kyiv to change its stance.

In the end, it seems that the United States considers that Europe (especially Germany) cannot hold the line forever against Russia and that a return of Russia as an energy export powerhouse is inevitable. This is why it is better, according to the current US leadership, to have a larger American stake in these projects now than before 2022 or even outright control them. While only Nord Stream 2 is viewed as a feasible US-Russia business cooperation in the pipeline sector, this may expand in the medium-to-long term and could be seen as a sign of goodwill to Russia in exchange for a distancing from Chinese economic and military alliances.

Metals and rare earth minerals

The technological race between great powers does not only require expertise and innovation, but it is also a very resource-heavy domain. This is why we are witnessing a race to the top for metals and rare earth minerals that are critical for technological advancement.

This was clearly showcased in the United States-Ukraine minerals deal, which gives Washington access to at least 55 materials and other natural resources (including oil and gas) in exchange for the formation of a Ukraine reconstruction investment fund with a 50-50 stake, meant for both civilian and military assistance. However, while Ukraine holds significant deposits of lithium, rare earths, graphite, titanium, or zirconium, around 40% of Ukraine’s metallic mineral resources are currently in territories under Russian occupation⁷. This indicates that the White House could consider not only striking a deal with the Kremlin for the resources within the occupied territories but also for other resources found on Russian territory. And there have been some indications from both sides that this could become reality soon enough.

According to US President Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, who has been involved in managing Washington’s relations with Moscow, the US’s mineral ambition is not limited to Ukraine and could expand to Russia as well. "Well, the mineral rights in Ukraine are quite extensive, but, by the way, they are quite extensive in Russia. And I think there will be plenty of opportunities for the US with Russia when this peace deal [on ending the Russia-Ukraine war] gets finished,” he mentioned.

Likewise, Vladimir Putin himself stated that he is open to working with Americans and to offering access to mineral reserves owned by Russia, including in the occupied regions. He mentioned reserves in the Donbas region, the Russian North, the Caucasus, and the Far East as open to foreign investments (for a more detailed view of Russia’s immense rare earth and critical mineral deposits, check out this map⁸). He especially emphasized to the United States his openness to collaborate on the production of aluminum. Considering Russia’s immense reserves of materials that are essential for the advancement of, among others, the AI and defense sectors, the United States could be offering in return plenty of recompenses and could drop sanctions.

A clear example where “one hand washes the other” in the minerals sector is the Tomtor deposit in Yakutia, Russia’s Far East, where the Russian government has already indicated to the Americans that it is open to extracting its resources in a joint effort. It contains niobium, a material that is essential to the production of pipelines, in the automotive industry, and in the ever-evolving field of quantum computing. However, as a result of the technology sanctions imposed on Russia after the full-scale invasion, the extraction process has been paused due to a lack of advanced technology. As such, this could be a trend that we will witness in a number of US-Russia business ventures: Russia gives access to critical minerals and materials, while the United States offers its technology and lifts all related sanctions.

Despite this scenario, which seems nightmarish for European security, some analysts argue that Russia’s promises of rare earth exploitation could just be a red herring. More exactly, Russia is simply attempting to escape the sanctions regime swiftly in exchange for the promise of extraction projects that would take years, if not decades, to implement. Furthermore, there is no certainty that a future US presidential administration would go further with such a collaboration, nor is it certain that Russia would be committed in the long term towards aiding the US in its resource race against China.

As such, one must keep in mind that Russia’s long-term promises could just be a form of geopolitical manipulation for short-term gains, and its commitment towards a long-term business relationship with the United States could just be a façade. Nevertheless, Washington’s interest in Russia’s resources is clear, and as things stand, it is willing to sacrifice many of its stances and partnerships for them.

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Currently under the control of the Russian army, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe could also be on Donald Trump’s “shopping list.” In an initial proposal to Ukraine, the plant would have been under Ukrainian ownership but managed by the United States, who would supply energy to both Russia and Ukraine.

This could be an option in the near future, since the head of the Russian nuclear energy company Rosatom declared that Russia is willing to engage in negotiations regarding the Zaporizhzhia plant with Washington, after initially refusing it categorically. However, if that does happen, the plant would not bring any significant financial or energy benefits to the United States in the short term, since the reactors are shut down⁹ and the facility lost its cooling water supply, on top of the unknown damage caused to the plant due to its proximity to the front line. It would take years for it to be running at its previous capacity. Nevertheless, it is still something that Vladimir Putin can bring to the table in future negotiations.

Will Europe take the bait?

It is still up for debate whether Russia’s intentions of building long-term business deals with American companies are genuine. Could this be a method through which Moscow can implement a multipolar foreign policy and juggle between Washington and Beijing, or is Russia simply exchanging long-term promises to the US for immediate benefits (returning to the European market, the lifting of sanctions)?

Of course, in this equation one has to observe how Europe’s energy policy towards Russia will develop. If one looks towards Brussels, the European Commission drafted in early May a roadmap towards phasing out Russian gas, which entails a ban on new Russian gas deals at the end of 2025 and a halt on imports from existing contracts by 2027. While this would be seen as a necessary and ultimately favorable development from a security point of view by Western European countries and by NATO’s frontline states (Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States), such a move could be seen with skepticism by others, especially by Central European nations, such as Hungary, Slovakia, or the Czech Republic. In these cases, the dependence on Russian energy is still significant, and populist movements can continue gaining traction by intimidating the population with the consequences of a Russian gas phaseout.

Most definitely, from an energy perspective, the elephant in the room remains Germany. Although Friedrich Merz has not portrayed himself in any shape as a Russia appeaser, he could at some point be forced to accept a middle way, one in which Germany continues importing Russian gas for its industries in particular, but at a smaller scale. If not, it is possible that the energy question, namely the high prices as a result of the decoupling from Russian energy, could be the main pivot pushed by the German populist parties. They could portray themselves as the solution to this problem by acting as the ultimate Trump and Putin whisperers alike. This pressure will be detrimental during the following years of Merz’s chancellorship.

In total, the European continent seems determined to reduce Russian gas dependency, but the task at hand will not be easy in countries most affected by this phaseout, as it could be the main engine behind anti-European movements. As it stands, Europe does not seem to take the bait of a Russian energy dominance on the continent, but one must not exclude that some countries, due to Washington and Kremlin pressure, could take the bait by having, to put it bluntly, the hook pushed down their throat.

Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to recapitulate what Trump genuinely desires through these concessions to the Putin regime, whether we refer to the harsh stance taken towards Ukraine or to the promised economic favors. Economically, the United States intends to profit and be involved in what it sees as an inevitable return of Russian gas by a “desperate” Europe, as well as gain access to rare earth minerals in Ukraine and Russia alike. Geopolitically, the US is working towards overtaking China when it comes to access to the rare earth minerals and other materials essential in the tech sector. It is also attempting to isolate Beijing from the military and energy developments taking place in the Arctic region with the help of Moscow. In Europe, it is obvious that the Trump administration is poised to break European unity against Russia, thus inevitably promoting populist movements. Under the setting of a divided Europe, Washington will have more influence in individual, country-by-country negotiations than with a unified block with stringent legislation.

We are witnessing a full display of what I have called in a previous article¹⁰ the “commodification of foreign affairs,” where the value of a strategic alliance is not determined by the protection of common values but by its economic, energy, and resource prospects and by how that can bring an upper hand against an adversarial power.

In short, what Trump is attempting is outmatching China at all costs, even by attempting to draw Russia towards him through attractive business deals. It remains to be seen how faithful of a partner Russia can be to the United States, given their decades-long rivalry and even disdain, and how fruitful it was to neglect the alliance with European democratic forces for it. In a positive scenario for the current Washington leadership, the US could indeed obtain stakes and access to the aforementioned energy and resource projects, from Russia and from Ukraine alike, and achieve superiority in the field of rare earth minerals. However, this would be done at the expense of its democratic and most trustful allies, who, out of a lack of options, could be lured by exactly Washington’s declared adversary, Beijing.