The first couple of months of Donald Trump’s US presidency, particularly his foreign policy approach, have left many Europeans to question whether any of the decades-long security and diplomatic ties that defined transatlantic relations are of actuality.

From calling the Ukrainian president a dictator to pressuring Kyiv to accept a rigid minerals deal while simultaneously making concessions to Russia before even the formal start of negotiations has left many, in Europe and other democratic countries of the world, wondering to what extent they can rely on Washington anymore. The current political equation is simple: Ukraine has currently lost any of its perspectives to join NATO, had its US military funding shut down, gravely impacting its air defense, and has little to no perspective of recovering any territory, but rather of losing even more, and has become a passive actor with no agency in the Washington-Moscow negotiations, reminiscent of the 19th-century “balance of power” strategies that defined imperial spheres of influence.

Meanwhile, Russia has been receiving only slaps on the wrist from the sitting US president, with Trump merely stating that Putin is “destroying” Russia and threatening sanctions only after a massive bombardment on Ukrainian cities. Despite these mild threats and the US president’s exaggerated openness to Moscow, the Kremlin has not made one concession to indicate its willingness to stop the war and continues to receive favorable terms either way.

While Trump’s policy can be profit-driven, wanting to stop the US’s military spending abroad at all costs while acquiring significant Ukrainian natural resources, different interests might stand on the basis of the new Washington-Moscow rapprochement.

However, it must be pointed out that we are only in the early stages of this reconciliation, that President Trump has proven himself to be an unpredictable leader, and that ultimately, US-Europe collaboration and US-Russia rivalry have deep roots that are difficult to remove.

Despite this, thus far we have seen no signals that Washington-Moscow relations could go sour, quite the opposite. For now, Trump has only been poised to consider America’s neighbors (Canada, Mexico) and the European Union as the United States’s rivals. Given these circumstances, the democratic world in general, and Europe in particular, has to look forward and consider the prospects of a United States reconciliation with Russia. Below you can find several possible implications.

Europe at a crossroads

The European continent must now understand that the crisis it is subjected to is also an opportunity. For decades, Europe’s defense has relied on its transatlantic ally, with only Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine starting a reinforcement of the European defense sector. Currently, Europe finally sees the importance of self-reliance in security issues and is building up its defense production and capacities. A united European defense can stand against an expansionist Russia on its own in the medium term, but the rearming of Europe should be implemented while also countering the rise of populism. Suppose the rise of the European defense and technology industries does not lead to economic growth that is visible to the average citizen. In that case, populists will effectively profit from it, since they are enjoying a more convenient geopolitical environment, having supporters both westward and eastward.

With the Trump administration and many of its associated figures, including Elon Musk, overtly supporting right-wing nationalist movements throughout Europe, these populist parties can easily continue pushing the same narratives they have been conveying for years, since now they could counter the pro-Russia accusations by arguing their support for a revitalized transatlantic relation. Simply put, they are not simply Putinists anymore; they can frame themselves as “Trump whisperers” and as gatekeepers of the US-Europe alliance. For example, the pledge to return to Russian energy resources could no longer be seen as succumbing to Russia’s demands but just as adapting Europe to a new geopolitical framework while returning Europe’s economy to its pre-2022 status quo, craved by many European citizens.

As such, while most current European governments (with a few notable exceptions, such as Hungary or Slovakia) have chosen a path toward the revitalization of Europe’s defense capabilities, the European people have not fully made this choice yet. As it stands, despite the recent apparent loss of Alternative for Germany in the February election, populism continues to be on a continuous rise, driven by the slowdown of the European economies in the last few years and especially by a deep fear of another European war. This is why it is crucial for the financial profits and opportunities that will appear through Europe’s rearmament project to trickle down to average working- and middle-class Europeans.

Otherwise, we could see Europe stuck between two world powers, listening to their dictates, in exchange for a sense of economic stability in the West and at the expense of existential uncertainty in Central and Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, strategic communication by the European leadership will prove crucial in this endeavor, explaining to the population that only a militarily prepared and self-reliant Europe can be prosperous and deter Russia from a direct conflict that many genuinely fear.

That being said, if Europe ultimately decides to choose to oppose Russia and its newly discovered partnership with the United States, it must reinforce other alliances—and this is where things might become complicated. While Europe has thus far been keen on enhancing their economic collaboration with other democratic countries, such as India, Indonesia, or South American states, as a response to the Trump presidency, it might not be enough to counter the Washington-Moscow duo.

As both Russia and the United States currently spell instability for Europe’s leaders, we might see a fruitful but dangerous cooperation between the European capitals and Beijing. What that implies in the long term can only be speculated, but it is a dangerous game that could lead, if we consider the cases of some Balkan and African countries, to an economic unilateral dependency and indebtedness, to the demotion of Europe to a junior partner. As such, Europe will have to strike a balance in its alliances, one that is based on shared values and economic interests alike.

Ukraine’s abandonment and what it signals to Central and Eastern Europe

With Ukraine now being treated almost like a colony being carved up by two world powers, anxiety arises among Central and Eastern European (CEE) nations. Countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and the Baltic States have been perceiving the United States since the 1990s as the ultimate guarantor of their safety from Russian expansionism and “threw themselves” into Washington’s arms, while Western Europe was viewed as an essential ally, but with slightly more reticence. This reticence stemmed, on one hand, from the deep wounds that Nazi Germany’s expansionism with the Soviet Union’s complicity left among many Eastern Bloc countries and, on the other hand, from the very close economic and energy relations between Western European countries (especially Germany) and the Russian Federation in the 2000s and 2010s.

As such, the United States was for a long time seen as the most reliable ally to assure the security and independence of CEE nations. However, seeing how Ukraine is being treated after years of unimaginable sacrifice, CEE countries will be cautious about Washington’s commitment to protect its allies. Instead, nations such as Poland have already understood that the current Western European partners are trustworthy and that a new European security architecture needs to be built alongside them. Simultaneously, countries such as Poland and Estonia have understood the importance of self-reliance as well, reflected in them being the first and second biggest NATO defense spenders as a percentage of GDP.

Regardless of Western European help in case of a Russian attack, CEE states need to be able to defend themselves from Russian aggression for at least a couple of months. As such, the rapprochement between the United States and Russia has made the Eastern European states understand that they cannot put all their eggs in the American basket and that, ultimately, they have to step up their defense preparedness to have a greater say in European security issues. Poland understood that, but many CEE states are lagging in terms of defense spending and modernization of their armies.

In total, the US’s renewed relationship with Russia has been a tremendous disappointment to the former communist countries, one that will further away one of Washington’s most loyal and trustworthy allies. Given the US’s immense loss of soft power following recent foreign policy actions, one then has to ask—besides purely financial interests (reducing war spending, accessing natural resources), why is Donald Trump’s administration turning towards Russia?

This question, as well as issues concerning the role of China, the reevaluation of guiding principles in policymaking, and the rebirth of authoritarian interventionism, are covered in the second part of this analysis.