In early 2025, Poland’s prime minister arrived in Ankara with an urgent proposal. He urged Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to take on “the greatest possible co-responsibility” for achieving peace in Ukraine and safeguarding regional stability. This high-profile appeal marked a striking turnaround in European attitudes. Only a few years ago, relations between the European Union (EU) and Türkiye were strained. Now, faced with war on the continent and a host of security crises, Europe is looking to Türkiye as a crucial partner. The Russian threat has cast a long shadow over Europe, forcing a rethink of old alliances and rivalries. In this new reality, a deeper security partnership between the EU and Türkiye is emerging not as a luxury but as a strategic necessity.

The Russian threat returns

For decades, many Europeans assumed major war on the continent was a relic of the past. That illusion was shattered when Russia invaded Ukraine. Suddenly, tanks and missiles were once again tearing through European soil, and millions of refugees fled westward. The war in Ukraine has become a defining challenge for Europe’s security. Russia’s aggressive actions—from annexing territory to threatening nuclear brinkmanship—have jolted Europe awake. Countries on NATO’s eastern flank, like Poland and the Baltic states, feel directly menaced by Moscow’s expansionist ambitions. Even nations farther west understand that an unstable, hostile Russia endangers the entire European project.

The conflict has proven that peace cannot be taken for granted. European governments, jolted by images of burning cities and columns of refugees, quickly united in support of Ukraine. They imposed sweeping economic sanctions on Russia and sent weapons and aid to Kyiv. Neutral countries like Sweden and Finland shed decades of caution and sought the protective umbrella of NATO. European nations doubled their defense budgets seemingly overnight. In short, Russia’s war rekindled the “traditional” security fears Europe had set aside. Yet as Europe fortifies its eastern borders and stocks up on ammunition, a hard truth looms: this confrontation with Moscow could last years, even decades.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threat isn’t confined to Ukraine. He has openly lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union and hinted at designs on other neighbors. Countries like Moldova or Georgia fear they could be next. Even NATO members such as the Baltic states or Poland worry about provocations. The Russian threat is now the core security challenge uniting Europe, and meeting that challenge will require unity and every ally that Europe can muster—including allies that have sometimes been kept at arm’s length, like Türkiye.

NATO, America, and Europe’s search for strength

When Russian troops surged into Ukraine, one institution moved front and center: the NATO alliance. Under NATO, European countries (and allies like the United States, Canada, and Türkiye) coordinated troop deployments to deter Russia from any thought of striking NATO territory. American and British jets patrolled the skies of Eastern Europe, while German and French tanks headed east. The crisis reaffirmed NATO’s importance as Europe’s defensive shield. But it also exposed Europe’s heavy dependence on the United States for security. While President Joe Biden’s administration stood firmly with Europe, memories lingered of the previous U.S. leader who had been openly skeptical of NATO. With U.S. elections looming (and indeed now a reality that Washington’s priorities can shift), Europeans have realized they cannot simply outsource their security to American guardianship forever.

This has led to a delicate balancing act. On one hand, Europe knows NATO—with Türkiye as a key member—is indispensable. On the other hand, the EU is talking more than ever about “strategic autonomy,” which means building up its own capacity to act in defense crises. Over the past two years, nearly every EU member state has pledged to raise defense spending. Germany, for example, launched a special fund to modernize its long-neglected military, a historic policy shift in Berlin. EU leaders have also discussed joint defense investments, better coordination of arms industries, and creating rapid response forces for emergencies.

Plans like a new “ReArm Europe” initiative aim to ensure Europe can deter threats even if transatlantic politics turn unpredictable. However, these efforts will take time—years to train troops, build missiles, and mend gaps like ammunition shortages that became painfully clear as Europe scrambled to supply Ukraine.

This is where partnerships become critical. Europe is seeking strength in numbers, not only among EU nations but also with external allies. The United Kingdom, even after Brexit, remains deeply involved in European security. And NATO countries that aren’t in the EU—above all, Türkiye—have renewed importance. As Europe builds a more self-reliant defense posture, it makes little sense to leave out a nation with one of the largest militaries in the alliance. The logical conclusion: Europe’s security architecture should include Türkiye if it wants to be truly robust.

Energy security and the “Winter Weapon”

Modern wars aren’t fought only with bullets. Moscow has wielded its vast energy exports as a geopolitical weapon, and Europe felt the sting. In the first winter of the Ukraine war, Russia dramatically cut natural gas supplies to Europe, hoping to freeze Europeans into abandoning support for Kyiv. This strategy failed—Europe endured by quickly finding alternative gas sources—but it taught a valuable lesson. Energy security is national security. Europe, which for years bought a third of its gas from Russia, had built a dangerous dependency. When Russia turned off the taps, European countries rushed to buy natural gas from elsewhere, importing shiploads of liquefied gas from North America and the Middle East.

They also accelerated plans to connect pipelines to new suppliers. In this scramble, Türkiye’s role as an energy corridor became more significant. A major pipeline known as the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline now channels gas from Azerbaijan across Türkiye into Southeast Europe. This Southern Gas Corridor gave Europe a lifeline of non-Russian gas and showed the potential of Türkiye as an energy bridge. In the Eastern Mediterranean, new gas fields off the coasts of Israel and Cyprus beckon—and again, Türkiye’s cooperation would be key to getting those resources to European markets.

Beyond gas, Türkiye’s geography makes it an ideal transit route for future green energy projects, like cables or pipelines bringing Middle Eastern electricity or hydrogen into Europe. All of this adds up to a strategic opportunity: closer EU-Türkiye ties in energy can blunt Russia’s ability to blackmail Europe. It also benefits Türkiye by cementing its role as a vital energy hub, attracting investment, and strengthening its own energy security. Both sides gain when the lights stay on and the homes stay warm, free from the whims of the Kremlin.

Guarding the gates: migration and border security

Security in Europe isn’t only about armies and missiles—it’s also about managing who crosses the borders and why. The Syrian civil war and other conflicts unleashed a massive refugee wave in the mid-2010s that shook European politics to the core. In 2015, hundreds of thousands of desperate people fled to Europe, many through Türkiye, which borders Syria. The influx sparked a humanitarian crisis and fueled political backlashes in EU countries. It became clear that Europe’s border security is intimately linked with Türkiye, the country that forms a land bridge from the Middle East into Europe. Recognizing this, in 2016 the EU and Türkiye struck a landmark deal: Türkiye would strengthen controls to stop irregular migration towards Europe and host millions of refugees, while the EU would provide funding and political concessions.

That partnership, though sometimes uneasy, prevented an even greater migration crisis. Türkiye today hosts around 4 million refugees—more than any other country in the world—including Syrians who might otherwise be seeking refuge in Germany, Sweden, or France. Turkish officials often remind their European counterparts that Europe’s “front line” against uncontrolled migration isn’t on the Greek islands or the Bulgarian border; it starts on Türkiye’s own frontiers with Syria, Iraq, and even Iran. In recent years, Türkiye has bolstered its border fences and patrols, intercepting not only Syrians but also Afghans and others heading west. European aid has helped fund some of these efforts, such as high-tech surveillance towers along the Turkish-Iranian border.

This is a clear example of mutual interest: Europe wants secure borders, and Türkiye wants support in handling the refugee burden. A future EU-Türkiye security partnership could elevate this cooperation. Imagine European and Turkish coast guards coordinating even more closely to combat human traffickers in the Aegean Sea or joint EU-Turkish initiatives to build better conditions for refugees in Türkiye so fewer feel compelled to risk the journey to Europe. Such collaboration would protect vulnerable people from exploitation while addressing European voters’ concerns about who is coming into their countries. It’s a challenging balance—upholding humanitarian values without sacrificing security—but working together, the EU and Türkiye stand a far better chance of achieving it.

Türkiye: NATO’s strategic bridge

Türkiye’s value to European security becomes obvious on a map. Spanning the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Türkiye (officially Türkiye) borders not only EU member Greece but also war-torn Syria and Iraq and sits across the Black Sea from both Russia and Ukraine. This geography has made Türkiye NATO’s strategic bridge since it joined the alliance in 1952. During the Cold War, Türkiye’s army—the second largest in NATO after the United States—was a bulwark on the alliance’s southeastern flank, containing Soviet influence. Today, that same military might is a key asset as NATO adapts to new threats. In the air, Turkish jets police skies alongside European fighters. At sea, the Turkish navy helps NATO control the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. On land, Turkish troops have served in NATO missions from the Balkans to Afghanistan.

Crucially, Türkiye controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, the only passage for warships between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In practice, this means Türkiye can limit Russia’s naval movements—and it has done so during the Ukraine war, closing the straits to most military vessels to prevent escalation. Ankara has also played an outsized diplomatic role. Turkish mediators brokered a deal that allowed Ukrainian grain ships to safely traverse the Black Sea despite the conflict—averting a global food crisis. And while maintaining dialogue with Moscow, Türkiye has supplied Ukraine with critical military hardware, most famously the Bayraktar drones that helped Ukraine stall Russia’s advance early in the war.

These agile, Turkish-made drones became symbols of Ukrainian resistance and showcased the growing prowess of Türkiye’s defense industry. In recent years, Turkish factories have started producing advanced tanks, fighter jets, and ships, transforming the country into a rising arms exporter. In 2024, Türkiye’s defense exports topped 7 billion dollars, with European countries among the buyers.

From high-tech unmanned aircraft to intelligence on militant groups, Türkiye contributes to Europe’s safety in ways that often go unheralded. However, it hasn’t all been smooth sailing between Türkiye and its Western partners. Over the past decade, political rifts opened up. Disputes with EU members Greece and Cyprus over maritime borders and energy rights in the Eastern Mediterranean grew heated. Ankara’s military operations against Kurdish terrorist groups in Syria drew criticism from European capitals concerned about human rights. In turn, Turkish leaders bristled at what they saw as a lack of solidarity—for instance, they felt the West was slow to condemn a 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan’s government.

Frustrated at times, Türkiye even bought a sophisticated air defense system from Russia a few years ago, alarming NATO allies. Despite these frictions, the bigger picture is that Türkiye has remained anchored in the Western security system. Its interests often align with Europe’s: a stable Balkans, containing terrorism, and countering threats like Russia’s aggression. What’s changing now is that both sides are coming to appreciate just how much they need each other in this dangerous moment.

From tensions to strategic opportunity

The war in Ukraine and a shifting global order have, in a sense, reset the calculus between Brussels and Ankara. European officials who once pondered how to sideline or “contain” Türkiye’s regional ambitions are now more inclined to seek its counsel. “European countries that thought they had the luxury of excluding Türkiye are now seeing they cannot exclude Türkiye anymore,” observed Sinan Ülgen, a former Turkish diplomat and security analyst. This sentiment is taking root in policy circles from Warsaw to Paris. Countries like Poland and the Baltic states, which feel Russia breathing down their necks, view Türkiye as an indispensable ally in keeping Europe safe. Even in Western Europe, there is a growing realization that a European security framework without Türkiye leaves a big strategic gap. Türkiye, for its part, also appears ready for a fresh start.

President Erdoğan and his foreign minister have publicly stated that Europe must include Türkiye in the continent’s new security vision in a “sustainable and deterrent” way. In plain terms, Ankara doesn’t want piecemeal cooperation or vague promises—it wants to be treated as a genuine partner in defending Europe. And Türkiye is showing it can contribute. Recently, Türkiye’s top general joined European army chiefs in Paris for talks on the future of European defense cooperation, a sight that would have been unlikely just a few years back. Turkish diplomats have been active in discussions about post-war security arrangements for Ukraine, even offering to contribute troops to potential peacekeeping missions if a ceasefire takes hold. Such steps signal that Türkiye isn’t content to sit on the sidelines; it wants a seat at the table where Europe’s security decisions are made.

There are still voices in Europe wary of embracing Türkiye too tightly. Long-standing issues haven’t vanished overnight. Some EU members remain uneasy about Türkiye’s domestic politics or its disputes with EU neighbors. But the strategic fundamentals are shifting. The United States, while still a close ally, might be less predictable in coming years—pushing Europeans to close ranks and maximize their own security network. And Russia’s menace simply leaves no room for intra-Western feuds. The mindset is moving from “with or without Türkiye?” to “we are safer together.” This creates a ripe moment to explore concrete ways the EU and Türkiye can deepen their security ties.

Toward a deeper EU-Türkiye security partnership

What might an enhanced security partnership between the EU and Türkiye look like in practice? It wouldn’t happen all at once; trust is built step by step. But there are several key areas where collaboration could grow quickly:

  • Joint defense and training: Europe and Türkiye can expand joint military exercises and training programs. Already, Turkish and European NATO forces exercise together; this could be complemented by EU-led missions that welcome Turkish participation. For example, if the EU creates a new rapid response force for crises, Turkish troops could be part of it. On the defense industry front, co-production of military equipment can be a win-win. European firms are already partnering with Türkiye’s industry on projects like next-generation aircraft and helicopters. By pooling expertise, both sides strengthen their militaries and create interdependence that cements the alliance.

  • Intelligence sharing: effective security cooperation requires sharing information about threats. Türkiye’s intelligence services have deep experience with extremist networks in the Middle East and beyond—knowledge that can help prevent terrorist attacks on European soil. Conversely, European agencies monitor Russian espionage and cyber threats, intelligence that would benefit Ankara as it navigates a complex neighborhood. A more structured intel-sharing arrangement, focusing on terrorism, organized crime, and hostile state actors, would make citizens in both Europe and Türkiye safer.

  • Counter-terrorism: both the EU and Türkiye have suffered from terrorism, albeit in different forms. Istanbul and Ankara have been targeted by ISIS bombs; European cities have faced attacks by ISIS-inspired extremists as well. Turkish forces have battled extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, and Türkiye continues to fight the PKK (a Kurdish terrorist group), which the EU lists as a terrorist organization. A closer partnership could mean coordinating efforts to cut off terror financing, tracking suspects across borders, and working together to stabilize areas where terrorists recruit (like parts of Syria). Europe and Türkiye won’t agree on everything—for instance, Türkiye urges Europe to crack down harder on groups it sees as linked to the PKK—but through honest dialogue they can find common ground on tackling violent extremism without compromising human rights.

  • Border protection and migration management: building on the existing cooperation, the EU and Türkiye could create a more permanent framework for managing migration and securing borders. This might involve the EU’s border agency working more directly with Türkiye or increased funding and technical support for Türkiye’s border security on its eastern and southern frontiers. Joint operations to bust smuggling rings and ensure proper humanitarian treatment of refugees would show that security and compassion can go hand in hand. By planning together for refugee crises—whether due to conflicts, as with Syrians, or natural disasters—both sides can avoid chaos and share responsibility. In essence, Europe and Türkiye can transform ad hoc arrangements into a lasting alliance on border security, to the benefit of stability in the wider region.

  • Diplomacy and conflict resolution: security isn’t only about hard power. Türkiye and the EU could collaborate more in diplomacy to resolve the conflicts that cause so many security problems. Türkiye has unique ties and influence in regions like the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. The EU, in turn, is a major economic player with aid and incentives to offer. Together, they could, for example, coordinate their approaches to easing tensions between Serbia and Kosovo (where Türkiye has historical connections and the EU leads mediation) or work jointly to support a peaceful transition in places like Libya or Syria. Even in dealing with Russia, Türkiye’s channels of communication might complement the tougher stance of EU members, creating a balance of pressure and dialogue. A partnership that combines the EU’s soft power with Türkiye’s regional reach could punch well above its weight in defusing crises before they explode.

Challenges and the road ahead

None of these avenues for cooperation will be without challenges. Decades of mistrust and political disagreements won’t vanish overnight. European leaders will expect Türkiye to firmly align with the West on the big geopolitical questions—especially regarding Russia. Ankara will need to continue the careful balancing act of standing up for Ukraine and European security while managing its own complex relationship with Moscow. As one analyst put it, for Türkiye to take a greater security role in Europe, it ultimately must “choose a side” on the Russia question. That means, for instance, staying committed to NATO plans and not undermining sanctions that Europe has placed on the Kremlin. It might also mean revisiting past decisions, like purchasing Russian weapon systems, to rebuild trust with NATO allies. On the other side, Europe will have to show flexibility and imagination.

This could involve finding a special status for Türkiye in European defense initiatives, even if full EU membership remains off the table for now. It might entail addressing some of Türkiye’s own security concerns—for example, acknowledging the impact of Kurdish terrorist groups or providing more support against threats Türkiye faces from instability in Syria. Diplomatically, European powers like France and Greece, which have clashed with Türkiye in the past, will need to engage in frank, constructive dialogue to prevent bilateral spats from derailing wider cooperation. The prize—a stronger, safer Europe—is well worth the difficult conversations.

The coming years will be decisive. If the war in Ukraine winds down, there will be questions about how to secure a lasting peace and deter any future aggression. If the war drags on, Europe will be in a prolonged face-off with Russia that tests its unity and resources. In either scenario, having Türkiye firmly on the side of Europe’s security order is a huge advantage. Conversely, if Türkiye were alienated or drifted away, only adversaries like Russia would benefit. Both the EU and Türkiye recognize this. The task now is to translate recognition into policy—to move from words at conferences to joint actions on the ground, from polite handshakes to signed agreements and shared missions.

A unified front for an uncertain future

Standing at this crossroads, one can glimpse the outlines of a future where the EU and Türkiye form a powerful strategic tandem. Imagine a European rapid deployment force that includes Turkish officers, ready to respond to a crisis at Europe’s periphery. Picture intelligence analysts in Ankara and Brussels securely videoconferencing to trade real-time information about emerging terror threats. Envision European and Turkish naval ships sailing in formation to keep vital sea lanes open, or border guards jointly inaugurating a new surveillance system that keeps traffickers at bay without barring legitimate travelers.

These snapshots illustrate what a deeper partnership could bring: a Europe that is more secure and a Türkiye that is more integrated with Europe, both reaping the benefits of stability and cooperation. It is often said that crises forge the strongest alliances. The Russian threat, the war in Ukraine, and the upheavals in global politics have certainly been grave crises. But they also present an opportunity to correct mistakes of the past and forge a stronger future. Europe’s security challenges are too large for any one nation or even one union to tackle alone. By embracing Türkiye as a full partner in confronting those challenges, the European Union can extend its reach and reinforce its defenses. Türkiye, in turn, can solidify its place in the Western fold, gain greater say in regional security affairs, and enjoy the economic and political fruits of closer ties with Europe.

For citizens from Paris to Ankara, a more secure environment means better lives and prospects for peace. As a new geopolitical era dawns, Europe and Türkiye find themselves on the same side of a defining struggle—one that pits stability and democratic values against aggression and chaos. The story of European security is still being written, but one thing is clear: it will be far more effective and hopeful if the next chapters are authored together by Brussels and Ankara.

The Russian bear at the gate has unintentionally done something years of diplomacy could not—it has reminded Europe and Türkiye of just how much stronger they are united. The challenge now is to seize this moment and build a security partnership robust enough to keep Europe safe, free, and at peace for generations to come.