Spain’s defense dilemma: security and political resistance

Since the European Union announced its ReArm Europe plan—a €800 billion initiative aimed at strengthening the military capabilities of its member states—Spain’s left-wing parties, which are part of the coalition government, have been reluctant to see defense spending take up a larger share of the country’s GDP. While it is true that Europe's rearmament strategy was conceived in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and fully took shape following the U.S. decision to pause military aid to Zelensky in March, Spain has every reason to reinforce its strategic posture, despite being geographically distant from Eastern Europe.

The EU is firmly committed to supporting Ukraine and is prepared to face the significant challenges that come with it. Donald Trump’s return to the White House marks a turning point in Europe’s defense policy. The U.S. is unwilling to continue providing financial and military aid to Ukraine, and the heated confrontation in the Oval Office—followed by the subsequent temporary suspension of arms shipments and intelligence sharing—served as the wake-up call the EU needed to confirm that the continent can no longer outsource its defense to third parties.

While countries such as the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland already invest significantly in defense, others still fall short of meeting the new expectations. Nations geographically distant from Russia, such as Portugal, Italy, and Belgium, fail to meet NATO’s 2% of GDP defense spending target. In 2024, Spain allocated the lowest percentage of its GDP to defense within the entire alliance, just 1.28%, falling behind even smaller nations like Luxembourg and Slovenia. (González, 2024)

According to the European Commission’s White Paper on Defense, each member state could increase its defense spending by up to 1.5% of annual GDP over a four-year period. If implemented, Spain would need to raise its military expenditure by a maximum of €24 billion by 2029. Whereas not all countries will be required to meet this threshold to avoid overinvestment, Spain has the most ground to cover, despite the fact that this increase is not a formal obligation. What is clear is that the EU’s fourth-largest economy must step up to meet the bloc’s evolving security needs.

President Pedro Sánchez—of the center-left PSOE party—has confirmed that Spain will increase its defense budget to align with the commitments made within NATO and the EU. This decision comes in response to both pressure from international partners and the need to strengthen strategic capabilities in a context of growing geopolitical instability.

The opposition, made up of the Popular Party and the far-right party Vox, agrees on this necessity. In fact, it is one of the few issues on which they see eye to eye, given Spain’s highly polarized political climate. What both the opposition and parliamentary allies fear, however, is that the government may bypass Parliament when approving the measures needed to implement the strategy. They also doubt that military spending can increase at such a rapid pace. And they are not wrong.

However, the left has firmly rejected the idea of increasing Spain's defense spending. Pedro Sánchez had to make a commitment to Yolanda Díaz, the vice president of the government and de facto leader of Sumar—the left-wing coalition with which the PSOE governs—not to cut any budget allocations for social welfare. Furthermore, the vice president stated that "this is not about increasing or decreasing the military budget, but about restructuring defense policy in Europe."

The left-wing Catalanist party, ERC, which is a parliamentary partner of the government, also expressed the same view: it is a matter of spending more efficiently. On the other hand, Ione Belarra, from Podemos—a party within the Sumar coalition—wore a T-shirt with the slogan "No to war" during her meeting with President Pedro Sánchez on this issue. Nevertheless, the PSOE will provide more details on how to implement this in the upcoming NATO summit and the European Council meeting in June.

The left's reaction is not solely based on ideological principles. On one hand, it is likely an attempt to pressure the PSOE in order to condition their support on other areas of the political agenda, such as measures against real estate speculation, taxes on higher incomes, or improvements in social protection. This negotiating strategy could also be employed by the parliamentary partners ERC and EH Bildu, the left-wing separatist parties from Catalonia and the Basque Country, respectively, to advance their regionalist political agendas.

On the other hand, the concern about cuts to social spending is also driven by electoral factors. The left fears losing a portion of its voters if it fails to fulfill, to some extent, its electoral promises. If this happens, it could create a favorable scenario for the Popular Party to form a coalition with the far-right Vox party in order to secure a parliamentary majority, something the left aims to prevent.

That being said, the idea that the issue is not about spending more but spending more efficiently deserves some nuance. The need to increase military spending could actually serve as an incentive for the government to identify inefficient areas of expenditure. Independent bodies such as the Court of Auditors and the Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF) have recently warned about cost overruns in public contracts and the need for greater transparency in budget management. They have also raised concerns about the inefficient use of funds in infrastructure and subsidies, recommending better evaluation of their impact. Furthermore, the OECD's Economic Survey of Spain 2021 highlighted the need to improve the efficiency of public spending and the evaluation of investments to ensure optimal resource allocation.

Even assuming that defense spending could be optimized, the reality is that additional investment remains necessary. The case of Ukraine itself demonstrates this. The Ukrainian military has restructured its procurement system to easily incorporate commercial technologies, allowing for faster integration of innovations into military operations. It also integrates AI into several key functions of its drone systems, such as autonomous navigation and real-time data analysis.

These actions, along with many others, have significantly increased the success rates of their operations while also greatly reducing operational costs (Bondar, 2025). However, it is Russia that has maintained the strategic initiative for months due to its industrial and financial superiority and a significantly larger troop contingent. Additional investment is still essential to sustain military capabilities in the face of an adversary with greater resources and forces.

Government spending on defense research could also be discussed in terms of its potential benefits for the private sector, fostering innovation and economic growth. A study published by the CEPR found that a 10% increase in defense-related R&D can lead to a 4% rise in private R&D investment, providing strong evidence of a “crowding-in” effect. For example, in the U.S. aerospace sector, $3.026 billion in defense R&D was estimated to generate an additional $1.632 billion in private R&D investment.

Moreover, indirect cross-country effects were observed, where government-funded R&D in a given industry within one country can stimulate private R&D in the same industry abroad. However, some arguments suggest that these positive spillovers are not guaranteed, citing potential limitations such as insufficient technology diffusion, the crowding-out effect, and limited econometric evidence supporting widespread applicability (Moretti et al., 2019).

Nonetheless, given Spain’s low investment in R&D relative to GDP, the government should consider these dynamics when designing policies to strengthen a sector that needs expansion. At a broader level, this approach would benefit the whole EU, where lagging competitiveness remains a structural challenge. If leveraged effectively, increased defense R&D could serve as a catalyst for technological progress and economic resilience across the bloc.

Another issue is that defense spending goes far beyond conventional warfare standards. Russia conducts disinformation campaigns, sabotage, and cyberattacks in Europe due to the support given to Ukraine. In this regard, the provision of military equipment and financial aid from several countries to Ukraine, including Spain, does not come without consequences. In this context of hybrid warfare, the number of Russian attacks has substantially increased since the onset of the aggression.

These operations include sabotage of transportation networks and critical infrastructure, cyberattacks carried out by pro-Russian hacker groups, and political interference in European institutions and electoral processes. There has even been the instrumentalization of illegal immigrants. The goal of these attacks is not only to carry out retaliatory actions but also to coerce governments, influence public opinion to support Russian interests, and undermine Western democratic norms and values (Jones, 2025).

Russian attacks have concentrated on NATO's eastern flank (Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland) but have also targeted other countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Spain itself. The government of Pedro Sánchez is clear that it will continue to support Ukraine, and in the event of a change in government in the coming years, the People's Party will maintain this stance. At the same time, Europe is uncertain about how much longer the aggression against Ukraine will last.

Despite the Trump administration holding talks with Russia and Ukraine to de-escalate the conflict, the current geopolitical uncertainty is evident, and there are no guarantees that full peace in Europe will come soon. Neither is there any certainty that EU-Russia relations will normalize in the short term. That is why preparing for any eventuality and for further destabilization campaigns by the Kremlin is crucial for each European Community member.

The CSIS report ‘Russia’s Shadow War Against the West’ also suggests that NATO members should not only carry out defensive measures but also take covert actions against key Russian assets. Offensive cyber operations targeting Russian military and commercial objectives, as well as an information campaign aimed at the Russian population, are also proposed. The aim of these measures would be both to weaken Russia’s operational capabilities, complementing the aid provided to Ukraine, and to increase pressure on the Kremlin.

The focus of attention in defense matters has been concentrated on Eastern Europe and support for Ukraine. However, Spain faces significant geopolitical challenges on its southern border, which adds to the need for strategic independence. Its neighbor, Morocco, maintains territorial claims over Ceuta and Melilla—territories that are legitimate under international law and have been part of Spain since before the creation of the Moroccan state—and even over the Canary Islands’ EEZ. On the other hand, the issue of Western Sahara is a central point in Moroccan foreign policy, presenting a recurring source of tension in bilateral relations, as Spain remains the administering power in the context of the territory's decolonization, although Morocco effectively controls it.

Morocco adopts a strategy of pressure to reinforce its territorial claims against Spain. For example, in 2018, Morocco unilaterally and without warning closed its customs office in Melilla, and it was not until the beginning of this year that an agreement was reached to reopen it, as well as inaugurate one in Ceuta, a city that had never had such an office due to Morocco’s stance that these territories are "occupied cities." This agreement is part of the broader rapprochement between the two countries, which followed Pedro Sánchez’s 2022 letter to King Mohammed VI.

In this letter, Sánchez endorsed Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara, marking a highly controversial departure from Spain’s long-standing position of neutrality on the issue. However, Morocco continues to regard Ceuta and Melilla as "occupied cities." Even Sánchez’s gesture did not prevent Morocco from snubbing him during a high-level meeting the following year, as King Mohammed VI failed to show up in Rabat, despite Sánchez traveling with a delegation of ministers. This gesture was interpreted as a slight and a sign that Morocco continues to set the tone in the bilateral relationship.

Another example is the use of irregular migration as a tool of political pressure. In May 2021, in an unprecedented episode, thousands of migrants crossed the border into Ceuta while Moroccan authorities appeared to turn a blind eye. This was widely interpreted as retaliation for Spain’s decision to hospitalize Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front. The Spanish government itself later acknowledged that, following Sánchez’s letter, illegal migration had dropped significantly—an indirect confirmation of the correlation.

Moreover, Morocco has been implicated in several international intelligence and corruption scandals. In 2022, it was revealed that the Pegasus spyware had been used to tap the phones of senior Spanish government officials, including Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of the Interior. While Morocco denies any involvement, multiple reports suggest it was the prime suspect behind the attack. Additionally, Morocco has been linked to the ‘Qatargate’ corruption scandal within the European Parliament.

Like Russia, Morocco is a personalist regime with a highly centralized power structure, where democratic mechanisms are absent. Morocco also pursues expansionist policies that not only aim to extend its territorial and strategic influence but also serve to consolidate a state project that reinforces its authoritarian and centralized model of governance. Moreover, Morocco openly challenges international law and UN resolutions that recognize the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination.

Adding to this, Morocco has significantly increased its military budget in recent years. In 2023, it approved a defense expenditure of €10.6 billion, and for 2024, it is expected to rise to €11.4 billion, nearing 9% of its GDP. This budget includes acquisitions of cutting-edge military equipment, such as F-16 fighter jets, Abrams battle tanks, and various types of drones (Ayerra, 2024). This surge in military spending places Morocco almost on par with Spain in absolute terms. However, it is largely driven by escalating tensions with its neighbor, Algeria, with whom diplomatic relations have been severed, fueling an ongoing arms race. Likewise, a potential conflict between these two regional powers would have direct repercussions for Spain in terms of security, migration, and energy.

Ultimately, Europe's decision to prioritize its defense reflects a shift from an idealistic vision to a more realistic stance. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the limitations of a policy based solely on dialogue and common sense, as most European leaders considered such aggression unlikely, assuming it was irrational from an economic and political perspective. Nevertheless, authoritarian regimes like Putin's often prioritize the glory of their nations and the consolidation of power over issues such as financial stability, the well-being of the population, or human costs. While most European leaders have learned the lesson, the left in Spain resists understanding it.

It is true that the risk of an open conflict is relatively low, but the issue is that there are many signs showing that it is not nonexistent. Hybrid warfare, however, represents the most evident threat on multiple fronts. Therefore, it is imperative for Spain to adopt a proactive stance, strengthening defense capabilities not only in military infrastructure and equipment but also in the digital, communicational, and intelligence domains, with a comprehensive approach that combines military deterrence, effective diplomacy, and a clear strategy to counter potential future threats.

It is important to note that Spain's debt exceeds 100% of GDP, and public deficit projections for 2025 and 2026 are expected to hover around 3%, excluding the increase in defense spending. Additionally, spending on pensions and social security already accounts for more than 40% of the state's budget. Therefore, it is essential to pay attention to the largest spending items and reflect on how to reduce them in the long term, as maintaining such a high level of public expenditure will eventually become unsustainable. The financial situation requires caution when further indebting, especially if Pedro Sánchez does not cut public spending to prevent the coalition government from weakening.

What is clear is that if the democratic pillars and international law are not reinforced, the very welfare state is at risk of being affected, as a lack of strategic foresight could jeopardize the social achievements of decades.