After going through the implications of a US-Russia reconciliation for Europe, for Central and Eastern Europe specifically, I ended the first part of the article by posing the question: what really drives Trump’s rapprochement with Moscow, besides economic interest? I attempt to answer this question by coming back to Richard Nixon and his alliance with China against the Soviet Union. In our contemporary case, Trump’s attempt could be labeled as a “reverse Nixon,” but below I outline why achieving a similar result to that of the former Republican president is unrealistic.
The mirage of a “reverse Nixon”
In the early 1970s, US President Richard Nixon successfully managed to draw the People’s Republic of China (PRC) towards closer bilateral relations and away from Soviet influence. This led to increasing US-PRC trade and prevented a deep alliance between Beijing and Moscow, being deemed at that time a significant foreign policy success. Nixon managed to keep China uninvolved in the Vietnam War and ultimately to gain US access to a significant and still underdeveloped market while simultaneously preventing the Soviets from becoming China’s main partners.
If behind Trump’s pandering to Russia is a deeper rationale than that of transactional politics, one based on reshaping geopolitical alliances, then it could be an attempt to enforce a “reverse Nixon”: drawing Russia closer to the United States to prevent it from becoming a junior partner of China. The prioritization of China as the main foreign policy concern for the current administration has been clear, with even the Biden administration outlining Washington’s desire to focus on the Pacific primarily.
Theoretically speaking, drawing a rift between Russia and China could be advantageous in the long term for the United States from a security perspective, as having the two major nuclear powers allied would significantly limit China’s capacity to express its hard power in its near abroad. Moreover, considering the evident interest of China in Russia’s resource-rich Far East regions, Moscow could, theoretically, see China as a greater national security threat than the United States, who in the end was benevolent to them in the Ukraine talks.
However, in practice, Donald Trump has little to no chance to achieve a “reverse Nixon,” for several reasons. For one, just a few years before Richard Nixon’s visit to China, Russia and China were on the brink of war in 1969 due to border disputes in Manchuria, resulting in tens of casualties on both sides. The Sino-Soviet split was already deep before Nixon engaged with Chairman Mao. Meanwhile, at the point in which Trump is attempting to woo Vladimir Putin, Russia and China are witnessing one of their most fruitful partnerships.
Secondly, the Sino-American relations were not as adversarial then as the Russo-American ones are now, and thus there was way more leeway on both sides in the 1970s. Moreover, in the past years particularly, Russian outlets have been training an almost Pavlovian sense within their population of associating the US with a bloodthirsty enemy, a degenerate and adversarial society that wants to destroy Russia and the values that supposedly define it. It will be hard for the Kremlin’s spin doctors to reprogram Russians into accepting the US as a reliable ally.
Thirdly, Richard Nixon engaged with China in a period when the US’s ties with its allies in North America and Western Europe were at their peak, with admiration for Washington being palpable in the societies of Eastern Bloc countries as well. Nowadays, Trump is reaching out to Vladimir Putin at the expense of his most loyal partners.
All in all, the sitting US president’s attempt to offer preferential treatment to Moscow could backfire in multiple ways: besides the loss of trust among European allies, it could also lead to Moscow accepting the US’s favorable terms in the short term and then nevertheless betraying American interests later on. Russia will attempt to play along with the US for as long as it can and until it can achieve as many territorial gains and as many security guarantees in regard to Ukraine as possible, but the declared Russia-China “no limit partnership” will be hard to break. Ultimately, it is based on a common disdain for the Western world order and its values, on a wider ambition to replace it with an alternative system, one whose blueprint can already be seen in formats such as BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
That being said, Beijing has much wider strategic and financial interests than a cooperation with Russia, which is not a priority. Considering Europe’s total rejection of Russia’s warmongering and of Trump’s negotiation tactics towards Moscow, we could see China attempting to draw the Old Continent on its side.
China as the new “adult in the room”
While China has oftentimes supported Russia during the ongoing war in Ukraine, especially with weapons and dual-use goods, it did so to the extent it can avoid full-scale Western sanctions simultaneously. Beijing’s refusal to distance itself from Russia only increased Europe’s suspicion regarding China’s intentions, but recently, especially since the start of Trump’s second term, Beijing has been cleverly pushing narratives meant to persuade Europe of its alleged good intentions.
For example, during the 2025 Munich Security Conference, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi underscored that all stakeholders should participate in the peace talks related to the Russia-Ukraine war. This goes at odds with Donald Trump’s approach of sidelining Ukraine and Europe from the negotiations and engaging bilaterally with Russia. Given the current picture of an aggressive Russia and an appeasing US, the European capitals might have to reconsider their relationship with Beijing, since they might be some of the only reliable “adults in the room” among the world powers.
Of course, Europe’s reticence to China is significant, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, and drawing closer to Beijing could be a blow that could spell a total rift in the Transatlantic relationship. However, given the already-depreciating US-Europe relationship, one should not exclude a multilateral foreign policy being undertaken by some European states, choosing to juggle between Washington and Beijing with all the inherent risks that engaging an authoritarian superpower may pose. Unfortunately, Trump’s disregard for decades-long alliances could push Europe towards such backup plans in preparation for the newly rising modus operandi in geopolitics.
Economic pragmatism to replace value-based alliances
In the Cold War, the demarcation lines between the spheres of influence were much clearer than now, drawn on economic (capitalism versus communism) and political regime (democracy versus autocracy) criteria, with the United States and the Soviet Union standing at the helm of each system. It felt natural for Washington to be allied with democratic states, especially from Europe, or at least with regimes that were anti-communist and anti-Soviet. This demarcation line became even more visible in the last years of the Russia-Ukraine war, with democratic states mobilizing to support Kyiv, while the “Axis of Evil” (Iran, North Korea, and others) mobilized for Russia.
Under Donald Trump’s current approach to Moscow, we could be witnessing a shift towards what can be called a commodification of foreign affairs. Democracy no longer represents for America a binding value to be exported around the world, “transactionalism” being the new guiding principle. An alliance is worth as much as the profits it can bring to my country and my companies, while an alliance with an authoritarian state with significant military leverage and natural resources is more beneficial than supporting some free-loading democratic states with a declining economy. The support for a country’s justified struggle is nothing more than an investment, while a truce becomes an opportunity to bargain and obtain access to financial opportunities.
This new foreign policy model can be soon adopted by other nations around the world as well if proven profitable in the case of the United States and its major companies. This could lead to a new boost in interventionism worldwide.
A boost in worldwide authoritarian expansionism?
Authoritarian nations worldwide look at the development of the US-Russia talks on Ukraine and ponder whether they could follow Moscow’s example in the near future. Could Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, some of the Sahel military dictatorships, Myanmar, and China see the US’s current approach to the Ukraine war and consider that the harassment and invasion of small neighboring nations is much more achievable now?
This seems highly likely, even when such actions seem to be going against United States interests directly. As long as either of the aforementioned countries could carve up a deal that addresses Washington’s financial interests, they might get a free pass on certain disruptive actions. The notable exception would probably be aggression towards Israel, which has a special relationship with the US, regardless of administration, and who would be protected in the face of a full-scale war.
Besides that, considering how Russia is dictating the terms of the Ukraine talks, despite being the aggressor and despite actively working against US strategic interests, this could make “the Axis of Evil” test the limits of US appeasement. While it is unlikely for other authoritarian states to receive the same treatment from Trump that Russia is, it is nevertheless a signal that US allies are exposed to uncertainty. In the case of expansionist dictators, this is the only signal that is needed.
Taking all this into account, who can guarantee that Iran will not try to destabilize neighboring Middle Eastern countries and fund terrorist militias? Who can guarantee Venezuela will not invade Guyana? Who can guarantee that North Korea will not feel emboldened to harass South Korea or Japan? Who can guarantee the protection of the few remaining democratic states in Western Africa from neighboring military dictatorships? And ultimately, who can guarantee that the United States will intervene in Taiwan’s defense in case of a Chinese invasion? After all, they are a fierce economic competitor…
The beginning of the end for a Western world order
If you choose to adopt a grim outlook, it seems that we are entering a post-Western order, as the old Americo-European alliance that shaped the contemporary international law and trade system is becoming more and more fragile. Meanwhile, the Chinese dragon is spreading its wings, as its transformation from a competitive foreign direct investment market for Western companies to a fully-fledged economic, military, and especially technological superpower is now complete. This has been shown by recent advancements that compete and even surpass American companies in certain domains, such as the tech sector and artificial intelligence. All these developments do not mean that the Europe we know is fading away, but it has to adapt to a reality in which it is no longer the focal point of the world.
Or will there be post-Trump Europe-US reconciliation?
On the other hand, from a more optimistic perspective, one has to draw a clear line between a Trump mandate and America’s foreign and security policy as a whole. It might be just a terrifying hiatus in a longstanding Europe-US partnership, one that can be revitalized after the 2028 US Presidential Election. Either way, this alliance has an unbreakable core, one that has historically shaped the destinies of both parts, with sacrifice and blood being split for the security and democracy of the other. From the beaches of Normandy, where Americans gave their lives to save democratic Europe from the grip of Nazi Germany, to European countries joining ranks and sending their support for the United States in the Middle East after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, the United States–Russia friendship has little to no historical basis and could break off as easily as it started.
Peace through strength
Concluding, I would like to refer to Trump’s foreign policy slogan—“peace “through strength.” It is not original; it has been used by many historical leaders, including Roman Emperor Hadrian, but it is most likely borrowed from former US President Ronald Reagan. Although I agree with the idea behind the slogan, I find it quite ironic that Trump chose to quote exactly Reagan, the pure definition of a Russia hawk, a Cold Warrior whose dedication to countering Soviet influence worldwide is what decisively contributed to the fall of the USSR and to the liberation of the Eastern Bloc countries.
Back when the Republican Party was defined by a clear anti-communist and anti-Soviet line, Reagan was the definition of value-based foreign policy, as opposed to transactional politics and concessions to dictators. Considering how Donald Trump is appeasing Russia on an unprecedented scale, to hear that the current administration appropriated Reagan’s motto makes me sure that the former US president is rolling over in his grave.