The South Caucasus has long been, and still is, a geopolitical chessboard where regional and global powers compete for influence. Historically, the Russian and Ottoman Empires vied for control over this strategically significant region and its immeasurable resources, and today, their successors—modern Russia and Turkey—continue to engage in a complex and ambivalent dance of rivalry and cooperation.

The three independent states of the South Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—find themselves caught between these two influential powers. While Russia has traditionally exerted control over the region through military presence and historical and political influence, Turkey has significantly expanded its role, particularly in Azerbaijan.

However, the 2020 second Nagorno-Karabakh war and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have altered the regional landscape, shifting the alliances and forcing Moscow and Ankara into an uneasy yet pragmatic partnership that continues to evolve with shifting global and regional dynamics. The balance of power in the South Caucasus is in continuous flux, as Russia's preoccupation with Ukraine weakens its grip, while Turkey strengthens its strategic footprint. Understanding this evolving relationship is critical for assessing the future stability of a highly uncertain region.

From imperial rivalry to modern geopolitical competition

The confrontation for dominance in the South Caucasus between Moscow and Ankara is centuries old and embedded in history and culture. The Russian and Ottoman empires fought numerous wars over the region, with Russia ultimately establishing dominance over much of the Caucasus in the 19th century. The Soviet period further solidified Moscow’s control, integrating Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia into its sphere of influence.

These territories, as well as others in Central Asia, despite a large melting pot of cultures, faiths, and customs, presented strong tribal and Muslim traditions, which Moscow did not fail to weaken first and destroy then. As a consequence, Turkey, as the successor to the Ottoman Empire, was largely sidelined during this period due to this systematic dismantling of every social and cultural tie that could go beyond and so undermine the Soviet order.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey saw an opportunity to reassert its influence, particularly in Azerbaijan, where ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties had remained stronger. Russia, for its part, sought to maintain its grip on the region through conventional means: political alliances, military bases, economic partnerships, and unconventional ones, namely cultural influence and Soviet heritage. Following the Soviet collapse, Russia attempted to maintain its influence through organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

In this way, today’s South Caucasus region, embedding its inner crossroad nature, remains a complex puzzle in which competing interests and contrasting cultures play the new “great game.” Armenia, which has historically opposed Turkey, continues to rely on Russia for security, both economically and militarily, whereas Georgia, after the 2008 war with Russia, turned increasingly towards the West and Turkey before re-approaching Moscow.

Azerbaijan, rich in energy resources, is balanced between the two powers but leans more towards Turkey, particularly on the military and energetic front and standing, together with Ankara, as the gateway for European hydrocarbons. Not surprisingly, the energy-rich Caspian basin became another focal point of competition, with Russia employing its extensive gas networks to maintain leverage over its neighbors, while Turkey promoted alternative routes such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to reduce reliance on Russian energy. This ongoing competition in energy, trade, and security laid the groundwork for the current balance of power in the region.

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war: a turning point

The six-week second Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 marked a watershed moment in the region’s geopolitical landscape. Differently from the First War—which lasted from 1988 to 1994 and was resolved with the win of Armenian forces—Turkey played a critical role in Azerbaijan's military success by providing military supplies, advisors, and diplomatic support, thereby strongly influencing the restructuring of regional balance.

Russia, on the other hand, while traditionally aligned with Armenia and heavily involved in the first conflict to support Yerevan, took a more neutral stance, eventually brokering the ceasefire agreement that ended the conflict. The result was a significant geopolitical victory for Turkey, as Azerbaijan reclaimed large portions of territory it had lost in the 1990s.

For Russia, the war exposed both its strengths and limitations. On one hand, Moscow maintained its role as the primary power broker by deploying peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh and fostering diplomatic meetings, solidifying its presence in the region. On the other, its failure to decisively support Armenia strained its relationship with Yerevan, leading to growing Armenian dissatisfaction with Moscow’s role as a security guarantor.

Turkey, for its part, emerged as a major power in the South Caucasus, achieving its long-term goal of securing a direct transport corridor with Azerbaijan via the Zangezur and Southern Gas corridors, further diminishing Armenia’s geopolitical leverage and reinforcing its pan-Turkish ambitions. Reflecting the shifting nature of South Caucasus alliances, according to Yerevan's disillusionment with Russia’s inaction during the conflict, Armenia began diversifying its partnerships, exploring closer ties with Western nations, and seeking to improve relations with Turkey. Russia, wary of losing its strategic ally, attempted to reinforce its military agreements with Armenia while simultaneously maintaining its economic and military ties with Azerbaijan.

This delicate balancing act underscored the changing regional dynamics in which Turkey was no longer merely a competitor but a key player that could rival Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and its implications

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had profound consequences for its foreign policy, including in the South Caucasus. As Western sanctions crippled the Russian economy and military setbacks in Ukraine weakened Moscow’s international standing, its ability to project power and influence in the South Caucasus diminished.

Turkey, meanwhile, capitalized on the shifting dynamics, positioning itself as a key mediator between Russia and Ukraine while simultaneously strengthening its influence in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The war put Russia on the defensive, forcing it to focus military resources on Ukraine while leaving its periphery more vulnerable to external influences, an argument that has always been sensible for the Kremlin elites.

Besides the competition launched by Ankara in the historical Russian “near abroad,” the war also deepened the interdependence between Russia and Turkey. Faced with economic isolation, Russia turned to Turkey as a vital economic partner, increasing trade and energy cooperation. By not adhering to the economic sanctions imposed on Moscow, Turkish companies facilitated the transit of sanctioned Russian goods, and Turkey’s role in energy transportation grew more significant, with Moscow increasingly relying on Turkish pipelines to export gas to Europe.

This pragmatic partnership demonstrated that, despite their competing interests, Moscow and Ankara found mutual benefits in cooperation. Additionally, Turkey’s role in facilitating the Black Sea Grain Initiative underscored its growing diplomatic weight, balancing between NATO obligations and its strategic relationship with Russia.

However, Turkey’s balancing act is not without risks. While maintaining economic and military ties with Russia, Turkey has continued to support Ukraine, providing drones and other military assistance. This delicate maneuvering allows Turkey to extract concessions from both Russia and the West, leveraging its position for maximum strategic gain. Meanwhile, Russia’s declining ability to dictate terms in the South Caucasus has opened the door for Turkey to further solidify its influence in Azerbaijan, and even Central Asia, where Turkish-Azeri cooperation is expanding.

A complex partnership: cooperation and competition

The relationship between Turkey and Russia in the South Caucasus is neither a traditional alliance nor an outright rivalry; rather, it is a fluid and evolving partnership shaped by realpolitik, pragmatism, and shifting power equilibria. While Russia, especially for its historical significance, remains the dominant military power in the South Caucasus, Turkey has steadily expanded its military influence, particularly in Azerbaijan. This growing significance of military presence in the area, generating an evolution in the power balance, has created a delicate interplay of competition and cooperation, where both countries seek to assert their interests without triggering open conflict and direct confrontation.

Although from a military standpoint, Turkey and Russia share completely competing interests, economically, these adversarial visions can turn into cooperation, particularly when broader strategic interests coincide. Energy, in this sense, plays a significant role in shaping Russia-Turkey relations. The building of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), directly exporting Azerbaijan’s gas to Turkey and Europe, remarks once again on Turkish pragmatism. Besides making Baku an even more strategic partner for Ankara’s ambitions, the SGC also offers an alternative to Russian energy supplies, displaying Turkey’s opportunism and demonstrating its independent strategic position by capitalizing on the changing geopolitical order.

The strong commitment to the opening of the Zangezur corridor, which would connect Turkey to the Caspian Sea and, consequently, to Central Asia, manifests even more Turkish aspirations. By taking advantage of the Ukrainian conflict, which weakened the Russian ability to maintain control over its “near abroad,” the construction of the Zangezur corridor would further tip the scales of power. Completely circumventing Russian territories, this transportation route would further reduce Russia’s control over the region and possibly threaten its lasting hegemony on hydrocarbons.

Despite this competition, Moscow and Ankara continue to engage in energy cooperation, recognizing the possible mutual benefits of economic and strategic ties. For example, the TurkStream pipeline, which transports Russian gas to Turkey and Europe, perfectly highlights the economic interdependence between the two nations and foresees possible future cooperation. This potential room for cooperation is stressed in the shared key interest in limiting Western influence in the South Caucasus. In spite of Turkish commitment to standing as a bridge between the East and West, both countries view growing U.S. and EU involvement in Armenia and Georgia as a challenge to their regional influence.

While Russia seeks to maintain its traditional dominance, Turkey, though a NATO member, often pursues an independent foreign policy, as demonstrated from the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, that diverges from Western priorities. This mutual interest in maintaining stability—on their own terms—has led to cooperation in security and fostering the joint Russian-Turkish ceasefire in Azerbaijan. This shared pragmatism allows them to navigate and compromise competition while ensuring external powers do not dictate the regional future.

An uncertain future

The evolving relationship between Turkey and Russia in the South Caucasus is a testament to the region’s shifting geopolitical landscape. While historical rivals, Moscow and Ankara have found common ground in economic cooperation and strategic pragmatism. However, their competition for influence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia remains a defining feature of regional politics. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have reshaped power dynamics, with Turkey gaining a stronger foothold and Russia facing increasing challenges. Looking ahead, the South Caucasus will remain a critical area of competition and cooperation between Russia and Turkey.

The extent to which their uneasy partnership holds will depend on developments in Ukraine, shifts in Western policies, and the willingness of regional actors to navigate this evolving geopolitical landscape. As both Russia and Turkey continue to recalibrate their strategies, the South Caucasus remains a volatile but strategically significant battleground for influence in Eurasia.