The 1990s were a time of foundational changes for international relations and for those analyzing them. Many believed that the end of the Cold War marked a revolutionary shift from traditional balance of power politics towards a new era where realpolitik would not have its place. As President Clinton once put it, in this new era, “the cynical calculus of power politics does not compute.”

In that context, Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ took the world by storm. As Nye kept expanding on it and other scholars picked it up, soft power rose dramatically to the forefront of the study of international relations during the 2000s and 2010s. Yet, despite three decades of existence, it has little to show for it.

The idea appears powerful on paper. Military and economic power, although important, were insufficient, and increasingly so, to attain foreign policy objectives. In a new era (seemingly) allergic to war, hard power was increasingly impotent. In the nascent global village, success will elude those who fail to persuade, convince, and seduce. The more attractive and reliable a country appears, the higher its international elevation. There is no need to fight since any potential rival’s heart is already yours.

As popular a concept as it is, however, it does a poor job of explaining actual international politics.

The United States is the world’s soft power leviathan. All things American, from blue jeans to Coca-Cola, Hollywood movies, and Taylor Swift, are immensely popular worldwide. American universities maintain a unique attractiveness to the young brains of the globe. Probably no other power in human history has had such an influence over the cultural practices and minds of the entire world.

And what did this unmatched influence bring to American foreign policy? The citizens of competitors like China and Russia have consumed fabulous amounts of American cultural content and products since the end of the Cold War. Many of their elites received their training in the best American universities and speak fluent English. But this had little influence on these states’ foreign policy choices. They still oppose many U.S. policies and sometimes directly threaten American interests. Moreover, its enormous soft power did little to win America’s wars in the Middle East or to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.

The other way around, Russia is a country with seemingly limited soft power. It has little cultural influence beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union and provides a model that few wish to emulate. Yet, throughout the last two decades, it has often succeeded in shaping favorable foreign policy outcomes. Despite having little soft power, it uses its tools of statecraft, and often naked all-out military force, to its advantage. One does not need soft power to score points, and attraction did not replace coercion in international politics.

Arguably, China, too, musters a massive soft power potential. It can leverage its ancient civilization, economic prowess, and large diasporas to seduce its neighbors and the wider world. Yet, soft power and actual foreign policy outcomes appear disconnected. Most of China’s neighbors fear Beijing’s rising power and are arming themselves and forming coalitions to counterbalance it. On the global stage, it is also far from evident that China is eliciting sympathy on a scale that compares with its soft power resources.

One could multiply such examples. Japan is a cultural powerhouse. Yet, who cares about Japan’s views on the Iranian crisis? South Korea has become a global center of the entertainment industry, but this newfound status hardly made North Korea budge. Everybody likes Switzerland or Sweden, but nobody listens to them.

Why does soft power generally not work? Now that the optimistic zeitgeist of the post-Cold War era has come and passed, the concept of soft power seems to be on its last leg. It is obvious that in today’s world, brute force, primarily military power, is still what makes the world go round. If Russia wants to subjugate Ukraine, or if China wishes to conquer Taiwan, no amount of soft power will suffice to make their citizens give up their sovereignty. Only force, or the threat thereof, can do that.

Not that soft power never matters. It can help in the commercial realm. There is no doubt that a link exists between the K-wave and Korean beauty product exports or between ‘Frenchness’ and the success of France’s luxury brands. Soft power can also help you attract foreign workers, tourists, and investments, hence representing an economic bonanza. It's better to have too much soft power than not enough.

Still, soft power has never replaced, and has never even come close to replacing, the enduring realities of power politics. Military power and the economic strength underpinning it still reign supreme. Like the ‘luxury navy’ of Wilhelmine Germany, it is a symbol of cultural status but has little tangible usefulness in the do-or-die jungle of international politics.