We live in a time of polycrisis. The Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have intensified the economic crisis, which in turn complicates efforts to address the climate crisis; the migration crisis is contributing to polarization over immigration, which is impacting an already challenged democracy, and so on. These interconnected crises affect how liberal democracies justify the exercise of political power. The concept of consent, which underpins the idea of legitimacy, is being tested by these crises. In this article, I will first explain the origin and meaning of the term polycrisis. Then, I will describe how it challenges traditional notions of legitimacy. Finally, I will propose an appropriate approach to addressing the polycrisis.

The term “polycrisis” was initially introduced in the 1990s by Edgar Morin and Anne Brigitte Kern. They used it to describe an age where it is not possible to pinpoint the most prominent problem that overshadows others. According to Morin and Kern1, “There is no single vital problem, but many vital problems, and it is this complex intersolidarity of problems, antagonisms, crises, uncontrolled processes, and the general crisis of the planet that constitutes the number one vital problem.” Thus, the concept of polycrisis suggests that various crises are interconnected and overlapping, leading to significant uncertainty across all domains and making it difficult to predict future outcomes despite advancements in science and technology.

For individuals outside of academia who follow European politics, the term "polycrisis" may be known through Jean-Claude Juncker, the former President of the European Commission (2014-2019). He described the polycrisis faced by the European Union not only as simultaneous crises but also as crises that feed each other and create a sense of insecurity2.

These are approximations to the concept. A more systematic account of the term polycrisis comes from a group of scholars from the Cascade Institute. They define polycrisis, or more specifically, global polycrisis, as “the causal entanglement of crises in multiple global systems in ways that significantly degrade humanity's prospects”3 4. This definition is useful because it indicates that the entangled crises have a global scope and harmful impacts.

Unfortunately, just because the polycrisis is harmful doesn’t mean that the solution will be painless. The coming paragraphs will be about this. I provided this brief overview of the polycrisis because what concerns me as a political theorist, and what I believe should concern anyone interested in the future developments of domestic and international politics, are the political reasons that will be proposed to address it.

In this article I will address two types of political reasons: those related to the acceptability of laws, rules, or public policies among those who will be affected by them, and those concerning actions taken to meet state needs, which may not primarily consider the acceptability among those affected. In other words, it will focus on public reasons and reasons of state.

The idea of public reason may sound unfamiliar to those not well-versed in political theory, yet it embodies a principle widely recognized in liberal democracies. This concept suggests that "the moral or political rules that regulate our common life be, in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom the rules purport to have authority"5. In essence, the legitimacy of exercising political power hinges on its justification to all members of liberal democratic societies.

It is important to clarify a key aspect here. The rejection of certain laws, rules, or public policies cannot be based on subjective opinions or mere personal dislikes. The concept of public reason aims to address the diversity inherent in pluralistic societies by referring to accepted general beliefs and conclusions of science when these are not controversial6. Therefore, if I oppose a specific law, rule, or public policy that is founded on the accepted beliefs of my society and supported by scientific conclusions, I cannot deem it illegitimate.

Conversely, the concept of reason of state has gradually become obscure in liberal democracies, and those who recall it often regard it with skepticism. This skepticism is not unfounded. While public reason suggests that political action should be based on common beliefs, values, or principles of justice, the reason of state implies that it may be necessary to transgress them to achieve certain ends, typically the preservation of the existing political order. Consequently, it can easily be manipulated to justify unjust actions. Putin has claimed on several occasions that the decision to invade Ukraine was driven by the perceived threat to Russia from Ukraine's affinity with NATO.

The issue with reasons of state is that, unlike public reasons where we can theoretically distinguish between what aligns with the shared beliefs, values, and principles of justice within a society and what does not, or what is supported by scientific conclusions and what is not, reasons of state lack such clear demarcations. We are only able to evaluate whether a reason of state is good or bad. For instance, considering the economic repercussions of the sanctions imposed on Russia, the significant number of Russian casualties, the uncertainty surrounding the war's outcome, the exodus of human capital from Russia, and its growing reliance on China, it is evident that the decision to invade Ukraine represents a poor example of a reason of state.

Nonetheless, this negative view of the reason of state is misleading. The transgression inherent to it is as old as the first political organizations and will persist because it is inherently linked to politics7. Even liberal democracies cannot get rid of it, and there are good examples of reasons of state in them. What I intend to convey is both that the harmful impacts of the polycrisis might be mitigated by transgressing some deeply held values and beliefs in liberal democracies and that doing so may do more to protect liberal democracies than not transgressing those values and beliefs.

Acknowledging the inevitability of the reason of state does not equate to endorsing evil; rather, it involves recognizing the tragic dimension of politics. It is evident that addressing the challenges posed by the polycrisis cannot solely rely on shared liberal democratic values. The conflict in Ukraine will not cease due to protests in Berlin, London, or Paris but through the fortification of Ukraine. Non-democratic regimes will persist, some democratic regimes may experience regressions, and these entities may exert pressure on democratic regimes if permitted.

The migration crisis necessitates regulatory measures. The idea that we can simultaneously achieve economic degrowth through democratic means, safeguard individual freedoms, and protect the environment is magical thinking8. The list of examples goes on. Furthermore, acknowledging the inevitability of the reason of state entails accepting that scientific conclusions often do not provide definitive guidance on the appropriate course of action, but when they do, the recommended actions may not align with liberal or democratic principles, as evidenced during the Covid-19 pandemic.

To summarize, governing the present and future during a time of polycrisis will necessitate transgressing some of our cherished values, beliefs, and principles of justice. Consequently, relying solely on watchdogs to alert us to such transgressions is insufficient. It is also essential to echo Max Weber's rejection of “the simple thesis that only good can flow from good, only evil from evil”9; to demonstrate sufficient maturity as a citizenry to discern when such transgressions are necessary; and to avoid cynicism by not celebrating these transgressions merely when the government aligns with our preferences, yet criticizing them when it does not.

References

1 Morin, E., & Kern, A. B. (1999). Homeland Earth: A Manifesto for the New Millennium. Hampton Press.
2 Juncker, J.-C. (2016). Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Annual General Meeting of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV).
3 Lawrence, M., Janzwood, S. & Homer-Dixon, T. (2022). ‘What Is a Global Polycrisis? And how is it different from a systemic risk? Discussion Paper 2022-4. Version 2.0. Cascade Institute.
4 Lawrence, M., Homer-Dixon, T., Janzwood, S., Rockstöm, J., Renn, O., & Donges, J. F. (2024). Global Polycrisis: The causal mechanisms of crisis entanglement. Global Sustainability, 7.
5 Quong, J. (2022) Public Reason. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
6 Rawls, J. (2005). Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press. 7 Del Águila, R. (2000). La Senda del Mal: Política y Razón de Estado. Taurus.
8 Milanovic, B. (2021). Degrowth: Solving the impasse by magical thinking. Global Policy Journal.
9 Weber, M. (1994). Weber: Political Writings. Cambridge University Press.