Military coups are carried out by the military establishment to seize control of the existing power. This action itself is a direct blow to the democratic order, the regime, and the will of the people. However, not all coups are carried out in the same way or with the same purpose. Sometimes the purpose behind it, and sometimes the conjunctural structure of the society in which it was carried out at the time, associate the coup with completely different dynamics. In this article, we will examine the coups that took place in the Turkish Republic and how these coups affected voter behavior before and after. We will examine the 1960 coup d'état, the March 12 Memorandum, the 1980 coup d'état, and the 1997 postmodern coup d'état, which is referred to as the February 28 process. Consistent with these analyses, we will examine voter and party behavior before and after the coups. At the end of the article, we will make a comparative interpretation of the effects of these coups on voter behavior.

1960 coup d'état

If we look at the political landscape from this period, after the multi-party transition period, Ismet Inönü, the leader of the CHP at the time, approved the establishment of a party. The party was founded by dissidents within the CHP; these four names were Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan. The party came to power in 1950, 4 years after its foundation. It was quite different from the CHP in terms of its policies. Menderes, who was himself a landlord and an indirect farmer, decided to focus on agriculture. The Democrats also benefited from the economic aid called Marshall Aid.

These aides wanted the economy to focus on agriculture rather than industry. During this period, we switched to mechanization in agriculture; tractors came to Turkey with Marshall's aid. However, the arrival of the Democratic Party led to a change not only economically but also culturally. One of the most important tactics of the Democratic Party was to gain the support of the rural population. (Mardin, 1973) The electoral campaigns of the Democrat Party intervened at just the right time to provide many transitional rural areas with the belief that they were not inferior.

The Democrat Party relegitimized Islam and traditional rural values. The return of the call to prayer to Arabic is one of the most important of these. However, there was also the army that was not happy with these changes. In addition, the military had a great respect for İsmet İnonü, and Adnan Menderes was aware of this respect and the influence of İnonü on the military and tried to intimidate the military officer as much as possible during his time in power. And he tried to reduce the influence of the military in the state and in society. On the other hand, there was very intense authoritarianism in the Democrat party and Adnan Menderes; there was even an attempt to lynch İsmet İnönü during this period, and Menderes also said that he would establish a board called the Board of Supervision of Politicians to supervise those in the parliament.

With all this, on May 27, 1960, the military staged a coup d'état and overthrew the current government. In the special courts established in Yassıada after the coup, many DP officials, including the then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan, were put on trial. As a result of the trials, Menderes, Zorlu, and Polatkan were sentenced to death and executed in 1961. The Coup (Cizre-Sakallioğlu, 1992) The coup had democratic-reformist orientations. The specific project of the coup makers was institutions of a Western European type of pluralist. On the other hand, it can be said that the coup led to a great polarization within the society.

The center-periphery divide has widened, and this is also observed among the right and more conservative voters. The expectation of having their representatives at the political level has diminished, and the expectation and orientation in this direction have gradually decreased. On the other hand, the coup led to an increase in the number of labor unions in the country. Socialist-based political parties such as the Turkish Labor Party (TİP) were established, all of which can be said to be the power of the libertarian structure and order of the 1961 constitution.

The increase in Neo-Corporatism after the coup can be said to be effective in the formation of this situation. In this model, the state involves workers' and employers' organizations in decision-making processes to maintain social order and economic balance. In this system, formal or informal agreements are made between trade unions, employers' associations, and the state, and these groups act together in the formulation of social and economic policies.

1971 memorandum

12 March 1971 was a memorandum issued by the military against the government of Süleyman Demirel and the Justice Party. Following this, Süleyman Demirel and the AP government were asked to hand over power. The reason behind this was the rise of protest thought, labor movements, and trade unions in the country. Organizations such as the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Syndicates, the Federation of Idea Clubs (FKF), and the THKO (People's Liberation Army of Turkey) had growing influence and power. However, it was not only internal factors that led to this memorandum; the country was subjected to a very large economic embargo due to the Cyprus peace operation. At the same time, there was also a poppy crisis in the United States. The American pressure on Turkey to stop the production of poppy, was Turkey's legal right, and the tension that arose due to this strained the entire public and political environment.

After the memorandum (Köse, 2010), the memorandum was issued on March 12, the government was overthrown, and the cabinet was disbanded. In this situation, a new government and a new cabinet had to be formed. The best way to do this was to form a “supra-party” government, and the idea was that this government should be led by a neutral prime minister. The natural link between the electorate and democracy was once again disrupted, and this gradually undermined public confidence in democracy. On the other hand, with this memorandum, the right-left tension in the country continued to increase.

In the aftermath of the memorandum, leftist parties and trade unions were subjected to increased pressure, which led the public to distance itself from these parties. Since leftist parties and trade unions were associated with “anarchy and disorder,” a large part of the electorate began to turn towards right-wing and center parties that would ensure political stability.

On the other hand, this memorandum led to the perception that the military was necessary to maintain order, which in turn led to the 1980 coup d'état, which we will see later in this article, being initially supported and welcomed by the public.

1980 coup d'état

The September 12, 1980 coup d'état was the most systematic and major coup carried out by the military throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey. Following the 1971 memorandum, it was carried out in 1980 under the leadership of Kenan Evren due to the increasing right-left conflict in the whole country, economic problems, the instability of the Nihat Erim government that came after the memorandum, and the political will that could not be achieved with the leaders who came afterward.

The coup d'état was carried out in a very coordinated manner, both in terms of its conception and the actors involved. Political parties such as the Republican People's Party, Demirel's Justice Party, and the Nationalist Movement Party were shut down, parliament was suspended, and political leaders were detained. With the regulations made after the 1980 coup, a near-majority system was introduced, and the electoral threshold was raised to 10%. This high threshold was intended to create a two- or three-party structure, making it particularly difficult for small parties to enter parliament. Martial law was declared, the constitution was suspended, and the country's administration was handed over to the National Security Council (NSC).

This was followed by the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, which was widely accepted by the population. Another reason behind this coup was the desire to provide the conditions for the transition to neoliberal policies that were spreading all over the world. The stagnation and the oil crisis in the 70s led to a decline in confidence in the Keynesian model, and under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the whole world entered this change. In Turkey, the architect of this change was Turgut Özal, who later founded the ANAP. Known as the January 24th Laws, this economic plan followed neoliberal principles.

Unlike other coups, this 80 coup had a long-lasting impact on the public. With the closure of political parties, some politicians were sent into exile. This led the public to distance itself from politics and democracy. The tension between the right and left wings, which had increased after the 70 memorandum, gradually decreased, and the contact between these two ideological groups was terminated. In the aftermath of the coup, the structure of the parties also changed, and parties that encompassed more than one ideology or ethnic group emerged. On the other hand, labor unions, which had been very influential before the coup, lost much of their influence and power, and many known powerful unions were forced to close down.

The habit of protesting or the reflex to defend their rights has almost disappeared. The changed constitution centralized power and restricted freedoms. On the other hand, the harsh policing during detentions, during periods of curfew, and especially the harsh methods applied to political prisoners in jail left many psychological and traumatic effects on the public going forward. In the 1983 elections, the ANAP's elbow-to-elbow with the coup mentality caused the public to feel the pressure of the military even when voting.

It can also be argued that the coup made the citizens of Turkey more obedient and destroyed the protest structure. Finally, the increased electoral threshold has also negatively affected voters in terms of not being able to vote for the party they want. In the new system, only a few parties can pass the threshold, but voters think that the party they want to vote for will not be able to overcome this threshold, and as a result of this thought, they are forced to vote for the party they do not want because they do not want their vote to be in vain.

1997 postmodern coup

This 1997 coup d'état, as its name suggests, had methodological and structural differences from the others. It has been called a “post-modern coup” because the military intervention was indirect rather than direct. The rise of the Welfare Party in the mid-1990s marked a major change in the Turkish political scene. Led by Necmettin Erbakan, the RP gained great support, especially among conservatives and Islamists, and formed a coalition with the True Path Party (DYP) to form a government in 1996. However, the RP's conservative policies caused concern among the military and bureaucratic sectors that were firmly committed to the principle of secularism.

The February 28, 1997 meeting included measures such as a ban on headscarves in universities and controlling the activities of sects and religious groups. It was said that these decisions were necessary to preserve secularism. As a result of these pressures, the Welfare Party government faced great difficulty, and Necmettin Erbakan was forced to resign as prime minister in June 1997. Subsequently, the Welfare Party was shut down, and Erbakan was banned from politics. This ban created a feeling among conservatives that their right to representation in politics had been taken away from them. This feeling had many effects and consequences in the long run.

First of all, conservative voters felt that their legal victory or right had been usurped. With all these, the fact that they were united in a common cause and goal led them to consolidate more easily, just like the AKP. On the other hand, it should not be assumed that this coup only affected conservative voters. The general electorate's trust in democracy has once again been shattered. The military has once again made its presence felt as an executioner, waiting over the Turkish Republic and its voters. Moreover, this coup led to the emergence of a secular-conservative tension, similar to the left-right tension of the 80s.

This tension led to a further polarization of the people. Similar to the 80s, this polarization did not only remain at the political level but also affected society in social life. This polarization and the inability to prevent his political representation through military means led the conservative electorate to search for a savior. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who stood by Erbakan, created such a perception among this conservative electorate. The AKP has maintained the 10% electoral threshold that came with the coup d'état of 1980, which has fragmented the opposition and forced them to join the AKP, forcing smaller parties that could not pass the threshold to either form an alliance or join the mulafete. With this, he was able to set up the political order he wanted.

In 2014, he even amended the system to make Erdoğan the first president in Turkey to be directly elected by the people. With the referendum in 2017, Turkey switched from a parliamentary system to a presidential government system. The perception of Erdoğan as a leader, which has been formed in the conservative sector since the February 28th decisions, is also supported by the fact that he has largely concentrated power in his own hands. The AKP came to power in the 2002 elections and has been in power for more than 20 years. The perception and propaganda based on the post-modern coup are still effective. Having gone through the worst economic and political periods in the history of the Republic, the AKP still maintains its power.

Conclusion

In general, each coup has had a different impact on the politics of the Republic of Turkey. However, even though they have had different effects, we see some common results and effects in all these coups and their variants. First of all, the will of the people is a natural consequence of this action, but it also creates an artificial separation and distrust between the people and democracy. This distrust and the feeling of the presence of the military are seen in all coups from the 1960 coup to the postmodern coup in 1997. Another conclusion we can draw is that the biggest motivation and justification behind the coups is that they only produce an apparent solution.

The reasons behind the memorandum of 1991, such as political instability and political tension, were the same reasons for the coup of 1980. With the 1997 coup, the left-right tension that was trying to be resolved was replaced by a conservative-secularist tension. In the coup in 1961, Menderes became too authoritarian, and after 60 years and many coups, we have been in power for 20 years and are governed by a presidential system.

References

Cizre-Sakallioğlu, Ü. (1992). Labour and state in Turkey: 1960-80. Middle Eastern Studies, 28(4), 712-728.
Mardin, Ş. (1973). Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics? Daedalus, 102(1), 169-190.