The Russian Navy is at a crossroads. Historically the poor sibling of the armed forces, and despite constrained industrial capacity and the burden of the war in Ukraine, the Russian Navy has pursued large ambitions, such as the Lider-class destroyer and the Shtorm-class aircraft carrier. These high-visibility ships, however, remain mere projects and have faded into the background of Russia’s recent naval policy. Indeed, they encapsulate an enduring dilemma of the Russian Navy. Does it envision challenging NATO in the high seas or on Russia’s periphery?

The two projects

Initially revealed in the early 2010s, the Lider-class (Project 23560) is envisioned as a nuclear-powered destroyer, displacing up to 19,000 tons, and capable of fulfilling a broad spectrum of missions. It would reportedly field Kalibr, Oniks, and possibly Tsirkon hypersonic missiles, along with the S-500 air defense systems, giving it both offensive and defensive punch at a scale unseen outside of U.S. Ticonderoga- or Zumwalt-class vessels. Its nuclear propulsion, similar to that of the Soviet nuclear-powered Kirov-class battlecruisers, would allow it to operate globally, independent of refueling logistics, which Russia’s limited access to the world ocean and lack of overseas bases constrain.

Yet, as of 2025, no keel has been laid. The Lider-class is estimated to cost multiple billions of dollars per ship. For the cost, Russia could purchase several Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates, armed with Kalibr missiles, which are adequate for Baltic, Black Sea, and Arctic missions. Hence, the opportunity cost is significant. It is perhaps for this reason that the project has languished in the design phase for over a decade. The heavy cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, which underwent a seemingly endless modernization, has become a cautionary tale of delays and cost overruns. Rumors persist that the Lider class has been quietly canceled or reduced to a technological testbed.

Another flagship project in hot water is the Shtorm-class (Project 23000) aircraft carrier. If built, it would represent an ambitious leap in providing Russia with a significant blue-water aviation capability to replace its current single, aging carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. The design of Project 23000 envisions a supercarrier with a displacement of 90,000 to 100,000 tons, positioning it in a similar size category to the largest aircraft carriers of the US Navy. While initial considerations included a conventional propulsion, the current preference leans towards a nuclear-powered system, unlike the Kuznetsov. Expected to have a sea endurance of approximately 120 days, the vessel would require a crew of 4,000-5,000 personnel, including the air wing.

Here, too, realization faces considerable challenges, and its future is uncertain. Financial constraints pose a major hurdle, with estimated costs potentially reaching $9 billion. Russia’s current financial pressures make funding such a large and expensive undertaking difficult. Technical challenges, particularly the development and integration of advanced systems such as electromagnetic catapults, would demand substantial investment and expertise. The project has yet to receive official approval for construction, and Russia’s current defense spending priorities appear directed towards other areas, including modernizing existing naval assets, such as the troubled Admiral Kuznetsov.

Russia’s strategic dilemma

Built in large numbers, Lider- and Shtorm-class ships would turn Russia into a leading maritime power of global stature. It would form a fleet capable of operating far from home. But, as mentioned above, Russian leaders seemingly cannot bring themselves to invest massively in these flagship projects. Where does this indecisiveness come from?

Russia’s navy suffers from what can only be described as a split identity. On the one hand, it maintains the allure of a blue-water power: long-range nuclear submarines, an aircraft carrier, bases in Syria, and distant ‘show-the-flag’ operations. On the other hand, its actual maritime priorities are heavily littoral: fighting the war in Ukraine, defending the country’s coasts, denying NATO access to the Black and Baltic Seas, securing the submarine bastions in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, and maintaining second-strike nuclear deterrent patrols.

Russia’s perceived primary security threat is NATO. Both an ocean-going fleet and a littoral fleet can serve to fight NATO, but in different ways. In wartime, a fleet of top-of-the-line destroyers and aircraft carriers could project beyond the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. Then, in coordination with submarines, they could threaten NATO’s sea lines of communication. NATO Europe needs to solidly control the Atlantic Ocean to send troops and material from the United States to the actual frontline. In other words, a blue-water fleet would reduce NATO combat power upstream, in what some like to call a ‘Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.’

A littoral fleet is less able to attack NATO’s sea lines of communication. However, it can still participate in a war by supporting land forces and launching ground strikes (like in Ukraine currently). Moreover, it would also help the war effort by keeping NATO navies at bay and performing air defense missions.

In an ideal world, Moscow would field both a blue-water and green-water fleet. But, although defense spending has risen during the war in Ukraine, the land forces and the air force consume much of it, and naval expenditure remains the poor cousin. With its heavy focus on smaller corvettes and frigates more suited for near-shore missions, Russia has, for now, chosen the littoral fleet option. It is just so much cheaper. However, if the Ukraine War ends and Moscow were to resolve its financial issues somehow, the ocean-going fleet could come back on the table.

Hence, should Russia eventually lay down a Lider-class or a Shtorm-class hull, it would reveal a lot about the future focus of the Russian Navy.