The series of conflicts between Ukraine and Russia since 2014 have provided reasons to consider the concept of a new Cold War. This article will not address whether this analogy is appropriate or not. Such a discussion would require a comparative analysis of aspects such as U.S foreign policy towards China and Russia, the contenders in this new Cold War, and U.S foreign policy towards Russia and the former Soviet Union. Additionally, it would necessitate an examination of the domains in which this rivalry is occurring. For example, there is no space race between the U.S and current Russia or China, and although each country has its own ideology, there is no existential struggle to determine which will prevail (at least not with the intensity of the first Cold War).

These factors should be considered when discussing a new Cold War, but there are undoubtedly more. I mentioned just a few of them to highlight the complexity of such an analysis, which I acknowledge I am unable to undertake

Therefore, rather than outlining the reasons for suggesting that we are in a new Cold War or dismissing this as a sensationalist analogy, I will focus on a specific aspect that has been the subject of many intellectual discussions recently, namely, Cold War liberalism and its contemporary relevance. Regardless of whether we are indeed in a new Cold War, there are notable similarities that evoke many of the concerns associated with Cold War liberalism. All major contenders possess nuclear weapons (including North Korea), there are proxy wars that risk escalating into large-scale conflicts, and these wars result in practices such as the killing of civilians, destruction of cities, and torture of prisoners of war, among other atrocities.

Cold War liberalism is a term that lacks a precise definition and can be difficult to describe. It generally refers to a form of liberalism that is non-utopian and stripped of illusions and grand ideals. A prominent figure associated with this line of thought is the political theorist Judith Shklar (1928-1992), whose liberalism of fear (as she called it) aims to avoid the worst or the summum malum.

While it may appear intellectually simplistic, those who study political theory cannot ignore that this perspective diverges significantly from the trend in liberalism. Shklar does not invite us to strive for the pursuit of the most just society, a self-regulated market society, or a society where rational individuals can engage in public debates and reach universally acceptable solutions, these being typical liberal ideals. Instead, she suggests striving to avoid "cruelty, the fear it inspires, and the fear of fear itself."1

Jan-Werner Müller provides one of the most cited analyses of Cold War liberalism, highlighting an interrelated structure of ideas and political strategies. To succinctly summarize Müller's points, he identifies key ideas within the vocabulary of Cold War liberals, such as pluralism, anti-determinism, negative liberty, constitutionalism, and social democracy. Additionally, the political strategies he outlines include historical political thinking (the idea of avoiding the worst was highly influenced by the first half of the 20th century), the psychological dimensions of politics, and a respectful engagement with intellectual adversaries.2

The analysis presented appears satisfactory at first glance. However, it does not require a deeper understanding to recognize its incompleteness. The account lacks the spatial and geopolitical specificities of the Cold War and does not consider the spatio-political frameworks that Cold War liberals employed as rhetorical tools.3 This includes associations of democracy or liberty with the West or America.

Another difficulty in approaching Cold War liberalism is not conceptual but ideological. Katrina Forrester4 and Samuel Moyn5 argue that Cold War liberalism lacks a transformative, radical, or emancipatory politics. Moreover, Moyn argues, it created the conditions for liberalism's current enemies to emerge and gain territory. Michael Brenes and Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins6 wonder about the point of maintaining the framework of Cold War liberalism when the conditions that allowed the Cold War to emerge have disappeared with the triumph of the United States and then propose to replace it with a liberal framework that is more democratic and egalitarian.

Of course, none of these critiques make much sense. Cold War liberalism doesn't have a transformative politics, so what? Paraphrasing Geroge Kateb, it may sound too little to just want to avoid the worst, but a society free of fear and cruelty is a great deal.7 On the other hand, blaming the set of ideas that make up Cold War liberalism for the current struggles that de facto liberal regimes have with their enemies is at least questionable. Finally, the logic that we should change our framework of thought because the conditions that made its emergency possible have changed is reasonable. But it doesn't mean that we have nothing to learn or retain from Cold War liberals. By this logic, reading the classics of political theory such as Plato or Aristotle would be an exercise in archaeology.

This brings me to the point with which I began this article. My purpose was not to debate what liberalism should be. I mentioned these authors' critique of Cold War liberalism in order to formulate a fundamental question about the conflicts that are taking place today, which involve contenders with nuclear weapons, massacres, destruction of cities, torture, and so on. The fundamental question is: how should we approach all this? Having witnessed Ukraine, Gaza, and illiberal regimes that want a place in the international order at all costs, is it really the best approach to seek democracy and egalitarianism there? Is it really too little to strive to avoid cruelty and fear in these situations?

Cold War liberalism may be a slippery term, and not very attractive compared to more grandiloquent strands of liberalism, but at its core there is an element that is crucial to addressing the atrocities of this supposed new Cold War: striving to eliminate or reduce them is currently more urgent than pursuing the ideals of some intellectuals.

References

1 Shklar, J. N. (1989). The Liberalism of Fear. In N. L. Rosenblum (Ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life (pp. 21–38). Harvard University Press.
2 Müller, J. (2019). The contours of Cold War liberalism (Berlin’s in particular). In J. Müller (Ed.) Isaiah Berlin’s Cold War Liberalism (pp. 37–56). Palgrave Macmillan.
3 Bavaj, R. (2022). Cold war liberalism in West Germany: Richard Löwenthal and ‘Western civilization.’ History of European Ideas, 49(3), 607–624.
4 Forrester, K. (2019). In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy. Princeton University Press.
5 Moyn, S. (2023). Liberalism against itself: Cold War Intellectuals and the Making of Our Times. Yale University Press.
6 Brenes, M., & Steinmetz‐Jenkins, D. (2021). Legacies of Cold War liberalism. Dissent, 68(1), 116–124.
7 Kateb, G. (1998). Foreword. In S. Hoffman (Ed.), Political Thought and Political Thinkers (pp. vii-xix). University of Chicago Press.