How Europe will survive developments in the Middle East is the most common unofficial preoccupation. As the distribution of world powers after the collapse of international equilibrium has become undefined, developments in the Middle East have raised concerns.

It is true that during and after the Cold War, the global system worked towards a coherent definition of global interest and the limits of power exercised. In a pre-defined way, the future of the growing strength of the West and the immature plans for domestic politics have led to a Mediterranean crisis. For this reason, the Lippmann strategy concept, which emphasizes, among other things, Western power and tools, as well as the risk and response profile in the Mediterranean region, is useful.

The preoccupation and concern for the Mediterranean are expressed best by Walter Lippmann who once wrote: “Foreign policy consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s power.” Failing to do so the gap between rhetoric and the realities of the Mediterranean region creates a situation called the "Lippmann Gap". It describes the framework where international politics becomes insolvent when the balance between its commitments and its means is lost. Traditionally, foreign policy can evolve into distinct, well-supported and balanced phases and into agreements that support collective security alliances.

We can agree that if this balance exists, then the foreign policy steps will depend on both domestic support and international approval. If the commitments we made exceed our power capabilities, then insolvency may result. However, by supporting the current status of any region, we must make the necessary corrections to develop a more solvent policy. Not doing this can create huge problems in the Mediterranean and not only.

We should remember that the main concerns and subsequent commitments of the West relate to regional stability, freedom of navigation, nuclear non-proliferation and the security of its Mediterranean allies. But the mismatch in Western engagement creates problems for most countries in the region, making Western strategy more difficult to be credible.

We know that the existing problems, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean, stem from the fact that the region forces us to try to think about them in a consensual context. But not everyone is ready to cooperate with the Turkish objections that constitute the main obstacle. The concept of "shipping freedom" in the disputed Eastern Mediterranean, angered Turkey with demands" threatening the sovereignty of many countries in the region like Israel, Cyprus, Egypt and Greece.

It is not easy for Western strategy today to deal with the problem, as Turkey is out of control and seriously threatening the Mediterranean status. At the same time, a stream of reports confirmed that Turkey's weapons programs are progressing strongly. World leaders and senior officials Speaking in many forums are directly critical of Turkey's behaviour in the Mediterranean.

Maybe the most fundamental problem in the Mediterranean Sea has been the credible definition of its interests. In many respects, this reflects the examination and perception of long-standing struggle strategists on how to shape the Western model of advanced interaction in the Mediterranean.

Western administrations have asserted their strong interest in maintaining a controlled non-nuclear Middle East away from Russian-triggered Turkey. But the intensity of the aggressive rhetoric of Ankara revealed an underlying Western weakness in creating a common response. It must be made clear that Turkey’s militarization plans and territorial threats in the Mediterranean are not only illegal but also dangerous. Not only does it threaten the sovereignty of many nations, but it also destroys existing Western projects.

The issue of free navigation as outlined by the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS is a good example. The convention sets out how coastal states are permitted to establish their sovereignty over territorial seas and exclusive economic zones. Turkey is opposed to the internationally accepted law making the protection of peace and stability in the Mediterranean area a difficult case. Russia through Turkey has developed a new shipping doctrine called "Mavi Vatan" hoping to force other participants to comply with its requirements in the control area above.

Turkey intends to change the international context of the region in favor of its interests alone and is indifferent to international treaties. After this indifference comes the failure to respond to Turkey's movements toward "grey zone" strategies according to the Lippmann gap. These strategies are specifically designed to change the status quo in the region by force with the threat of conventional war.

Although the West continued to shyly develop its reaction mainly based on a unified diplomatic opposition to the claim, Turkey had already shifted to the militarization of its actions. The Western response to turkey is not working. Competing with Turkey's aggressive deployment of the military arsenal against its neighbours in the region is a problem to solve. Cooperation is needed to address Turkey's threats and to exclude Russian efforts to control the region and avoid a Lippmann gap.

Turkey has used a series of asymmetrical provocations against Greece to achieve its goals with potentially serious consequences that could risk an outright war. Turkey hopes this way to put the West back on its heels regarding how to address developments.

Concerning Turkey's militarization campaign, the West lacks clarity about the true depth of the problem, which makes it easy to underestimate Russia's control plans. Policymakers should take a close look at the allies that have remained in the West and not seek to establish links with Russian-backed regiments like Turkey. Policymakers having in mind the Lippmann gap should take a close look at the allies who have remained in the West and not seek links with Russian-backed regiments such as Turkey.

There is indeed a credibility issue for the West in supporting authoritative states like Turkey. The usually powerful words of the West in a democratic sense lose weight by supporting or tolerating Turkey's actions. The ongoing production of Russian nuclear installations and the development of ballistic missiles against NATO’s allies create strong concerns about the security capability of the West. The approach must be re-evaluated if it is to retain its present status as an alliance. The need for a more sustainable and competitive Western strategy - not only in the Eastern Mediterranean but in the Middle East generally is a necessity.

The question, therefore, arises as to how the West can frame its interests more credibly and precisely. The failure of the West to articulate accurately a credible set of interests in the Mediterranean has severely hampered its strategy creating a Lippmann gap. In some cases, such as the F16 hunter, the exact nature of the U.S. interests and its will to defend them are obscure.

The rubbish bin of history is full of dictators and aggressors who underestimated Western determination and power. But continuing problems in the Mediterranean suggest the need for a more robust debate about how the West can find the best solution and go forward.

West has tremendous political, economic, and strategic advantages in the Mediterranean but obstacles remain to be solved. A large number of the European population trapped and prisoned in modern Turkey amounting to 38 per cent of the counties 84 million citizens must be freed. The need for freedom is obvious but the policymakers face a tremendous obstacle in the Lippmann gap considerations. Both allies and partners are waiting anxiously to see the West present a credible regional strategy in the region supporting the trapped populations.

Western strategy in the Mediterranean has become unrealistic and at times a failure a true Lippmann gap. Identifying the specific challenges to be met is necessary to address the asymmetry of interests; the problem of incrementalism; the imposing costs of military action; and regional coalitions. It is important to understand how these geopolitical obstacles have limited and undermined Western strategy, and how to overcome them in the future.

Finally dealing with the Mediterranean’s Lippmann gaps and developing a more realistic approach will serve the West’s interests and advance the security of the region as well.