Disinformation has become a pervasive threat to modern societies, eroding trust in institutions and sowing discord within and among nations. Advances in digital technology and social media have allowed false or misleading information to spread instantaneously across borders, often blurring the line between fact and opinion. Adversaries—state and non-state alike—exploit the open communication channels of democratic nations to manipulate public opinion, weaken social cohesion, and undermine democratic processes.

Democratic states face a fundamental dilemma in countering this threat: how to combat orchestrated falsehoods effectively without compromising the very freedoms of expression and open debate that define their political systems. Robust debate and a free media environment are cornerstones of democracy, but these same conditions provide fertile ground for disinformers.

Free societies encourage pluralism and the unfettered flow of information, making it easy for propaganda and conspiracy theories to circulate. Legitimate actions to defend the public from disinformation must therefore be carefully calibrated so as not to slip into undue restrictions on media freedom or overt censorship—a line that is often difficult to discern in practice. By contrast, authoritarian regimes have no such reservations about controlling information. In the name of “fighting fake news,” they impose draconian measures to dominate the narrative and stifle dissent, both domestically and internationally.

The stark divergence between democratic and authoritarian responses to disinformation defines a spectrum between freedom and control. This article examines national strategies across that spectrum, comparing how open societies in NATO and other democracies strive to build resilience against disinformation versus how authoritarian states like Russia weaponize information while tightly controlling it at home. It also looks at international efforts to coordinate responses.

Understanding these approaches is crucial for crafting policies that protect democratic institutions from disinformation without eroding the liberties that underpin them.

Democratic strategies

Open societies have responded to the disinformation challenge by developing multifaceted strategies that seek to strengthen their defenses without undermining civil liberties. A key principle in democratic approaches is transparency and the rule of law: governments attempt to counter false narratives and malign influence through legal, informational, and societal measures rather than through blanket censorship. In many NATO member states and other democracies, national strategies against disinformation have been formulated that emphasize resilience, education, and collaborative action. One cornerstone of democratic strategy is enhancing media literacy and public awareness.

Democracies increasingly recognize that an informed, critical-thinking citizenry is the best long-term defense against manipulation. Many countries have introduced educational programs to teach people how to discern reliable information from false content. Media literacy curricula are being integrated from schools upward, so that young people learn to verify sources and think critically about what they encounter online. Finland is often cited as a model in this regard – it has woven media literacy training into all levels of education, starting as early as primary school. The result is a population better equipped to spot disinformation and less likely to be duped by online falsehoods. Other nations, from the Nordic states to Canada, are following suit by expanding digital literacy and critical thinking programs.

Research has reinforced the wisdom of this approach: studies have concluded that teaching citizens how to navigate the information ecosystem and identify manipulation is crucial for building societal immunity to fake news. In addition to education, democratic governments are investing in specific institutions and tools to counter disinformation. Many have set up dedicated units or task forces within their government structures to monitor the information environment, detect emerging disinformation campaigns, and coordinate responses. For example, specialized strategic communications teams analyze online influence operations and help formulate counter-messaging.

Ahead of major elections, some countries establish election security task forces to guard against foreign interference and propaganda aimed at voters. Intelligence and cybersecurity agencies are also increasingly tasked with tracking foreign disinformation efforts, especially those linked to hostile states. The goal is to detect threats early and address them in a timely manner to blunt their impact before falsehoods take root in the public consciousness.

Legal and regulatory measures form another pillar of democratic strategy. While upholding free speech, democracies are trying to curb the most dangerous forms of disinformation—particularly those that incite violence, threaten public safety, or subvert electoral processes—through targeted laws and regulations. France provides a notable example: it adopted legislation requiring online platforms and service providers to ensure transparency of political advertising and allowing rapid legal action against deliberate falsehoods during election periods.

This law empowers authorities and courts to halt the spread of patently false information that could affect election integrity. Germany, too, has enacted rules compelling social media companies to swiftly remove illegal content, including hate speech and egregious misinformation, or face hefty fines. At the European Union level, collective initiatives have bolstered national efforts.

In 2018 the EU introduced a voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation for major tech companies, and more recently it passed the Digital Services Act—a far-reaching regulation that, among other things, obliges large online platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks like the spread of disinformation. These steps stop short of outright bans but increase accountability for platforms, making it harder for malicious actors to exploit social media with impunity. Democracies also leverage the strengths of an open society to fight back in the information domain.

Independent media, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens all play roles in exposing and debunking falsehoods. Fact-checking groups and investigative journalists work to verify claims and call out propaganda, often coordinating across borders to address disinformation that is international in scope. Civic initiatives—sometimes termed a form of “digital civil defense”—have” sprung up, especially during crises.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, for example, volunteers took part in grassroots campaigns to counter Russian propaganda: private citizens sent Russians truthful messages about the war, while volunteer hacker collectives attacked the websites of Russian state media and government agencies to disrupt their disinformation machinery. Such bottom-up efforts demonstrate the agility and creativity that democracies can harness without direct state control.

At the same time, democratic governments have begun to refine their own strategic communications and even consider limited offensive measures, all within the bounds of law and ethics. Rather than simply refuting false claims after the fact, many now emphasize proactive communication—regularly providing factual narratives and transparency to preempt the space that disinformation seeks to fill. Some Western militaries and security agencies are integrating counter-disinformation tactics into their doctrines, understanding that the information front is a key battleground in any conflict.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and France, for instance, have each taken steps to improve how their defense and diplomatic establishments respond to influence operations. France even went so far as to experiment with mirroring an adversary’s tactics in one case: French operatives reportedly created fake online personas and networks to push back against jihadist and Russian propaganda in Africa. This controversial initiative, which imitated the deceptive playbook of authoritarian disinformation campaigns, sparked debate—critics argued that democracies should not adopt the same manipulative methods as their foes, as doing so risks legitimizing those methods and blurring the moral high ground. Nevertheless, the willingness of France and some of its allies to actively contest malign influence shows a determination in democratic capitals not to cede the information space entirely to aggressors.

Despite a growing toolbox of measures, no democracy has developed a perfect solution or a fully comprehensive system against disinformation. Each approach comes with trade-offs, and policies are continually being refined through trial and error. Several democratic nations do stand out as pioneers. In Europe, the Nordic countries and the Baltic states—often on the front lines of Russian disinformation—have combined strong education efforts with agile governmental responses. France and Germany have likewise established legal and institutional frameworks that are becoming reference points for others. The common thread across these initiatives is an attempt to stay true to open-society values while mounting an active defense.

By investing in public resilience, fostering cooperation with technology platforms and media, and engaging the whole of society, democracies aim to make their citizens “harder targets” for falsehoods. They seek not to control information flows in an authoritarian manner but to strengthen the informational environment so that truth can compete and prevail over lies.

Authoritarian strategies

Authoritarian governments approach the information domain in a fundamentally different way, prioritizing control over openness. For these regimes, maintaining a tight grip on the narrative is often seen as essential to preserving power and social order. Under the pretext of combatting “fake news” or external disinformation, authoritarian states impose sweeping restrictions on media and online content, criminalize dissenting viewpoints, and promote their own state-sanctioned version of reality. Domestically, authoritarian leaders use both legal and extralegal tools to suppress unwanted information. Russia provides a telling example.

In recent years, the Kremlin has enacted broad “fake news” and “extremism” laws that carry heavy fines or even jail time for spreading information deemed false or harmful to the state. Independent news outlets and opposition voices in Russia have been forced to shut down or go into exile, especially after Moscow’s 2022 escalation of the war against Ukraine.

The government has blocked access to major Western social media platforms and any news sources that challenge the official line, effectively sealing off its information space. A similar pattern is seen in China, which maintains perhaps the world’s most extensive system of internet censorship. China’s “Great Firewall” blocks foreign websites and scrubs domestic online content that the Communist Party considers politically sensitive. Authorities there readily censor discussion of topics ranging from human rights to high-level corruption, and they have introduced vague anti-rumor and cybersecurity laws to legitimize the silencing of dissent. In both Russia and China, draconian controls ensure that most citizens hear a single dominant narrative aligned with the regime’s interests, while alternative information is tightly constrained.

This heavy-handed approach is not limited to the major powers. Smaller authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states have also adopted laws and practices that conflate countering disinformation with muzzling critics. In Belarus, for instance, Aleksandr Lukashenko’s regime has used anti-misinformation decrees to arrest journalists and block independent media sites under the guise of maintaining public order. Likewise, various governments across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia have jumped on the “fake news” legislation bandwagon, enacting broad laws against vaguely defined “false information.”

These measures conveniently serve to curb domestic unrest by providing legal cover to detain critics or even shut down social media during sensitive periods. Even some democratically elected leaders have shown authoritarian tendencies in this arena: countries like Turkey and India have pressured social media companies to remove or censor content critical of the government, at times threatening to ban platforms outright if they do not comply.

Such actions are typically justified with appeals to national security or public stability, but they frequently target legitimate dissent or unfavorable news rather than genuine foreign disinformation campaigns. Ironically, while these regimes tout their crackdowns as efforts to fight disinformation, many are simultaneously prolific spreaders of disinformation on the world stage. Authoritarian powers use information warfare as a tool of statecraft abroad. The clearest example is Russia’s concerted propaganda offensives aimed at foreign audiences. Russian state media outlets and proxy websites flood global channels with misleading narratives — denying or downplaying Russian military abuses, casting Western democracies as corrupt or aggressive, and promoting conspiracy theories that suit Moscow’s agenda.

Kremlin-linked troll farms and cyber operatives amplify these themes on social media, often impersonating ordinary users to aggravate social divisions in target countries. Moscow’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election and the disinformation surrounding the war in Ukraine illustrate how far-reaching and corrosive these influence operations can be. China, for its part, also engages in external propaganda, albeit often in a more subtle fashion. It leverages state-run media and an army of diplomatic voices on Western social platforms to polish China’s image and spread Beijing’s preferred narratives, dismissing international criticism of its human rights record as biased “fake news.”

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese media outlets and bot networks actively circulated disinformation about the virus’s origins and about Western vaccines in an effort to deflect blame and undermine trust in rival nations. Other authoritarian regimes — from Iran’s cyber units to North Korea’s state media — likewise contribute to the global disinformation barrage, each advancing their strategic interests through false or manipulative messaging.

The authoritarian strategy toward disinformation is thus two-faced: it combines stringent internal information control with aggressive external information manipulation. At home, these governments equate truth with whatever the state declares to be true, silencing independent voices under the banner of stability. Abroad, they exploit the free flow of information in open societies to inject falsehoods that destabilize those societies. This starkly contrasts with democratic approaches. Authoritarian rulers do not hesitate to sacrifice freedom of expression to maintain control, and in doing so, they often entirely erode the public’s access to factual information. The result may be a more tightly managed public opinion domestically, but it comes at the cost of credibility and innovation, as citizens are denied open debate and honest inquiry.

Furthermore, the flood of propaganda from authoritarian sources onto global networks forces democracies to play defense on yet another front. In the end, while autocracies claim to be safeguarding their societies from chaos and lies, their model underscores an unwavering commitment to control, extending from their own population’s newsfeeds to the social media feeds of citizens in faraway countries.

International initiatives

Because disinformation transcends national borders, democracies have also turned to international partnerships and institutions to bolster their response. The European Union has been at the forefront of multilateral action against disinformation. In the wake of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its ongoing propaganda offensives, the EU established a dedicated team known as the East StratCom Task Force to identify and expose pro-Kremlin disinformation in Europe. This was part of a broader EU action plan to counter disinformation, which has since evolved to include cooperation with online platforms and support for independent media and fact-checkers across member states.

The EU’s initiatives have culminated in stronger regulatory measures as well. The Digital Services Act, for instance, not only pressures big tech companies to be more transparent and responsible in policing online falsehoods but also encourages EU countries to share information and best practices in tackling malign digital campaigns. Brussels has provided a framework for member states to act in unison, acknowledging that no single country can weather the disinformation storm alone. NATO, the transatlantic security alliance, has likewise made countering disinformation a key part of its strategy. NATO views hostile information operations as a threat to the alliance’s cohesion and to the security of its member nations. To address this, NATO centers its efforts on strategic communications — proactively conveying NATO’s policies and values to the public — and on rapidly rebutting false claims that aim to discredit the Alliance.

NATO and its specialized bodies (such as the StratCom Centre of Excellence in Latvia) monitor propaganda narratives directed at the Alliance, whether from terrorist groups or from state actors like Russia. Rather than engaging in tit-for-tat information warfare, NATO emphasizes shaping the information environment through truth-telling and the exposure of falsehoods. For example, during periods of tension when adversaries spread rumors about NATO’s activities, the Alliance ensures that accurate information is readily available to the media and the public, preempting the impact of disinformation. By sharing analyses among member states and training officials in how to respond to influence operations, NATO helps coordinate a collective defense on the information front.

The United Nations has also acknowledged the disinformation crisis as a global governance issue. The UN Secretary-General has warned that misinformation and cyber propaganda “poison our public discourse” and has called for international cooperation to address these threats while respecting freedom of expression. The UN system is working on approaches to foster what it calls “global digital trust and security.” This includes support for media development and journalism in fragile states, as well as discussions about a potential international code of conduct to promote integrity in digital communications. Although consensus is hard to reach—given that authoritarian and democratic governments deeply disagree on definitions and norms for information control—the very presence of disinformation on the UN agenda underlines its significance worldwide.

Overall, cross-border cooperation is becoming increasingly central to counter-disinformation efforts. Democracies coordinate through forums like the G7 and other international bodies to share intelligence about foreign influence operations, align policy responses, and press social media companies to be more transparent and proactive across their global user base. Non-governmental organizations and independent research networks form a global community dedicated to exposing disinformation campaigns as they emerge. While the challenge is immense and constantly evolving, the concerted efforts of alliances and institutions signal a recognition that defending the truth in the digital age is a shared responsibility.

Conclusion

The battle against disinformation is a long-term contest in which democratic societies must defend themselves without abandoning their core principles. On one end of the spectrum, open democracies are refining methods to inoculate their citizens and institutions against fake news through education, transparency, and targeted interventions—all while striving to uphold free expression and open debate. On the other end, authoritarian regimes clamp down on information at home and unleash falsehoods abroad, choosing control at all costs and counting on the openness of their adversaries as a vulnerability to exploit.

Ultimately, the most effective democratic responses seem to be those that reinforce societal resilience and trust rather than impose broad censorship. By educating the public, strengthening independent media, and demanding accountability from online platforms, democracies can blunt the impact of disinformation without emulating authoritarian tactics. International coordination amplifies these efforts, as countries learn from each other’s experiences and present a united front against those who wield disinformation as a weapon.

Striking the right balance between protecting society and preserving liberty will remain a central challenge. Yet it is precisely this balance that democratic nations must seek. In confronting the menace of disinformation, they cannot afford to sacrifice the freedoms that give their societies vitality. Instead, democracies will need to keep adapting—harnessing technology, engaging citizens, and crafting smart policies—to safeguard the truth and the open discourse that sustains it. In this struggle between control and freedom, the surest path to victory for democracies lies in fortifying their values, not forsaking them.