Germany’s port deal with China

The Merkel administration was rightfully criticized for many of its policy decisions. Arguably the worst aspects of the former chancellor’s legacy can be observed in the sphere of foreign policy. For years the German government had been criticized for its close ties to Russia. Germany’s failed “Energiewende” (the transition strategy for a low-carbon economy) and its blatant dependence on Russian fossil fuels, particularly gas, as well as the shameful appeasement of the Russian dictatorship, are just some of the factors that have led to the current situation in Ukraine and its consequences for the wider world.

For those reasons, it seems even more absurd to read about the ongoing developments of German foreign policy. The war in Ukraine was supposed to lead to a “Zeitenwende”—a “changing of times,” a complete 180-degree switch in Germany’s foreign and security policy.

Yet, as if nothing had happened, the headline seems to be Chancellor Olaf Scholz's bizarre decision to overrule members of his coalition in their attempt to block the Chinese company Cosco from buying a part of the Hamburg harbor. In the initial deal, Cosco was supposed to buy 35% of the terminal “Tellerort,” allowing the company to become a majority shareholder.

The deal was blocked by the Minister of Economic Affairs, Robert Habeck, from the Green Party, and subsequently opposed by 6 other ministries from Scholz’s cabinet. After a couple of chaotic days, the coalition came to a “compromise.” Through Scholz’s deal, Cosco will be limited to 24.9% of the shares, without veto rights and without a direct influence on the management of the terminal.

However, there are still plenty of critical voices in Germany. The FDP parliamentarian Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, a politician who specializes in military affairs and security policy, once criticized the deal as a “mistake during a time of uncertainty.” She criticized Germany’s “flexible back” in its relations with Peking, which “belongs in the Hamburg ballet, not the Hamburg Harbour.”

Anton Hofreiter from the Greens was critical, too. The politician argued in the ARD “Morgenmagazin” that while with the 24.9% share, the influence of China is significantly reduced, the country remains a dictatorial regime that is using government-owned companies to buy German infrastructure.

There were also strong attacks from the biggest opposition party, the CDU. The former minister of health, Jens Spahn, compared the transaction to Germany’s failed Russia policy. He argued that just like in the case of Russia and gas, Germany now deepens its dependence on a Chinese state company.

It is hard to disagree with the critical voices from all sides of the political spectrum. It’s difficult not to be cynical regarding the SPD and Scholz. What’s troubling, however, is the changed position of the coalition partners—the Greens and the FDP. Neither party feels comfortable with Scholz’s decision. It is clear that the compromise is, first and foremost, a political one and very likely a shortsighted one.

While it is unclear which direction Germany’s politics will drift towards in the next years—after all, in a democracy, coalitions and leaders tend to change, the direction in China’s case seems to be very straightforward. The Chinese president Xi Jinping is transforming the already totalitarian country into a nationalist dictatorship closer to those seen in the last century. The appeasement of Russia led to the war in Ukraine, and the appeasement of China led to the violent oppression of the liberal democracy in Hong Kong.

We can only hope that the next victim of European “compromises” won’t be Taiwan. In recent months and years, China has been issuing what amount to military threats to Taiwan with very little subtlety, such as holding intimidating military drills. Europe is not currently ready to deal with the immense challenge of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

If Germany’s leadership is serious about a real “Zeitenwende,” it must begin to demonstrate consistency and clarity in its foreign policy decisions. Economic pragmatism cannot once again outweigh long-term security considerations. The era of short-sighted deals with autocratic regimes must end. Germany has the opportunity to lead by example in Europe—but only if it chooses to learn from past failures rather than repeat them in new forms.

A more resilient and responsible German foreign policy requires greater strategic foresight and coordination across all ministries. Instead of improvising compromises that satisfy short-term political convenience, the government should prioritize systemic coherence and democratic accountability. With global tensions, Germany’s actions will reverberate far beyond its borders. The world is watching whether Berlin will step up as a principled actor or continue hedging between values and business interests. A Zeitenwende is more than a slogan—it must be a sustained commitment backed by bold, consistent action. Anything less risks undermining Germany’s credibility, Europe’s unity, and the stability of democratic alliances.

This article was written by Adam Mazik. Adam is a German writer and the events manager at the Prometheus Institute.