Gaza, Rome, cyclical geopolitics and peace

It is strange how history often appears to repeat itself, but often in unforeseen variations, so that no patterns appear discernible.

It is also strange how those who claim they do not want to repeat the errors of the past in seeking peace fail to achieve their goals―assuming they really try!―precisely because the political situation may appear similar to events in the past but is, in fact, profoundly different.

It is easy to make facile historical analogies: the difficulty lies in fully explicating the difference between then and now…

At the same time, it is also strange how peace proposals made and rejected in one period of history suddenly become relevant and perhaps politically feasible.

Copper coins of the revolt against Rome

In the midst of Israel’s war in Gaza in 2025, archaeologists in northern Israel uncovered copper coins dating back more than 1,600 years; they were buried deep within the Hukok hiding complex, a network of tunnels and chambers that was carved during the Great Revolt against Rome (66–70 CE). That was when the Roman “occupiers” (to use a modern term) destroyed the Jerusalem Temple, and the majority of Jews fled to Babylon in modern Iraq or else to Egypt. If not enslaved, many eventually fled to Italy, Spain, Gaul, and Eastern Europe.

For those who remained under Roman captivity, the tunnels were extended for use in the Bar-Kochba Revolt (132–136 CE). The coins just discovered appear to have been hidden during the third Gallus Revolt of 351–352 CE against the rule of Constantius Gallus, brother-in-law of Emperor Constantius II, during the civil war between the rebel Roman General Magnus Magnentius and Constantius II.

Fast Forward: If one replaces the Jewish Sicarii and the Zealots of the first Jewish-Roman war (66–70 CE), and then later Jewish resistance groups, with Hamas, and one also replaces the Roman empire with Israel, backed by the American empire, the story is once again repeating itself in horrific new variations.

Just like the Jewish resistance fighters, who once fought the Romans from hidden tunnels, hiding their copper coins, so too has Hamas in Gaza, with new shekels filtered through Israel from Qatar, ironically under Netanyahu’s supervision, which resulted in the “Qatar-gate”¹ scandal in Israel—a scandal that is being used by Netanyahu’s opponents to further discredit him.

Even in an era of high-tech warfare, drones, and AI-guided missiles, some things- like underground “hybrid” warfare- don’t change. Moreover, the nature of political demands and the repression that follows hardly alters in substance―even if the actors involved and the geopolitical situation are totally different.

Talking peace, doing war

The presumed “inevitability” that history always repeats itself in cycles of violence does not provide much optimism for qualitative social and political change. It would be excellent if Homines Geopolitici and Economi could finally transcend its present state of turpitude and what is really “war of some against some”—because not everyone is fighting in a Hobbesian “war of all against all”—at least not yet.

Nevertheless, there is a great danger that those leaders who talk the most about peace are among the first to engage in war once they come into power. And the “Big Lie” is rapidly becoming the standard media norm in almost all major and less powerful countries.

It is also the case that plans for peace—that might succeed or fail miserably given disputes over what seem to be small details—can suddenly be unearthed like Roman coins buried in the tunnels of the human memory. Some plans can potentially become actualized, but only in new circumstances and variations.

2005 Gaza Withdrawal

One failed “peace” attempt was Ariel Sharon’s decision, made in 2003-05, to withdraw Israeli forces and settlements from Gaza.

On the surface, the withdrawal, which eventually took place in August 2005, appeared intended to provide the Gaza Palestinians with “self-rule.” Instead, it ended up dividing the two major Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, and sparking a bitter civil war that Hamas won. In effect, the unilateral withdrawal froze the peace process―as was its actual intent.

At that time, Netanyahu, in resigning in protest from his post as finance minister in the Sharon government, had warned² against the impending Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005, “Gaza is becoming a base for Islamic terror… Everyone sees this. Hamas is getting stronger and taking credit for what looks like our running away under fire.’”

Knowing well that Hamas was gaining influence, the Sharon government nevertheless withdrew from Gaza without fully consulting the Palestinians and the major actors that were concerned with Israel’s relations with the Palestinians.

Had Sharon engaged with the Palestinian Authority and the Quartet Group of the UN, US, EU, and Russia, his Arab neighbors, he could have possibly achieved a lasting peace.

A sustainable peace would have required the deployment of truly neutral international peacekeepers under a general UN mandate. Such an international peacekeeping force could have protected both Palestinians and Israelis—much as I argued³ in my talk, the “Future of Transatlantic Relations,” at a Forum du Futur conference held at the French Senate (June 21, 2005) that took place two months before the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

Return of Netanyahu

Once Netanyahu returned to power, he remained in office as Prime Minister for far too long—from 2009 to the present, after having already served from 1996 to 1999. During this time, he has ironically been able to manipulate the divided Palestinian leadership and the Hamas threat as a means to stay in office.

More recently, he has used the war in Gaza since October 2023 as a means to rally and unify Israeli domestic support for his failing⁴ leadership and for his extreme right-wing Zionist coalition government that has sought to undermine the legal power of Israel’s courts⁵—the foundation of Israeli democracy.

Here, one wonders how so-called “democracies” can permit presidents and prime ministers to serve multiple terms and still call themselves “democracies”—and not quasi-authoritarian fiefdoms!

A single 4-6 year term⁶ for prime ministers and presidents should be sufficient depending on the country. Then it is time for someone else—whether of the same party or another!

A date which will live in infamy

Eighteen years after Israel’s 2005 withdrawal, on October 7, 2023, Hamas engaged in a horrific massacre—a “date which will live in infamy”—much as Netanyahu had forewarned in a self-fulfilling prophecy way back in 2005.

The Israeli narrative is that less than 700 IDF soldiers were stationed at the Gaza border when some 3000 Hamas jihadists rushed it on the morning of October 7, 2023. Hamas was purportedly able to surprise—or perhaps fool⁷—the Israeli defense forces despite all of the latter’s vast human and artificial intelligence capabilities. In April 1985, there had been a somewhat similar PLO plan for a major attack on the Israeli military headquarters in Tel Aviv; yet that attack had been foiled by Israel.

So why did Netanyahu fail to stop the October 2023 Hamas attack that he himself had been warning about for years?

In fact, Netanyahu had been warned of an impending Hamas attack for at least a year before⁸. And Israeli surveillance knew Hamas was engaging in military exercises in an imitation kibbutz. Moreover, Netanyahu was purportedly warned at least ten to three days before the Hamas attacks by Egypt⁹ (denied by Netanyahu). Instead of acting, however, Netanyahu’s government may have opted to suffer the initial blow from Hamas on October 7, 2023—much like Franklin D. Roosevelt allegedly did at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1945—that “date which will live in infamy.”

It is possible that Netanyahu’s decision not to confront Hamas on October 7 could have been taken to politically justify a massive military reprisal that was intended to “eradicate” Hamas altogether, regardless of the massive civilian death and destruction caused by Israel’s intervention into Gaza.

Given Israel’s vast contemporary surveillance and spying capabilities, it appears dubious that Netanyahu did not know of the planned October 7 attack. So if Netanyahu did know, it raises questions as to why IDF forces that were engaged in the West Bank at the time, or others, were not immediately deployed to Gaza.

Was it a sacrifice for the greater cause? After all, who, among the Israeli right, cares about rave parties and Kibbutzniks?

Hannah Arendt, Albert Einstein, and other major Jewish intellectuals had already warned¹⁰ about the iron fist methods of the right-wing Zionist movement when Menachem Begin visited the US in 1948. They warned that Begin represented “a Fascist party for whom terrorism (against Jews, Arabs, and British alike) and misrepresentation are means, and a ‘Leader State’ is the goal.”

An Israeli national commission should investigate and hopefully unveil the truth.

Analogy to the British mandate

The 20-point Trump peace plan could prove workable—but only if it moves significantly away from Trump’s initial 2020 Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plan and the later 2025 “Gaza Riviera” plan.

In order to succeed in establishing a more or less positive peace, more extensive Israel-Palestinian and international negotiations will be needed. The key problem is that the present Israeli leadership is resisting the internationalization of the conflict and only wants to deal with the US—and evidently only with the US under Trump and not with US leaders like Biden or Obama.

In reading the 20 points, another historical analogy comes to mind. That of the Balfour Declaration, the Treaty of Versailles, and the British mandate of colonial governance that is outside international oversight…

The 20-point plan proposes a new international transitional body, the "Board of Peace," headed by Donald Trump, that will “set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump's peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza.”

While this approach appears appropriate as long as the Board serves as a fundraiser and does not engage directly in Palestinian politics, it nevertheless does not appear to include a role for the UN Security Council—unless it fully incorporates many of the proposals of the Saudi-French peace plan, which does include a major role for the UN in working with the Palestinians.

Nevertheless, the appointment of former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair as a member of the board is a bad sign. Blair was nicknamed “Bush’s poodle” when he was a neoliberal propagandist for the 2003 Iraq War. It seems ironic that President Trump would pick someone who was a proponent of the “forever wars” and who is generally not a very well-liked person in the Arab world.

Now, Blair appears to be Trump’s poodle: His staff helped craft the absurd “Gaza Riviera” plan in which Palestinians would be treated like American Indians on reservations, but without ownership of property and businesses, i.e., it appears those who decide to remain (if not booted out) would all be working in Trump casinos!

While the 20-point plan does not make any direct mention of a role for the UN that would help provide international legitimacy and oversight for the new reformed Palestinian government and Israeli relations with that government, the Trump plan does refer to the Saudi-French peace plan that does explicitly reference working with the UN Security Council and the Palestinian Authority, as previously stated, and that foresees the implementation of the “two-state solution.” So there needs to be some clarity and synthesis here.

The “Board of Peace” should accordingly make it clear that it will work with the UN, the EU, and the Arab states, as well as with the US, to provide international finance and expertise to establish a functioning government in reforming the Palestinian Authority and Gaza governance, in dialogue with Palestinian leaders.

While the present Hamas leadership should be excluded from the new government, the US and Israeli’s will still need to deal with Hamas―until the Palestinians themselves choose a new leadership and possess both a major political and an ownership stake in the development of their new country.

As Hamas may prove unwilling to leave power, transition may prove difficult to realize. Releasing Marwan Barghouti from Israeli prison might provide the Palestinians with a new leadership that can work to supercede Hamas and Fatah.

Several other issues need to be resolved: The 20-point plan does not yet address key issues of how to achieve a political-economic integration of Gaza with the West Bank into a larger state with East Jerusalem as the capital. Should a unitary or confederal, or another model be considered? That needs to be determined by the Palestinians.

As the plan proposes, an interfaith dialogue is crucial, yet there also needs to be more far-reaching steps taken toward Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, much as took place in South Africa after the overthrow of Apartheid. But after such horrific death and destruction in Palestine, that will evidently take quite some time if it occurs at all.

Peace force? Or forced peace?

Point No. 15 establishes a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) that is crucial for the security of both Israel and a future Palestinian state. The new Palestinian leadership will need to accept the conditions of neutrality and demilitarization to obtain statehood. Yet if Gaza is to be neutral and demilitarized, the Palestinian population must be guaranteed protection.

While it is critical to stop the flow of arms to Gaza, as point 15 of the Trump plan states, it is also critical to protect the Palestinians from Israeli abuse. This means such an International Stabilization Force (ISF) should be strictly neutral and jointly overseen by Israeli, Palestinian, and UN authorities and not by Israeli defense forces alone.

Here, the Trump plan, point 9, also refers to the Saudi-French plan, which explicitly envisions a “temporary international stabilization mission upon invitation by the Palestinian Authority, to be mandated by the UN Security Council, in line with the New York Declaration.” Meanwhile, we commit to scaling up our support to train and equip Palestinian police and security forces, building on existing programs, including USSC, EUPOL COPPS, and EUBAM Rafah.”

Here, even though the Trump plan does not mention the UN, perhaps for domestic political reasons, ideological Republican party opposition, and/or because of Israeli refusal to work with the UN, the reference in point 9 to the Saudi-French plan explicitly mentions working with the UN. So once again, some clarity would be helpful.

In addition, Trump’s plan does not, at least at this time, appear to address the timing for the Israeli Defense Forces to withdraw from Gaza. The plan does not define clear borders between Israel and the new Palestine, nor does it discuss dismantling illegal settlements in the West Bank. All this requires coordination between the UN, Israel, the Palestinians, and decent and trustworthy security forces. And the ISF should be possibly be deployed in the West Bank as well.

Demilitarization and deradicalization must be mutual. The dilemma is that Israel also needs to restrain members of its own population, security forces, and private contractors from inciting violence. Since its deployment as a substitute for the UN and humanitarian organizations, the US-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) and Israeli forces have allegedly killed, between 27 May and 13 August 2005, “at least 1,760 Palestinians seeking aid; 994 in the vicinity of the GHF sites and 766 along the routes of supply convoys. Most of these killings were committed by the Israeli military.”

As Hamas has been reluctant to give up its arms in fear Israel will continue to use force in the future, the dilemma is that if Israel cannot restrain itself and refuses to accept international norms, then only a neutral, long-term, and not “temporary,” international peacekeeping force under a general UN mandate could protect the Palestinians—as long term peacekeeping will create more dilemmas!

Could Israel violate the peace again?

There is accordingly the danger that peace negotiations could once again be disrupted by Netanyahu. In September 2025, Israel tried to assassinate Hamas negotiators in Doha, Qatar, at the risk of embroiling the whole region. Under pressure from Trump, who needs to continue to restrain Israel, Netanyahu “apologized” to Doha…

What did Netanyahu think his airborne Sicarii-like assassination attempt was going to achieve? It failed to kill the Hamas leadership. Such an action has only further tarnished Israel’s already negative image—in which it has been accused of “genocide”—as well as the image of the US, which once saw itself as a champion for human rights, for so far strongly backing plans for a “greater Israel.”

There is a real possibility that once Hamas releases the remaining hostages, and thus Netanyahu obtains what he needs to boost his domestic support in Israel, and put an end to the daily protests against his government, he could find a pretext to start the war again.

And Netanyahu could also divert attention from Gaza and the West Bank by sparking a war with Iran. He has done that before as well…

It would have been a very different story way back in August 2005 if Ariel Sharon had coordinated Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, with the Quartet Powers of the UN, EU, US, and Russia and with Israel’s Arab neighbors―in deploying a truly neutral international peacekeeping force designed to keep Israelis and Palestinians from killing each other.

And, as observed by mediator Gershon Baskin (The Times of Israel, 9 October 2025), Hamas was ready for a somewhat similar peace accord in September 2024, outlined in the “Three Weeks Deal.” Hamas had agreed “to release all of the hostages, not to govern Gaza any longer, and to end the war. But Israel was not prepared to go ahead”—and Biden was not willing to pressure Netanyahu…

And Trump might not have finally decided to pressure Netanyahu to accept a deal with Hamas―if Netanyahu had not been idiotic enough to order a (failed) attack on Hamas mediators in Doha, Qatar on Sepember 9 in an airborne Sicarii assassination attempt. The US Al Udeid airbase had previously protected Qatar against Iranian attacks, yet this time, the US did not even attempt to intercept Israel’s F-35 attack. By the end of September, Trump promised Qatar US security guarantees against any attack.

Will peace work this time?

Now world leaders appear to be resurrecting old peace and peacekeeping proposals from deep within the tunnels of human memory like ancient coins—that could be applied and spent in different ways and in new variations…

If the above issues and others are not soon addressed, the world can expect more horror from the tragedy of the Middle East, with the US empire backing its Israeli gendarme and acting not much differently than ancient Rome.

Let us hope we are not in a new global cycle of revenge and counter-revenge!